UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CONNOR BECKWITH, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 14-00214 (RC)
:
v. : Re Document No.: 27
:
INTERSTATE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, :
LLC, :
:
Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Connor Beckwith (“Beckwith”) was assaulted in a hotel where he was a guest. In this
diversity action, he alleges that the hotel management company was negligent in maintaining
security measures and in responding to the assault. The defendant has moved for summary
judgment. To prevail at trial, Beckwith would need to prove, among other things, that the
criminal assault was “so foreseeable that it became [the defendant’s] duty to guard against it by
adhering to a recognized standard of care.” Clement v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., 634 A.2d 425,
427 (D.C. 1993). Because Beckwith has not proffered sufficient evidence of either the assault’s
foreseeability or the standard of care, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In June 2009, Beckwith and his family were guests of the Hamilton Crowne Plaza Hotel
in Washington, D.C. See Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 1; Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 3, ECF No.
27-1. The hotel was managed by Interstate Management Company, LLC (“Interstate”). Kia
Decl. ¶ 2, Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 27-2.
On June 28, 2009, Beckwith went to the lower level of the hotel lobby to use the
restroom. Upon reaching the lower level, he encountered Anthony Lopez (“Lopez”), who
approached and began a conversation with Beckwith, walking alongside him toward the men’s
restroom. See Connor Beckwith Dep. at 10:12–15, 11:4–16, 12:11–13, 13:9–20, Def.’s Ex. B,
ECF No. 27-3. Just outside the restroom door, Lopez touched Beckwith on the crotch. Id. at
13:21–14:3. Beckwith said nothing, entered the restroom, and went into a stall. Id. at 14:12–22,
15:15–17. Lopez followed him into the stall and again touched him on the crotch. Id. at 15:10–
16:11. Beckwith then told Lopez to leave, and Lopez complied. Id. at 16:11–13. After using
the restroom and returning upstairs, Beckwith reported the incident to his parents, and his father
immediately alerted the hotel’s front desk. See id. at 16:14–15; Brian Beckwith Dep. at 16:5–9,
17:21–18:2, Def.’s Ex. C, ECF No. 27-4. The hotel’s security director, having reviewed security
camera footage, found Lopez dining in the hotel’s restaurant. See Kia Decl. ¶¶ 13–15, Def.’s Ex.
A. After Beckwith identified Lopez to the police, Lopez was arrested. See Connor Beckwith
Dep. at 20:1–4, 23:8–12, Def.’s Ex. B.
At the time of the assault, the hotel had numerous security cameras in place, including
one in the lower level of the lobby. Kia Decl. ¶ 8, Def.’s Ex. A. The camera in the lower level
captured the hallway near the men’s restroom, but the restroom door was slightly off camera. Id.
¶ 9. On the day of the assault, the hotel’s security director was the only member of the security
staff on duty. Id. ¶¶ 10–11; Street Dep. at 64:14–19, Def.’s Ex. D, ECF No. 27-5. From 2007 to
2009, there were 542 violent crimes and 4,171 property crimes within a half-mile radius of the
hotel. Street Decl. ¶ 5, Pl.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 28-1.
Beckwith subsequently filed a one-count complaint in this Court, alleging that Interstate’s
negligence in maintaining security at the hotel and in responding to the assault caused him
physical and emotional injuries. See generally Compl. 1 Interstate moved for summary
judgment on the basis that Beckwith’s evidence is insufficient to establish the duty, breach of a
standard of care, or proximate causation required to sustain a negligence claim. See generally
Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 27.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A court may grant summary judgment when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party moving for summary judgment bears the “initial responsibility” of
demonstrating “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In response, the non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and
“designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
IV. ANALYSIS
The parties do not dispute that the tort law of the District of Columbia governs this
diversity action. Under D.C. law, where the plaintiff alleges that the defendant negligently failed
to prevent a third party’s injurious criminal act, he must prove that the criminal act was “so
foreseeable that it became [the defendant’s] duty to guard against it by adhering to a recognized
standard of care, that [the defendant] breached that standard of care, and that the failure to
1
Although the original complaint named several entities as defendants, the Court
subsequently granted a consent motion to substitute Interstate for the original defendants. See
Consent Order, ECF No. 6 (Mar. 28, 2014).
exercise due care proximately caused” the injury. Clement, 634 A.2d at 427; see also Bd. of Trs.
of Univ. of Dist. of Columbia v. DiSalvo, 974 A.2d 868, 870 (D.C. 2009) (framing elements more
generally as “duty, breach of that duty, and injury proximately caused by the breach”).
