FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 25 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GEVORG SUKIASYAN, No. 13-72112
Petitioner, Agency No. A099-903-951
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 17, 2015**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
Gevorg Sukiasyan, a native and citizen of Armenia, petitions for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for
substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards
governing adverse credibility determinations created by the REAL ID Act,
Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010), and we review de
novo questions of law, Rivera v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1271, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 2007).
We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination
based on Sukiasyan’s convictions for crimes involving fraud, Sukiasyan’s
implausible testimony that he did not recall details pertaining to a false
identification card he used, and the inconsistency between Sukiasyan’s testimony
and the record evidence regarding whether he had obtained or used a forged
driver’s license on another occasion. See id. at 1048 (adverse credibility
determination reasonable under the totality of circumstances); see also Unuakhaulu
v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 931, 938 (9th Cir. 2005) (criminal conviction involving
fraud undermined credibility); Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2007)
(implausibility finding was supported by substantial evidence). We reject
Sukiasyan’s contention that the BIA erred and/or violated due process by
considering the documents submitted by the government. See Gu v. Gonzales, 454
F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2006) (hearsay may be admitted in immigration
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proceedings “if it is probative and its admission is fundamentally fair”); see also
Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring error and prejudice to
prevail on a due process claim). We also reject Sukiasyan’s contentions that the
BIA erred in concluding his corroborative evidence was insufficient to sustain his
burden of proof. See Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 2011); Aden v.
Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Even if we might conclude to the
contrary regarding sufficiency of corroboration, we cannot say that any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”) (internal quotation
and citation omitted). Thus, Sukiasyan’s asylum and withholding of removal
claims fail.
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s conclusion that Sukiasyan
failed to establish it is more likely than not that he will be tortured if returned to
Armenia. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2003); see also
Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining an adverse
credibility finding in the asylum context does not end the CAT inquiry).
Finally, we lack jurisdiction to consider Sukiasyan’s contentions that the IJ
violated his statutory and due process rights, because Sukiasyan did not raise these
issues to the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
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