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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JOSEPH WAYNE WILSON
Appellant No. 882 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 2, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0011979-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED MARCH 04, 2015
Appellant, Joseph Wayne Wilson, appeals from the May 2, 2014
aggregate judgment of sentence of one year’s probation, imposed after he
was found guilty of one count each of obstructing the administration of law
and resisting arrest.1 After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant factual history of this case as
follows.
On August 14, 2013, at approximately 10:00
p.m., Sergeant Matt Lucas was patrolling the area of
Lincoln and North Jackson Avenues in Bellevue
Borough when he heard what sounded to him like
angry screaming. He parked and exited his vehicle
to investigate the scream. As soon as he exited his
vehicle, he was able to identify the source of the
sound as a female juvenile, who was screaming
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5101 and 5104, respectively.
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profanities. The juvenile was known to the sergeant,
and she was walking towards his location with
[Appellant]. Sergeant Lucas was concerned about
the juvenile’s behavior because of the presence of
many young children, who were leaving a church
festival in the area.
[Appellant] and the juvenile continued walking
in the direction of Sergeant Lucas and his vehicle,
and Sergeant Lucas intercepted them as they
passed. The officer informed the juvenile, whom he
knew from being a resource officer at the local high
school, that she could not scream profanities as she
was doing and that she should stop her behavior and
go home. The sergeant believed that she had heard
and understood him, and the juvenile began walking
away. When the juvenile was approximately five (5)
feet away from the officer, she turned and screamed
“f[**]k you” toward the officer, drawing everyone’s
attention. At that point, Sergeant Lucas took the
juvenile by the arm, informed her that she was
under arrest, and began walking her to his patrol
car. The juvenile was being arrested for disorderly
conduct.
As Sergeant Lucas was escorting the juvenile
to his vehicle, [Appellant], who placed himself at the
sergeant’s shoulder within the sergeant’s personal
space, began repeatedly trying to talk Sergeant
Lucas out of arresting the juvenile. Sergeant Lucas
described that [Appellant] was “very, very close” to
him. As [Appellant] continued to tell the sergeant to
let the juvenile go, even after the officer told
[Appellant] to leave at least four (4) times, the
juvenile began resisting by pulling away from the
sergeant, screaming and kicking. Sergeant Lucas,
who was by himself throughout this incident, was
finally able to get the juvenile into handcuffs and
partially into his police cruiser. Throughout this
struggle with the juvenile, [Appellant] was in close
proximity to the officer, so close that the officer
could push him away at times and so close that
[Appellant] trapped the officer between himself and
the police vehicle.
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[Appellant]’s actions took the sergeant’s
attention away from the juvenile with whom he was
struggling and caused the sergeant to place his
attention on [Appellant], whose intentions were
unclear. In fact, the sergeant testified that he was
worried that the [Appellant] was going to jump on
top of him, get aggressive, incite others to
aggressive acts, act on ill intentions, or put his hands
on the officer to take something from his belt or hurt
the officer.
At this point, because he was still by himself
and he was unsure what [Appellant] was going to do
to further interfere with the juvenile’s arrest,
Sergeant Lucas advised [Appellant] that he was
under arrest and grabbed his wrist, which was right
in the officer’s face. Upon grabbing [Appellant]’s
arm, [Appellant] began to resist, pulling away from
the officer and, in fact, getting his hand free of the
officer’s grip. Sergeant Lucas grabbed [Appellant]’s
wrist again and was forced to try to take him to the
ground. Back-up support then arrived, and it took
two (2) officers to take [Appellant] to the ground and
three (3) officers to get [Appellant] into custody.
[Appellant] also testified in his own defense
during the trial. During his testimony, he
acknowledged that he did not listen to the officer’s
instructions and that he advanced on the officer
during the arrest of the juvenile. He also testified
that he “blacked out” at some point during the
incident and that there were several points that he
could not remember. Importantly, [Appellant] could
not remember how close he was to the officer during
the incident.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/24/14, at 2-4 (internal citations omitted).
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On December 5, 2013, the Commonwealth filed an information
charging Appellant with the above-mentioned offenses, as well as one count
of selling or furnishing alcohol to a minor.2 On May 2, 2014, Appellant
proceeded to a one-day bench trial, at the conclusion of which, the trial
court found Appellant guilty of obstructing the administration of law and
resisting arrest. The furnishing alcohol to a minor charge was withdrawn.