A. Foreseeability
Interstate is entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed facts do not establish
the foreseeability of the assault suffered by Beckwith, as required for showing that Interstate had
a duty to conform to a standard of care. Clement, 634 A.2d at 427.
In the District of Columbia, a “sliding scale” analysis determines the existence of a duty
to protect a plaintiff from intervening third-party criminal acts: The two ends of the scale are (i)
the criminal act’s foreseeability and (ii) the degree to which the defendant owes a “greater duty
of protection” by nature of his relationship to the plaintiff. DiSalvo, 974 A.2d at 872 (citing
Workman v. United Methodist Committee on Relief of Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries of the
United Methodist Church, 320 F.3d 259, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). In the absence of a protective
relationship, the plaintiff must make a “heightened showing” of the criminal act’s foreseeability
to establish a duty. Id. Conversely, a relationship “entailing a greater duty of protection”
lightens the plaintiff’s burden to show foreseeability. Id. 2
The parties do not dispute the “sliding scale” formulation. See Pl.’s Mem. Resp. 5, ECF
No. 28 (citing DiSalvo’s “sliding scale” test); Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 8–9 (discussing
DiSalvo at length). They part ways, however, over whether a special protective relationship is
lacking in this case. Although the fact that Beckwith was a guest at the hotel is undisputed, see
2
After endorsing the “sliding scale” formulation of the D.C. Circuit, however, the
DiSalvo court explained that “even if the [defendant-plaintiff] relationship here did entail a
greater duty of protection, we find that to hold [defendant] liable . . . would still require a
heightened showing of foreseeability greater than the DiSalvos’ showing here.” DiSalvo, 974
A.2d at 872. This Court need not consider the impact of this dictum: As explained below, even
under an ordinary foreseeability standard, Beckwith cannot prevail.
Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 3, neither the D.C. Court of Appeals nor any federal court in
this Circuit has squarely addressed liability for third-party criminal acts in the context of an
innkeeper-guest relationship. If the innkeeper-guest relationship were one “entailing a greater
duty of protection,” then Beckwith would not need to make a “heightened showing” of the
assault’s foreseeability. DiSalvo, 974 A.2d at 872.
This Court concludes that Interstate did owe Beckwith a “greater duty of protection” by
virtue of their innkeeper-guest relationship, DiSalvo, 974 A.2d at 872, taking guidance from the
D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477
(D.C. Cir. 1970). In that case, Kline was assaulted by an intruder in a common hallway of her
apartment, where a similar attack had occurred two months earlier following a decline in security
conditions over several years. Id. at 478–80. In concluding that Kline’s landlord had a duty to
protect her from foreseeable criminal acts, the court drew parallels between the landlord-tenant
relationship in a modern urban apartment building and the innkeeper-guest relationship at
common law. Id. at 482–85. The court concluded that for both relationships, 3 the “theory of
liability is essentially the same”:
[S]ince the ability of one of the parties to provide for his own
protection has been limited in some way by his submission to the
control of the other, a duty should be imposed upon the one
possessing control (and thus the power to act) to take reasonable
precautions to protect the other one from assaults by third parties
which, at least, could reasonably have been anticipated.
3
While focusing on the innkeeper-guest relationship, the Kline court suggested that its
analysis would apply in other analogous relationships: “employer-employee, school district-
pupil, hospital-patient, and carrier-passenger.” Kline, 439 F.2d at 482–83; see also Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 314A(2) (1965) (“An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests [as the
common carrier’s duty to its passengers].”).
