STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A13-0915
Court of Appeals Dietzen, J.
Concurring, Lillehaug, J.
Dennis E. Kinworthy,
Appellant,
vs. Filed: March 4, 2015
Office of Appellate Courts
Soo Line Railroad Company,
d/b/a CP Rail System,
Respondent.
________________________
Randal W. LeNeave, Richard L. Carlson, Hunegs, LeNeave, & Kvas, P.A., Wayzata,
Minnesota, for appellant.
Megan K. Ricke, Jeffrey A. Abrahamson, Ricke & Sweeney, P.A., Saint Paul, Minnesota,
for respondent.
________________________
SYLLABUS
1. The recoverability of prejudgment interest in an action brought in state
court under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2012), is
governed by federal substantive law.
2. Pursuant to existing federal law, a successful plaintiff in a FELA action
brought in state court is not entitled to post-verdict, prejudgment interest under Minn.
Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(a) (2014).
Affirmed.
1
OPINION
DIETZEN, Justice.
The issue in this case is whether a successful plaintiff in a state court action
brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2012),
is entitled to interest under Minnesota law from the date of the jury verdict until the date
of the entry of judgment. Appellant Dennis Kinworthy brought a FELA lawsuit against
respondent Soo Line Railroad Company, and the jury awarded him damages for his
injuries. The district court denied Kinworthy’s post-trial motion under Minn. Stat.
§ 549.09, subd. 1(a) (2014) for interest from the date of the verdict to the date of
judgment, on the ground that prejudgment interest is not available in a FELA action. The
court of appeals affirmed. Because post-verdict, prejudgment interest is not available in a
FELA action as a matter of federal substantive law, we affirm.
Dennis Kinworthy was injured on January 24, 2009, during the course of his
employment as a conductor with respondent Soo Line. Kinworthy brought an action
against Soo Line in Minnesota state court seeking the recovery of damages under FELA
and the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 20701-20703 (2012).1 After
trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Kinworthy for $340,000, finding that the
railroad had violated LIA.
1
The Supreme Court has interpreted the LIA to be an amendment to FELA, such
that proof of a violation of LIA is effective to show negligence as a matter of law under
FELA. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 189 (1949).
2
Kinworthy subsequently filed a motion to amend the judgment, requesting
$7,854.30 in interest on the judgment, calculated from the date of the verdict until the
date the judgment was entered, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(a). Soo Line
opposed Kinworthy’s motion, and the district court denied the motion on the ground that
prejudgment interest is not available in FELA cases under binding precedent from the
United States Supreme Court. See Monessen Sw. Ry. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330 (1988).
The court of appeals affirmed the denial of prejudgment interest, concluding that
Monessen, 486 U.S. 330, is controlling and that federal substantive law does not permit
prejudgment interest in FELA actions. Kinworthy v. Soo Line R.R., 841 N.W.2d 363,
367-68 (Minn. App. 2013).
I.
Kinworthy argues that his FELA case, which was commenced in Minnesota state
court, is subject to state procedural rules; that post-verdict interest under Minn. Stat.
§ 549.09, subd. 1(a), is a procedural rule; and therefore, that he is entitled to post-verdict
interest under the statute. Thus, Kinworthy argues that federal precedent on prejudgment
interest does not apply. Soo Line counters that Kinworthy is not entitled to post-verdict,
prejudgment interest in his state court FELA action because under Monessen, 486 U.S. at
338, prejudgment interest is not available in FELA actions.
There are no factual disputes in this appeal; rather, the application of Minn. Stat.
§ 549.09, subd. 1(a), in a state court FELA action is a question of law, which we review
de novo. See Monessen, 486 U.S. at 335.
3
Under Minnesota law, a successful plaintiff in a state court action generally may
recover pre-verdict interest. Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b). Once a verdict is rendered,
“[t]he court administrator shall stay entry of judgment for thirty days . . . unless the court
orders otherwise.” Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 125. During this delay between the verdict and
the entry of judgment, a successful plaintiff generally may recover “interest from the time
of the verdict, award, or report until judgment is finally entered,” or post-verdict interest.
Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(a). Thus, a successful plaintiff in a state court action is
generally entitled to recover not only pre-verdict interest, but also post-verdict interest
until the date judgment is entered. Id., subd. 1(a)-(b).
To determine whether a successful plaintiff is entitled to recover post-verdict,
prejudgment interest in a state court FELA action, we first discuss the nature of a cause
of action under FELA, and then examine relevant case law regarding the availability of
post-verdict, prejudgment interest.
A.
Under FELA, a railroad “shall be liable in damages to any [employee] suffering
injury . . . from the negligence” of the railroad or its employees. 45 U.S.C. § 51.
Congress enacted FELA in 1908 to “provide a federal remedy for railroad workers who
suffer personal injuries as a result of the negligence of their employer or their fellow
employees.” Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 561 & n.5 (1987).
FELA was enacted to achieve national uniformity in personal injury actions brought by
railroad employees against their railroad employers. Dice v. Akron, Canton &
Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952); N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147,
4
149 (1917). An injured railroad employee may bring a FELA claim in either state or
federal court. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (“The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under
this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States.”).
When a plaintiff chooses to bring a FELA claim in state court, as is the case here,
federal law governs all substantive matters, but procedural matters are subject to state
procedural rules. St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Dickerson, 470 U.S. 409, 411 (1985); Brown v. W.
Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949). A state’s classification of its own law as
procedural is not dispositive; instead, we must look to federal law to determine what is
procedural and what is substantive. See Monessen, 486 U.S. at 336; Dice, 342 U.S. at
363; Brown, 338 U.S. at 298-99. Thus, a state court faced with the question of whether a
particular issue in the case is governed by federal or state law must determine whether the
issue is a “procedural” matter in which the state applies its own law, or a “substantive”
matter in which the state court applies federal law.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has also considered principles of
uniformity and the supremacy of federal law in determining whether state law applies to
FELA causes of action. Based upon these considerations, some state rules that have
traditionally been regarded as procedural, such as presumptions, jury trials, pleadings,
statutes of limitations, and damages, have been deemed substantive in FELA cases in
order to ensure uniform enforcement of the Act. See, e.g., Dickerson, 470 U.S. at 411
(jury instructions regarding the proper measure of damages are substantive); Chesapeake
5
& Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 489-90 (1916) (proper measure of damages is
substantive).2
More recently, the Supreme Court applied principles of uniformity and supremacy
of federal law in a case that squarely addressed whether prejudgment interest is available
in a state court FELA action. Monessen Sw. Ry. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330 (1988). In
Monessen, the Court considered whether, pursuant to local practice, a state court may
award pre-verdict, prejudgment interest in a FELA action brought in state court. 486
U.S. at 334. There, a railroad employee brought a FELA action against his employer in
Pennsylvania state court and was awarded $125,000 in damages and approximately
$27,000 in prejudgment interest under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. 486
U.S. at 332. The Court reversed and remanded the award of prejudgment interest,
holding that state courts may not award “prejudgment interest” pursuant to a state rule of
civil procedure in FELA actions. 486 U.S. at 338-39. The Court concluded that
prejudgment interest constitutes a substantial part of a defendant’s potential liability
under FELA, and therefore should be determined by federal substantive law, not state
procedural rules. 486 U.S. at 336. Based upon its analysis, the Court concluded that
federal law does not authorize the award of prejudgment interest in a FELA action. 486
U.S. at 336-38. Specifically, the Court reasoned that when Congress enacted FELA in
2
See also Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1980) (jury
instructions are substantive); Dice, 342 U.S. at 363 (jury trial is substantive); Brown, 338
U.S. at 295-96 (pleadings standard is substantive); New Orleans & Ne. R.R. v. Harris,
247 U.S. 367, 372 (1918) (presumption in favor of plaintiffs is substantive); Atl. Coast
Line R.R. v. Burnette, 239 U.S. 199, 201 (1915) (statute of limitations is substantive);
Cent. Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 512 (1915) (burden of proof is substantive).
