NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 26 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES GREGORY REECE, No. 13-16333
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No.
2:09-cv-01350-TLN-CMK
v.
TERRY DICKENSON, et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 17, 2015**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Charles Gregory Reece appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging access-to-courts
and due process violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo, Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009), and we
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Reece’s due process claim as barred by
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because Reece challenged disciplinary
proceedings and the resulting loss of good time credits. See Wilkinson v. Dotson,
544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (inmate’s § 1983 action is barred if “success in that
action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its
duration”); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645-48 (1997) (challenge to loss of
good-time credits not cognizable under § 1983).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Reece’s
access-to-courts claim against Dickenson because Reece failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether he suffered an actual injury as a result of
Dickenson’s alleged misconduct in processing his prison appeal. See Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-53 (1996) (setting forth actual injury requirement); see
also Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th
Cir. 2011) (“To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must set forth
non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not sweeping conclusory allegations.”).
AFFIRMED.
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