Id. at 483. Applying this reasoning, this Court finds that because a hotel guest’s ability to protect
himself from a criminal assault in the hotel “has been limited in some way by his submission to
the control of” the hotel management company, id., the innkeeper-guest relationship “entail[s] a
greater duty of protection,” DiSalvo, 974 A.2d at 872. In light of this duty to protect, Beckwith
need not make a “heightened showing” of foreseeability under the “sliding scale” test. Id. 4
Although Beckwith’s burden to establish foreseeability is lightened, he still must make
some showing that the assault was foreseeable. DiSalvo, 974 A.2d at 872 (articulating sliding
scale test). As Kline teaches, even the plaintiff-guest must establish the foreseeability of the
injurious criminal act that the defendant-innkeeper allegedly negligently failed to prevent. See
Kline, 439 F.2d at 482 (“[T]he innkeeper is generally bound to exercise reasonable care to
protect the guest from abuse or molestation by third parties . . . if the attack could, or in the
exercise of reasonable care, should have been anticipated.” (emphasis added)). The D.C. Court
of Appeals, likewise, has repeatedly required a showing of foreseeability, notwithstanding a
4
Although not itself a decision of the D.C. Court of Appeals, Kline is especially
persuasive because it binds the D.C. Court of Appeals. See M. A. P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312
(D.C. 1971) (“As a matter of internal policy, we have adopted the rule that no division of this
court will overrule a prior decision of this court or refuse to follow a decision of the United
States Court of Appeals rendered prior to February 1, 1971, and that such result can only be
accomplished by this court en banc.”); accord Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173, 179 n.5 (D.C.
1977) (“[Kline] was rendered in 1970 and hence binding on this court . . . .”).
Additionally, the fact that Beckwith’s injury occurred in and near the lower level lobby
restroom, as opposed to his guest room, does not weaken Interstate’s protective duty. Cf. Banks
v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F.2d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 1984) (explaining, in a case where defendant argued
that a building owner had no duty to prevent a criminal assault occurring on “a public sidewalk
outside the building,” that Kline found liability for assault in a common hallway, and that there
were accordingly no “physical limitations on a landlord’s duty of care to his tenants,” but rather
“an affirmative duty to take precautionary measures in areas within the landlord’s control”).
Even assuming arguendo that Interstate had a weaker duty to protect Beckwith given the location
of this particular assault, the Court’s analysis would be unchanged. Under DiSalvo’s sliding
scale test, a weaker protective duty would require a correspondingly heightened showing of
foreseeability. See DiSalvo, 974 A.2d at 872. Here, the Court holds that even under an ordinary
foreseeability standard, Beckwith’s evidence is insufficient.
stronger protective relationship between plaintiff and defendant. See, e.g., WMATA v. O’Neill,
633 A.2d 834, 840 (D.C. 1993) (“But where a special relationship exists, such as between a
common carrier and its passengers, the carrier undeniably has a duty to protect its passengers
from foreseeable harm arising from criminal conduct of others.” (emphasis added)); Graham v.
M & J Corp., 424 A.2d 103, 105 (D.C. 1980) (“Foreseeability is the key element establishing the
landlord’s duty [to maintain the safety of common areas under his control].” (emphasis added));
Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173, 177 (D.C. 1977) (upholding trial court determination that
landlords had duty to maintain safety of common area, given that they were “on notice of the
likelihood of unauthorized entry into the building by persons with criminal intent” (emphasis
added)). 5
Here, Beckwith has not proffered adequate evidence of the assault’s foreseeability.
Beckwith relies exclusively on these crime statistics: From 2007 to 2009, 542 violent crimes and
4,171 property crimes occurred within a half-mile radius of the hotel. Street Decl. ¶ 5, Pl.’s Ex.
A; Pl.’s Mem. Resp. 6. On the basis of these figures, Beckwith asks the Court to conclude that
“it was foreseeable that an intruder would come on the premises.” Pl.’s Mem. Resp. 6–7. 6 But if
these crime statistics alone were enough to establish the assault’s foreseeability, any assault in
any area with a non-negligible crime rate—presumably many densely populated metropolitan
5
Applying D.C. law in a diversity action involving a guest-on-guest attack in a luxury
hotel, a panel of the Seventh Circuit criticized as “legal mumbo-jumbo” the rule that a
“heightened foreseeability” requirement attaches in cases involving an intervening criminal act,
instead opting for the “practical question” of “whether the defendant knows or should know that
the risk is great enough, in relation to the cost of averting it, to warrant the defendant’s incurring
the cost.” Shadday v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 477 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 2007) (Posner, J.).
By its distinctive approach, the Shadday panel reached the same outcome as this Court,
reasoning that “[u]nder any standard” of foreseeability, id. at 514—heightened or not—the
plaintiff “failed to present enough evidence” that the defendant was negligent, id. at 518.
6
The complaint alleges that these reported crimes include offenses of a sexual nature.
See Compl. ¶ 22(b). Nothing in the record substantiates this allegation.
areas—would likewise be foreseeable. This is not the law. See Kline, 439 F.2d at 483
(distinguishing between “possible” crimes, which are ubiquitous and innumerable, and those
crimes that are “foreseeable” under the law—those that are both “probable and predictable”).