6
1908, the federal common law did not allow prejudgment interest in personal injury or
wrongful death suits, and there is no evidence that Congress intended to abrogate the
common law sub silentio. Id. at 337-38. Moreover, when Monessen was decided, federal
and state courts had concluded with virtual unanimity over more than seven decades that
prejudgment interest is not available under FELA. 486 U.S. at 338. Further, neither
FELA nor the federal interest statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012), mention prejudgment
interest. 486 U.S. at 336. Consequently, prejudgment interest is not available in a FELA
action.
B.
With these principles in mind, we return to the question of whether Kinworthy is
entitled to recover post-verdict, prejudgment interest. Essentially, Kinworthy makes
three arguments. First, Kinworthy relies upon Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861 (Minn.
1988), to argue that he is entitled to interest from the time of the verdict until the entry of
judgment under state law. See Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1. According to Kinworthy,
pre-verdict and post-verdict interest serve “different purposes” and therefore should
receive different treatment. It is true that in Lienhard we described post-verdict interest
and post-judgment interest as “compensation for the loss of use of money as a result of
the nonpayment of a liquidated sum, for which liability has already been determined.”
431 N.W.2d at 865. But the classification of post-verdict, prejudgment interest as
substantive or procedural in a FELA action must be resolved by federal law, not state
law. See Monessen, 486 U.S. at 336; Dice, 342 U.S. at 363; Brown, 338 U.S. at 298-99.
7
Consequently, our classification of post-verdict, prejudgment interest as procedural in
Lienhard is not relevant to the issue before us.3
Second, Kinworthy relies upon several decisions from other states to argue that
Monessen did not address the issue of post-verdict, prejudgment interest, and therefore
3
Kinworthy also argues that providing for post-verdict, prejudgment interest under
Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(a), promotes the uniformity envisioned by Congress when it
enacted FELA by equalizing the interest available in a Minnesota state court and
Minnesota federal district court. Specifically, Kinworthy argues that the delay caused by
the automatic stay in Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 125 deprives state court FELA litigants of
interest they would receive upon an immediate entry of judgment in the federal system.
Compare Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 125 (providing for the stay of entry of judgment for 30
days “after the court orders judgment following a trial unless the court orders
otherwise”), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b) (providing generally for the prompt entry of
judgment when the jury returns a general verdict or the court awards “a sum certain”).
Kinworthy’s uniformity argument lacks merit. It is true that differences in the
rules of civil procedure in federal district court and in Minnesota state court may result in
a practical circumstance in which a FELA plaintiff in Minnesota federal district court
receives interest from the date of verdict, but a FELA plaintiff in Minnesota state court
does not begin to receive interest until the date of the judgment following the
determination of post-trial motions. Notably, Minn. R. Civ. P. 58.01 provides for the
entry of judgment upon a jury verdict “forthwith,” and Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 125 does not
prevent the district court from ordering the immediate entry of judgment without a 30-
day stay. Thus, a successful FELA plaintiff may request immediate entry of judgment in
state court, and the state court has the authority to eliminate the loss of interest in FELA
cases by declining to delay the entry of judgment if the court concludes it is appropriate
to do so.
Moreover, Congress enacted FELA to achieve national uniformity, and that
uniformity is achieved when federal substantive law governs the adjudication of FELA
claims in state courts. Here, Kinworthy seeks to substitute state law—Minn. Stat.
§ 549.09, subd. 1(a)—for federal substantive law, which would result in a lack of
uniformity because the state law is not the same as federal law on point.
8
Monessen is not dispositive.4 We agree that the precise issue before the Court in
Monessen involved pre-verdict interest, not post-verdict, prejudgment interest. But the
Monessen opinion broadly concluded that “prejudgment interest” of any kind is not
recoverable in a state court FELA action. Monessen, 486 U.S. at 336. The basic
definition of “prejudgment interest” in the opinion clearly means any and all interest that
accrues before the entry of the judgment in the case.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v.
Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990), confirms this conclusion. In Kaiser, the Court
considered whether post-judgment interest under the federal interest statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1961, properly runs from the date of the damages verdict or the date of the entry of
judgment. 494 U.S. at 834. The Court held that under the plain language of the federal
interest statute, post-judgment interest accrues from the date of the entry of judgment, not
the date of the verdict. 494 U.S. at 836. Therefore, under federal law post-judgment
interest is calculated from the date of entry of judgment and all interest prior to the entry
of judgment is necessarily prejudgment interest.
4
Currently, only a handful of state courts have considered the issue before us, and
those that have are split. Some states have concluded that post-verdict, prejudgment
interest is not recoverable in a FELA action. See Lund v. San Joaquin Valley R.R., 71
P.3d 770, 779 (Cal. 2003); Bodenheimer v. New Orleans Pub. Belt, 860 So. 2d 534 (La.
2003); Hairston v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 823 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (N.Y. App. Div.
2006). Other state courts have concluded it is recoverable. See Lockley v. CSX Transp.,
Inc., 66 A.3d 322, 326-29 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013); Jacobs v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R., 806
N.W.2d 209, 216 (S.D. 2011); Denning v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. M2012-01077, 2013
WL 5569145, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2013); Weber v. Chicago & Nw. Transp. Co.,
530 N.W.2d 25, 31-32 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
9
It would be contrary to logic and common sense to conclude that prejudgment
interest includes interest that accrues before the jury verdict, but excludes interest that
accrues after the verdict but before entry of the judgment. Had the Court intended to
limit prejudgment interest to pre-verdict interest, and not post-verdict, prejudgment
interest, it could have easily said so. We discern no basis in Monessen to adopt the
artificial distinction between pre-verdict and post-verdict, prejudgment interest proposed
by Kinworthy. Indeed, Kinworthy proposes that we add a limitation to the holding in
Monessen that does not exist in the language of the opinion. Further, our interpretation is
supported by the underlying reasoning of the opinion. The Court in Monessen reasoned
that federal law does not authorize prejudgment interest, and there is no evidence that
Congress intended to abrogate that law. 486 U.S. at 337-38. Moreover, neither FELA
nor the federal interest statute mentions prejudgment interest. 486 U.S. at 336. The most
reasonable reading of Monessen, therefore, is that prejudgment interest, whether it is pre-
verdict or post-verdict, is not recoverable in a FELA action brought in state court.
Our interpretation of Monessen is consistent with the principles of national
uniformity intended by Congress when it enacted FELA. A plaintiff who brings a FELA
action in state court should be subject to the same rule regarding prejudgment interest
regardless of the state in which the action is commenced.
We conclude that prejudgment interest under Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(a)-(b),
whether it is pre-verdict or post-verdict, is not recoverable in a FELA action brought in
Minnesota state court. The recoverability of post-verdict, prejudgment interest under
Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(a), in a FELA action brought in state court is governed by
10
federal substantive law. Pursuant to Monessen, 486 U.S. at 338, a successful plaintiff in a
FELA action is not entitled to recover post-verdict, prejudgment interest.
Affirmed.
11
CONCURRENCE
LILLEHAUG, Justice (concurring).
I write separately to: (1) emphasize that we are bound by what may be overbroad
United States Supreme Court precedent that it alone can refine; and (2) highlight a
potential solution to the FELA post-verdict interest problem.
On September 28, 2012, a jury in state district court returned a verdict in favor of
an injured worker, Dennis Kinworthy. But, as is customary in Minnesota state courts,
judgment was not entered that day. After considering post-trial motions pursuant to
Minn. R. Civ. P. 59, the district court ordered entry of judgment on November 27, 2012.
Pursuant to the automatic stay of Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 125, judgment was not entered
until December 27, 2012. Thus, there was a 90-day gap from verdict to judgment.
