MEMORANDUM DECISION
Feb 24 2015, 6:56 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Suzy St. John Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Karl M. Scharnberg
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Pamela Richardson, February 24, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
49A04-1406-CR-244
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
Cause No. 49F10-1403-CM-11969
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff. The Honorable Linda Brown, Judge
The Honorable Marshelle
Broadwell, Master Commissioner
Barnes, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Pamela Richardson appeals her conviction for Class B misdemeanor disorderly
conduct. We affirm.
Issue
[2] The issue before us is whether there is sufficient evidence to support
Richardson’s conviction and rebut her claim of self-defense.
Facts
[3] The evidence most favorable to the conviction is that, on Saturday, March 8,
2014, Richardson went to Indy Trade Association, a small bar in Indianapolis.
Richardson was seated at the counter, which was next to the dance floor.
Yvette Markey and her husband, neither of whom knew Richardson, were
dancing close to Richardson. Richardson became agitated at the couple’s
“bouncing around” and “jumping” next to her, and a physical altercation
ensued between Richardson and Markey. Tr. p. 28. Markey alleged that
Richardson “swung and hit” her, while Ieshir Walker, a disk jockey working at
the bar, testified that Markey instigated the fight. Id. at 8, 29.
[4] After seeing the altercation, Walker, an acquaintance of Richardson’s, broke up
the fight between Richardson and Markey, and escorted Richardson outside.
Markey called the police to report the altercation and provided a description of
Richardson. Officer Jonathan Schultz of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
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Department was dispatched and arrived at the bar around 1:00 a.m. By this
time, Richardson was back inside the bar.
[5] Upon entering the bar, Officer Schultz identified Richardson from the
description provided, and while moving through the crowd, he “noticed that
[Richardson] started to punch an unidentified male”—purportedly a cousin of
Markey’s. Id. at 17. Identifying himself as a police officer, Officer Schultz,
who was in uniform, approached Richardson and ordered her to stop.
Richardson did not immediately desist and “punched the male a few more
times” in Officer Schultz’s presence. Id. at 17-18.
[6] Richardson was arrested and charged with battery, a Class A misdemeanor,
and disorderly conduct, a Class B misdemeanor. Richardson asserted claims of
self-defense for both charges. After a bench trial, Richardson was found not
guilty of battery but was convicted of disorderly conduct. In so finding, the trial
court emphasized that Richardson “continued to punch the unidentified male”
even after Officer Schultz ordered her to stop. Id. at 42. Richardson now
appeals.
Analysis
[7] “The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a
claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the
evidence claim.” Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000). When
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the
evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses. Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d
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133, 135 (Ind. 2012). We view all evidence—even if conflicting—and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the
conviction. Id. We affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value
supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[8] To convict Richardson of disorderly conduct, the State was required to prove
that she recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally engaged in “fighting or
tumultuous conduct.” See Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(1). Richardson does not
deny that she fought with the unidentified male but argues that her actions were
justifiable as a measure of self-defense. “A person is justified in using
reasonable force against another person to protect the person . . . from what the
person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” I.C. § 35-
41-3-2(a). To prevail on a self-defense claim, the defendant must show that she
(1) was in a place where she had a right to be; (2) acted without fault; and (3)
was in reasonable fear or apprehension of bodily harm. Henson v. State, 786
N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ind. 2003). The State need only disprove one of these
elements beyond a reasonable doubt for the self-defense claim to fail. Wilson v.
State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. 2002). If a defendant is convicted despite a
claim of self-defense, we will reverse only if no reasonable person could find
that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
800-01.
[9] There is substantial evidence that Richardson acted with fault by willingly
participating in the fight from which the disorderly conduct conviction derives.
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See Rodriguez v. State, 714 N.E.2d 667, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.
Even if Richardson may have been justified in initially defending herself against
the unidentified male, her continued violence after Officer Schultz ordered her
to stop indicates willful participation, which negates the self-defense claim.
[10] Richardson contends that her actions were based on a good-faith belief that
continued physical force was necessary to repel the unidentified man. For a
self-defense claim to prevail, the “amount of force which is reasonably
necessary to defend oneself is determined from the standpoint of the accused in
light of the surrounding circumstances,” and the force must be commensurate to
that required in the situation. Geralds v. State, 647 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1995) (emphasis added), trans. denied. By continuing to engage in fighting
after the announced presence of a uniformed police officer, Richardson’s force
was excessive and unwarranted given the circumstances. In light of Officer
Schultz’s presence, Richardson employed more physical force than was
reasonably necessary, extinguishing her right to a self-defense claim. Harmon v.
State, 849 N.E.2d 726, 731 (Ind. 2006). A reasonable person in similar
circumstances would not deem such continued force necessary to prevent harm
while in the presence of an officer. See Washington v. State, 997 N.E.2d 342, 349
(Ind. 2013) (“[F]acts and circumstances must be balanced against what a
reasonable person would believe under the same or similar circumstances.”).
[11] The law of self-defense is predicated on necessity. A claim of self-defense is
valid only when the necessity begins and ends when the necessity dissolves.
Whipple v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1363, 1366 (Ind. 1988). Officer Schultz’s presence
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significantly abated if not terminated any necessity of self-defense, rendering
Richardson’s self-defense claim unavailing.
Conclusion
[12] There is sufficient evidence to support Richardson’s conviction. We affirm.
[13] Affirmed.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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