Even assuming that the crime rate cited by Beckwith was extraordinarily high (there is no
evidence to this effect), and that an assault by an intruder was foreseeable, the Court finds no
evidence suggesting that Lopez was actually an intruder. To the contrary, the fact that the
security director found Lopez dining in the hotel’s restaurant following the assault suggests that
he was an invitee of the hotel. See Kia Decl. ¶¶ 13–15, Def.’s Ex. A; cf. Shadday v. Omni
Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 477 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 2007) (“At most, . . . crime conditions in the
[hotel’s] neighborhood are relevant to the risk of a criminal intrusion into the hotel, not to the
risk posed by one hotel guest to another.”).
Beckwith correctly “concedes that there is no specific history or pattern of sexual assaults
in the hotel.” Pl.’s Mem. Resp. 6. Only one other assault occurred in the hotel between 2007
and 2009—a December 2008 incident in which a male guest grabbed and slapped a female
member of the hotel’s housekeeping staff while she was cleaning his room. Incident Report,
Def.’s Ex. E, ECF No. 27-6. All other crimes within the hotel were non-violent room thefts. See
Street Dep. at 55:12–59:21, Def.’s Ex. D. In Obwoya, the D.C. Court of Appeals determined that
a robbery and shooting in an apartment’s common hallway was rendered foreseeable by
“sufficiently related” evidence of one prior assault in the same hallway, burglaries of apartment
units by force from the hallway, and the presence of “unauthorized persons” in the apartment.
Obwoya, 369 A.2d at 177. The landlord had been placed “on notice”; the prior incidents and
vulnerabilities made “the possibility of harm [to the tenant] . . . clear to the ordinary prudent
eye.” Id.; see also Graham, 424 A.2d at 106 (holding that “minor acts of trespass and
vandalism,” “neighborhood . . . high in criminal activity,” frequent past complaints about a faulty
outer door lock, and a previous attempted robbery created a “triable issue of fact as to whether
the danger of a criminal assault by means of arson” was foreseeable). By contrast, Beckwith has
presented no “sufficiently related” evidence that put Interstate on notice of the risk of sexual
assault in the lower level of the lobby. Obwoya, 369 A.2d at 177. 7
The Court certainly does not hold that the attack on Beckwith was necessarily
unforeseeable merely by virtue of its location or the fact that another guest was the perpetrator.
Nor must Beckwith show that Interstate had prior “notice of the particular method” of his assault.
Id. Rather, the Court concludes only that Beckwith had the burden to proffer evidence of the
assault’s foreseeability, and the surrounding area’s crime rate and unrelated past incidents in the
hotel simply do not suffice. Cf. Woods-Leber v. Hyatt Hotels of Puerto Rico, Inc., 124 F.3d 47,
51 (1st Cir. 1997) (“We do not mean to imply that, merely because a rabid mongoose had never
before invaded the premises and bitten a guest, the attack could not have been foreseen. . . . But
here, the plaintiff offered no evidence to support a finding of foreseeability . . . .”).
In the end, Beckwith wants this Court to impute the assault’s foreseeability to Interstate
without determining whether the evidence actually establishes foreseeability under the “sliding
scale” test. See Pl.’s Mem. Resp. 6 (“Interstate should be charged with a heightened level of
foreseeability . . . .”) This the Court cannot do. See Workman, 320 F.3d at 265 (“Sitting in
diversity, . . . our task is to apply the law of the District of Columbia as its own courts would
7
Beckwith’s expert testimony about inadequate security measures primarily bears on the
standard of care, as discussed below. Here, the Court notes that this testimony cannot establish
foreseeability: Even if the hotel’s security measures were inadequate, there is no evidence that
the hotel had notice of any “failed security measures” that were immediately “threatening” the
safety of its guests. Bruno v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc., 973 A.2d 713, 721 (D.C. 2009)
(distinguishing “far more threatening” signs of a “broken gate and broken doors” at a school
where a student was abducted and raped, from mere “speculat[ion] [about] whether security
cameras would have provided the deterrent effect necessary to prevent” a gas station assault).
apply it . . . .”). Because Beckwith’s evidence does not establish the assault’s foreseeability, he
cannot show that Interstate owed him a duty to prevent the assault by adhering to a standard of
care. Clement, 634 A.2d at 427. Thus, his negligence claim cannot survive summary judgment.