That same day, the trial court imposed a sentence of six months’ probation
on each count, to run consecutively. On May 30, 2014, Appellant filed a
timely notice of appeal.3
On appeal, Appellant raises the following two issues.
I. Did the trial court err when it found [Appellant]
guilty of obstruction of administration of law
where the evidence was insufficient to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Appellant]
intentionally obstructed, impaired, or perverted
the administration of law, by way of force,
violence, physical interference or obstacle, but
his actions merely avoided compliance with law
without affirmative interference with
governmental functions?
II. Did the trial court err when it found [Appellant]
guilty of resisting arrest where the evidence
was legally insufficient to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that [Appellant] created a
substantial risk of bodily injury or employed
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2
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6310.1(a).
3
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
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means justifying or requiring substantial force
to overcome the resistance?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Both of Appellant’s issues on appeal challenge the sufficiency of the
Commonwealth’s evidence. We begin by noting our well-settled standard of
review. “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether
the evidence presented at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the
verdict winner, support the jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 A.3d 55, 66 (Pa. 2014) (citation
omitted). “The Commonwealth can meet its burden by wholly circumstantial
evidence and any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the
fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter
of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined
circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 113 (Pa. Super.
2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), appeal
denied, 95 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2014). As an appellate court, we must review “the
entire record … and all evidence actually received[.]” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “[T]he trier of fact while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced is free to
believe all, part or none of the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). “Because
evidentiary sufficiency is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo
and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d
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119, 126 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Diamond v.
Pennsylvania, 135 S. Ct. 145 (2014).
Instantly, Appellant was convicted of obstructing the administration of
law and resisting arrest. The statutes for those offenses provide as follows.
§ 5101. Obstructing administration of law or
other governmental function
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second
degree if he intentionally obstructs, impairs or
perverts the administration of law or other
governmental function by force, violence, physical
interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or
any other unlawful act, except that this section does
not apply to flight by a person charged with crime,
refusal to submit to arrest, failure to perform a legal
duty other than an official duty, or any other means
of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative
interference with governmental functions.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101.
§ 5104. Resisting arrest or other law
enforcement
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second
degree if, with the intent of preventing a public
servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging
any other duty, the person creates a substantial risk
of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else,
or employs means justifying or requiring substantial
force to overcome the resistance.
Id. § 5104.
We first address Appellant’s argument regarding his conviction for
obstructing administration of law. Specifically, Appellant avers that the
Commonwealth failed to provide sufficient evidence that “[his] actions were
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done with the intent to obstruct, impair, or pervert Sergeant Lucas from
effectuating the arrest of [the female juvenile].” Appellant’s Brief at 15.
The Commonwealth counters that Appellant committed “physical
interference … as the sergeant tried to perform his official function and
arrest [the female juvenile.]” Commonwealth’s Brief at 10.
Evidence that one has physically impeded a
law enforcement officer from administering the law
has been held sufficient to sustain a conviction under
§ 5101. See Commonwealth v. Conception, 657
A.2d 1298 ([Pa. Super.] 1995) (appellant blocked
door of her apartment to prevent the police from
entering to apprehend fugitive who was hiding in the
shower stall); Commonwealth v. Reed, 851 A.2d
958, 963–64 (Pa. Super. 2004) (defendant
attempted to obstruct the pathway of a uniformed
police officer in the common area of an apartment
house after the officer had exclaimed to the
defendant: “Just let me get by and do my job.”);
Commonwealth v. Love, 896 A.2d 1276, 1284–
1285 (Pa. Super. 2006) (defendant, in an attempt to
interfere with the law enforcement officer who was
escorting his wife from the courtroom, placed his
arm across court officer’s chest and attempted to
push him).
The interference need not involve physical
contact with the government official as he performs
his duties. Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 634 A.2d
1109, 1113 ([Pa.] 1993). See also
Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 414 A.2d 54
([Pa.] 1980), (upholding a § 5101 conviction based
on the defendant’s verbal abuse of a parking
enforcement officer upon receiving a parking ticket,
which then deterred the officer from subsequently
performing the job).
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 100 A.3d 207, 214-215 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(parallel citations omitted).
