IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MARVIN FLETCHER, §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 711, 2014
Appellant, §
§
v. § Court Below—Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware,
STATE OF DELAWARE, § in and for Kent County
Plaintiff Below, § Cr. ID No. 0307022941A
Appellee. §
§
Submitted: January 9, 2015
Decided: February 24, 2015
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and VALIHURA, Justices.
ORDER
This 24th day of February 2015, upon consideration of the appellant’s
opening brief, the State’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to the
Court that:
(1) The appellant, Marvin Fletcher, filed this appeal from the Superior
Court’s denial of his motion for correction of illegal sentence under Superior Court
Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”). The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm
the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Fletcher’s
opening brief that his appeal is without merit.1 We agree and affirm.
1
Supr. Ct. R. 25(a).
(2) The record reflects that, in March 2004, a Superior Court jury found
Fletcher guilty of Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession of Cocaine with Intent to
Deliver, Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances, three counts of
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”),
Tampering with Physical Evidence, Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon,
Conspiracy in the Second Degree, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Fletcher
was sentenced to twenty-nine and a half years of Level V incarceration, suspended
after fourteen years for decreasing levels of supervision. This Court affirmed the
Superior Court’s judgment on direct appeal.2 Fletcher subsequently filed two
unsuccessful motions for postconviction relief.3
(3) On December 15, 2014, Fletcher filed a Motion for Correction of
Sentence under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a). Fletcher claimed the three
counts of PFDCF should have merged into one count because there was only one
occurrence of a firearm. He also claimed that even if each PFDCF conviction
related to a felony drug conviction, he was only convicted of two drug felonies,
leaving an additional PFDCF conviction. The Superior Court denied the motion as
2
Fletcher v. State, 2005 WL 646841 (Del. Mar. 16, 2005).
3
Fletcher v. State, 2009 WL 4604642 (Del. Dec. 7, 2009) (affirming denial of second motion for
postconviction relief); State v. Fletcher, Cr. ID No. 0307022941A (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008)
(order denying first motion for postconviction relief).
2
untimely and repetitive under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b). This appeal
followed.
(4) In his opening brief on appeal, Fletcher claims that: (i) the Superior
Court erred in treating his motion as a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule
35(b), rather than a motion for correction of illegal sentence under Rule 35(a); and
(ii) the Superior Court erred in denying his motion because there was only one
occurrence of a firearm and there were only two felony drug convictions
underlying the three PFDCF convictions. We review the Superior Court’s denial
of a motion for correction of sentence under Rule 35(a) for abuse of discretion,
although questions of law are reviewed de novo.4 Under Rule 35(a), a sentence is
illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous with
respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally
contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the
substance of the sentence, or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not
authorize.5
(5) As to Fletcher’s first claim, it appears that the Superior Court
mistakenly treated Fletcher’s motion as a motion for modification of sentence
under Rule 35(b), rather than a motion for correction of illegal sentence under Rule
4
Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014).
5
Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998).
3
35(a). We nonetheless affirm the Superior Court’s denial of the motion on the
independent and alternative ground that it lacked merit under Rule 35(a).6
(6) First, to the extent Fletcher attacks the legality of his PFDCF
convictions, the limited purpose of Rule 35(a) is to permit correction of an illegal
sentence.7 Rule 35(a) is not a means for a defendant to attack the legality of his
convictions.8 Second, to the extent Fletcher attacks the legality of his PFDCF
sentences, separate and distinct felonies can each support a separate PFDCF or
Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony
(“PDWDCF”) conviction and sentence, even if there is only one weapon.9
Fletcher’s three PFDCF convictions were based on three different drug felonies --
Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Deliver, and
Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances (not two drug felonies as
Fletcher claims) -- and Fletcher’s three PFDCF sentences were therefore legal. We
6
Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995) (noting that Delaware
Supreme Court may affirm judgment on basis of different rationale than rationale articulated by
trial court).
7
Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d at 578.
8
Id.
9
See, e.g., Nance v. State, 903 A.2d 283, 288 (Del. 2006) (holding four PDWDCF sentences
based on two drug felonies and two guns did not violate Double Jeopardy Clause); Williamson v.
State, 707 A.2d 350, 363 (Del. 1998) (rejecting argument that two PDWDCF convictions
exposed defendant to double punishment and should merge because only one knife was used
during two felonies); Robertson v. State, 630 A.2d 1084, 1092-93 (Del. 1993) (holding
defendants could properly be convicted of more than two PDWDCF counts, even though only
two guns were used, because multiple felonies were committed with those two guns).
4
conclude that Fletcher’s attacks on his sentence are without merit and the Superior
Court did not err in denying his motion for correction of sentence.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that motion to affirm is GRANTED
and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen L. Valihura
Justice
5