B. Standard of Care
In the alternative, even if the assault were foreseeable, summary judgment would be
appropriate because Beckwith’s evidence does not establish the requisite standard of care. See
Clement, 634 A.2d at 429–30 (citing insufficient standard-of-care evidence, rather than lack of
foreseeability, as basis for affirming grant of summary judgment to defendant) (Schwelb, J.,
concurring).
Lack of evidence sufficient to establish a standard of care is “fatal to a negligence claim”
under D.C. law. Briggs v. WMATA, 481 F.3d 839, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Where “the defendant is alleged to have failed to protect the plaintiff from harm, the expert must
‘clearly articulate and reference a standard of care by which the defendant’s actions can be
measured.’” Varner v. District of Columbia, 891 A.2d 260, 269 (D.C. 2006) (citation and
emphasis omitted). Moreover, “[a]n expert may not rely upon a general duty of care to establish
an objective standard requiring specific conduct.” Id. at 273 (faulting plaintiff’s expert, who
cited university’s general duty to protect its students, for failure to “identify any specific standard
of care” requiring university to share certain information with police during a homicide
investigation, which information might have prevented the second homicide underlying
plaintiff’s action). Nor may the plaintiff rely on “[a]n expert’s own conclusory opinion . . .
without any showing that the proffered standard has been promulgated or is generally known . . .
.” Briggs, 481 F.3d at 847 (internal citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, the expert’s opinion “as to what he or she would do under similar circumstances”
cannot suffice to establish a standard of care. Id. at 846 (quoting Clark v. District of Columbia,
708 A.2d 632, 635 (D.C. 1997)).
To establish the applicable standard of care, Beckwith proffers the expert testimony of
Andre Street, a Baltimore hotel’s security director. See Street Decl. ¶ 1, Pl.’s Ex. A. In his
deposition, Street explained that there are no mandatory national standards concerning hotel
security measures. See Street Dep. 41:3–18, Def.’s Ex. D. Nor, according to Street, does any
government entity regulate a hotel’s placement of security cameras or the number or location of
its security guards. Id. at 42:3–5. But turning to his “honest opinion[s]” of the hotel in this case,
Street claimed that “one [security officer on duty] is definitely inadequate” for securing the hotel,
id. at 64:14–19, that a security guard should have patrolled the lower level lobby restroom area
“at least a couple times an hour,” and that someone should have been monitoring the security
cameras constantly, id. at 66:1–6. 8 His declaration also clarified his deposition statements:
Although there are no “statutes,” “ordinances,” “written laws,” or “regulations” bearing on hotel
security measures, there were hospitality industry “best practices” and “many articles by security
experts” that articulate “certain minimum standards that a prudent head of security should
follow.” Street Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4, Pl.’s Ex. A.
None of Street’s statements “clearly articulate and reference a standard of care by which
[Interstate’s] actions can be measured.” Varner, 891 A.2d at 269 (citation and emphasis
omitted). His vague, passing references to “best practices,” “articles by security experts,” and
“certain minimum standards,” shed no light on the substantive content of any standard of care.
Street Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4, Pl.’s Ex. A. Without more, these “generalized references” to industry
8
Similarly, in his declaration, Street claimed that “in [his] opinion,” Interstate should
have deployed “more frequent security patrols and should have had someone monitoring the
close[d] circuit television system at all times.” Street Decl. ¶ 6, Pl.’s Ex. A.
standards cannot suffice. Briggs, 481 F.3d at 846. 9 Moreover, Street concedes that there are no
uniform national standards governing hotel security measures. See Street Dep. 41:3–18, Def.’s
Ex. D. Likewise, he does not point to any “objective standard requiring specific conduct”
pertaining to the placement or monitoring of security cameras or the deployment of security
staff. Varner, 891 A.2d at 273; see also Briggs, 481 F.3d at 847–48 (rejecting, in a wrongful
death suit alleging the negligent failure to adequately illuminate and ensure visibility of area
around a subway station, the adequacy of a general security design concept promoting increased
visibility as standard-of-care evidence, and concluding that the plaintiff’s expert cited “no
national security standard for lighting” or “the appropriate timing for the removal of construction
fencing”). 10
Beckwith relies, however, on Street’s claim that the major hotel chains operating in the
Baltimore and Washington, D.C., areas have fairly uniform procedural policies requiring that the
design of each hotel’s security infrastructure be informed by an assessment of its unique
attributes and vulnerabilities. See Street Dep. at 42:12–43:21, 50:16–21, Def.’s Ex. D; see also
Pl.’s Mem. Resp. 8 (contending that Street testified to the practice of placing security cameras
“after an assessment of the property to determine where vulnerabilities exist”). The complaint
appears to make out a claim that Interstate did not adhere to these procedures, alleging that it
“[f]ailed to provide security in accordance with custom and practice in the industry including the
9
Even if Street had elaborated, “best practices” in particular could not constitute the
standard of care, given that under D.C. law, “[a]spirational” industry standards cannot suffice.