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In this case, Sergeant Lucas testified that while he was attempting to
place the female juvenile in his police car, Appellant immediately attempted
to interfere with his arresting her. N.T., 5/2/14, at 16. Specifically, he
testified that Appellant desperately pleaded with him not to arrest the
juvenile. Id. at 16-17. Sergeant Lucas further testified that Appellant’s
conduct then escalated beyond mere pleas when he physically used his body
to obstruct Sergeant Lucas’s efforts to arrest the female juvenile by
“trapping” Sergeant Lucas between Appellant and his police cruiser. Id. at
19. Appellant argues that the extent of his interference was videotaping the
incident from two feet away. Appellant’s Brief at 16. While Sergeant Lucas
testified that Appellant did pull out a mobile phone during the incident, and
that Appellant told him he was videotaping the incident, he also stated that
Appellant did not remain two feet away, but rather placed Sergeant Lucas
between Appellant and the police cruiser. N.T., 5/2/14, at 18-19. The trial
court, as the factfinder, was permitted to reject this argument, and believe
the portion of Sergeant Lucas’s testimony that Appellant’s actions went
beyond mere pleading and videotaping. See Watley, supra. In our view,
this is sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 5101 because it
“physically impeded a law enforcement officer from administering the law[.]”
Conception, supra. As Appellant physically interfered by boxing Sergeant
Lucas between Appellant and his vehicle, in an effort to block the completion
of the arrest, the trial court was permitted to infer Appellant’s intent. Based
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on these considerations, Appellant’s first issue on appeal does not merit
relief.
In his second issue, Appellant avers that the Commonwealth failed to
present sufficient evidence for the charge of resisting arrest. Specifically,
Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to show that his actions “created
a substantial risk of bodily injury to the police officers effectuating the
arrest.” Appellant’s Brief at 21.
As this Court has previously noted, “Section 5104 does not require
evidence of serious bodily injury, nor does it require actual injury. Merely
exposing another to the risk of such injury is sufficient to sustain a
conviction under Section 5104.” In the Interest of Woodford, 616 A.2d
641, 644 (Pa. Super. 1992); see also Commonwealth v. Butler, 512 A.2d
667, 673 (Pa. Super. 1986) (stating that for a conviction for resisting arrest,
“[t]he fact that the officer was not injured is of no consequence[]”). It is
also true that Section 5104 does not require physical contact. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 907 A.2d 540, 546 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating
that a conviction under Section 5104 was proper where the defendant
“continued to resist attempts to subdue him by spitting blood and saliva at
[the officer]”), appeal denied, 932 A.2d 75 (Pa. 2007).
In this case, the trial court found the Commonwealth satisfied this
element based on the following.
In this case, the evidence showed that
[Appellant] initially resisted Sergeant Lucas’
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attempts to take him into custody by pulling his arm
out of the officer’s grasp and pulling away from the
officer. [Appellant] was also refusing to place his
hands behind his back, and he was flailing his arms
in a defending posture. Due to [Appellant]’s
struggles, he was required to be taken to the ground
in order to be subdued. It took at least two (2)
officers to take [Appellant] to the ground. As he was
laying on the ground, [Appellant] laid on top of his
hands, refusing to put them behind him to be placed
into handcuffs. Force was required to pull
[Appellant]’s hands out from underneath him. It
ultimately took the efforts of three (3) police officers
to get [Appellant] handcuffed.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/24/14, at 10.
Upon careful review of the certified record, we conclude the
Commonwealth met its burden. As the trial court notes, Officer James
Niglio, who provided backup to Sergeant Lucas, testified that Appellant was
actively resisting, in part, because “[h]is arms were flailing, in a … defending
posture.” N.T., 5/2/14, at 46. Furthermore, force was required to get
Appellant to get his arms behind his back for the purpose of handcuffing
them. Id. at 44. In fact, the force of three police officers was required in
order to secure Appellant’s compliance. Id. In our view, the
Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to show that Appellant’s defensive
behavior and actions constituted a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another. See Jackson, supra; Woodward, supra; Butler, supra. Based
on these considerations, we conclude Appellant’s sufficiency challenge does
not warrant relief. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clark, 761 A.2d 190, 193
(Pa. Super. 2000) (stating that the Commonwealth provided sufficient
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evidence to sustain a Section 5104 conviction where the defendant “pulled
his hand away from the officer and put his hands … up in a fighting stance[,
gave chase, and t]he three officers attempting to effect the arrest struggled
with Appellant on the ground[]”), appeal denied, 771 A.2d 1278 (Pa. 2001).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude both of Appellant’s issues on
appeal are devoid of merit. Accordingly, the trial court’s May 2, 2014
judgment of sentence is affirmed.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/4/2015
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