FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 24 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-10116
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 1:04-cr-05212-LJO
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DOMINIC FREDDIE BELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 17, 2015**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
Dominic Freddie Bell appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 36-month sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Bell contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to consider
the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors, instead basing the sentence exclusively
on a promise made to him by the court at an earlier sentencing hearing. He also
argues that the district court erred by failing to explain the extent of its upward
variance from the Guidelines range except by reference to that promise. Because
Bell preserved these challenges, we review de novo. See United States v. Grissom,
525 F.3d 691, 695-96 (9th Cir. 2008). Contrary to Bell’s argument, the record
reflects that the district court considered the parties’ sentencing submissions and
the statutory sentencing factors in imposing sentence. The court imposed sentence
on the basis of Bell’s breach of the court’s trust, a permissible sentencing factor,
and its explanation of the sentence was legally sufficient. See United States v.
Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“The district court need not
tick off each of the § 3553(a) factors to show that it has considered them.”); United
States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006) (at a revocation sentencing,
the court may sanction the violator for his breach of trust).
Bell next contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Bell’s sentence. See Carty,
520 F.3d at 993. The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the section
2 14-10116
3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of circumstances. See Carty, 520 F.3d
at 993.
Bell’s request for judicial notice is denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 14-10116