Had the case been tried in federal court, judgment would have been entered
promptly after the jury verdict. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, after a verdict “the clerk must,
without awaiting the court’s direction, promptly prepare, sign, and enter the judgment.”
Post-judgment interest begins to accrue from that date. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012)
(federal interest statute). In federal court, Kinworthy would have been entitled to several
thousands of dollars of post-judgment interest.
With reluctance, I agree that Kinworthy cannot recover post-verdict prejudgment
interest during the 90-day gap because this case is controlled by Monessen Sw. Ry. v.
Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 336 (1988), and Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno,
494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990). Together, Monessen and Kaiser hold, flatly, that interest prior
to judgment is not recoverable in FELA actions, whether in federal court or in state court.
C-1
Perhaps the Supreme Court did not foresee, much less contemplate, the nuance presented
in this case: that, under some states’ statutes and rules, what is technically post-verdict
prejudgment interest is, as a practical matter, the equivalent of federal post-verdict post-
judgment interest. But if there were to be such a carve-out from the holdings of
Monessen and Kaiser, it would be for the Supreme Court, rather than us, to wield the
scalpel.
In my view, such a carve-out—or, alternatively, a requirement that judgment be
entered immediately in state FELA cases so as to start the running of postjudgment
interest—would be appropriate so as to equalize interest awards in state and federal
courts. This would promote the uniformity goal of FELA, see Norfolk & Western Ry. v.
Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493 n.5 (1985) (goal of FELA is to create uniformity throughout
the country), and further Congress’ intent “to provide liberal recovery for injured
workers,” Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958).
Our holding in this case directly conflicts with the holding of the South Dakota
Supreme Court in Jacobs v. Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern R.R., 806 N.W.2d 209 (S.D.
2011) (interest on FELA verdict accrues from the time of the verdict and through entry of
judgment). Railroads in the north central region and their employees who move from
state to state will face inconsistent outcomes.1 This conflict between the supreme courts
1
Railroads that serve both Minnesota and South Dakota are: BNSF Railway; Soo
Line Railroad (a subsidiary of Canadian Pacific Railway); Rapid City, Pierre & Eastern
Railroad; and Twin Cities & Western Railroad. See Official South Dakota Rail Map,
South Dakota Department of Transportation (Nov. 2014),
http://www.sddot.com/transportation/railroads/docs/railmap.pdf; Minnesota Freight and
(Footnote continued on next page.)
C-2
of neighboring states connected by rail might present the Supreme Court with a good
opportunity to refine its unequivocal holdings in Monessen and Kaiser.
Whether or not the high court has that opportunity or takes it, our district courts
should be aware that there is a potential safety valve in Rule 125 itself. The automatic
stay applies “unless the court orders otherwise.” As the Advisory Committee’s Comment
to Rule 125 confirms, the district court “can order immediate entry of judgment in any
case.” (Emphasis added.) It strikes me that it would be well within the sound discretion
of the district court to enter judgment immediately upon a FELA verdict, by motion of a
party2 or otherwise. This step would transform into post-judgment interest what would
otherwise be post-verdict prejudgment interest. Prompt entry of judgment, as is routine
in federal court, would promote FELA uniformity and not penalize workers for
proceeding in Minnesota district courts.
With these observations, I respectfully concur.
(Footnote continued from previous page.)
Commercial Vehicle Operations, Minnesota Department of Transportation (Dec. 2014),
http://www.dot.state.mn.us/ofrw/maps/MNRailMap.pdf; Twin Cities & Western Railroad
Company and Affiliates, Twin Cities & Western Railroad Company (Aug. 23, 2013),
http://tcwr.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/TCW.MPL_.SMRR_.Map_.082313.Screen-
11-4-13.pdf.
2
No such motion was made in this case. On January 18, 2013, Kinworthy moved to
amend the judgment entered on December 27, 2012, to allow for post-verdict
prejudgment interest. The motion was denied by order dated April 1, 2013, and a motion
for reconsideration was denied by order dated April 30, 2013.
C-3