Briggs, 481 F.3d at 848 (quoting Varner, 891 A.2d at 272).
10
Beckwith further contends that the law does not require standards of care to be
“written.” Pl.’s Mem. Resp. 9–10. But the Court does not hold that the standard of care must be
written, given that Street’s testimony does not establish any applicable standard of care—written
or not.
inability to understand and anticipate the level of crime within a several mile radius of the hotel
and the number of registered sex offenders living in the vicinity in June 2009.” Compl. ¶ 22(e).
To the extent that Beckwith invokes this “procedural” standard of care, his claim would
still not survive summary judgment. First, Street’s experience with hotels in the Baltimore and
Washington, D.C., areas cannot be the basis of a “nationally recognized” standard of care.
Briggs, 481 F.3d at 846 (quoting Clark, 708 A.2d at 635). Second, Street’s testimony was
limited to the practices of “major chain[s],” and there is no evidence that those entities alone can
define the national standard of care for the hospitality industry as a whole. Street Dep. at 42: 9–
11, 45:13–46:4, Def.’s Ex. D; cf. Moltner v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. 08 CIV. 9257 (LAP),
2009 WL 3573190, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2009), aff’d, 399 F. App’x 630 (2d Cir. 2010)
(finding insufficient evidence on metropolitan New York coffee or tea shops’ standard of care in
serving hot beverages, where expert was familiar “only with major fast-food chains”). Lastly,
even assuming (without deciding) that Beckwith’s evidence shows that a national standard of
care required Interstate to follow certain procedures when it designed the hotel’s security
measures, the Court finds no evidence supporting Beckwith’s allegations that Interstate failed to
adhere to those procedures, and to survive summary judgment, he must “go beyond the
pleadings.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In the end, Street offers only his own “opinion” that Interstate’s security measures were
inadequate in various ways—that it should have had more on-duty security officers, more
patrols, and more monitoring of cameras. See Street Dep. at 64:14–19, 66:1–6, Def.’s Ex. D;
Street Decl. ¶ 6, Pl.’s Ex. A. But standing alone, “[a]n expert’s own conclusory opinion,”
Briggs, 481 F.3d at 847 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), “as to what he or she
would do under similar circumstances,” id. at 846 (citation omitted), cannot save Beckwith from
summary judgment. Because inadequate standard-of-care evidence is “fatal” to Beckwith’s
negligence claim, the Court would grant summary judgment to Interstate even under the
arguendo assumption that the assault was foreseeable. Briggs, 481 F.3d at 841 (citation
omitted). 11
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Interstate’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 27) is
GRANTED. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and
contemporaneously issued.
Dated: March 4, 2015 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge
11
Because the Court finds deficient Beckwith’s evidence of foreseeability and standard
of care, it need not decide whether his evidence can establish proximate causation. See Clement,
634 A.2d at 427. The Court observes, however, that proximate causation also hinges on
foreseeability. See Workman, 320 F.3d at 265. Besides foreseeability, proximate causation also
requires causation-in-fact, see Smith v. District of Columbia, 413 F.3d 86, 102–103 (D.C. Cir.
2005), and here, there is no evidence, beyond Street’s speculation, that the assault would have
been averted but for Interstate’s alleged negligence, cf. Shadday, 477 F.3d at 516 (“Had there
been a security camera [inside the elevator], the rape would have been completed long before a
guard, alerted by what the camera showed, would have arrived on the scene . . . .”); Street Dep.
at 72:5–8, Def.’s Ex. D (“I feel strongly had the patrol been there and been adequate enough, it
would have strongly probably would have [sic] persuaded Mr. Lopez from committing the act
that he did.”).