IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
RALPH A. THOMAS, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D13-4439
DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed March 5, 2015.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
John C. Cooper, Judge.
Ralph A. Thomas, pro se, Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Jennifer Parker, General Counsel, and Holly N.
Simcox, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
ROBERTS, J.
The Appellant, Ralph A. Thomas, appeals the trial court’s order imposing
liens on his inmate trust account for court costs and fees incurred as a result of his
Petition for Writ of Mandamus. We agree with the Appellant that the portion of his
petition that challenged his inability to earn gain time for one month was a collateral
criminal proceeding, which was exempt from the lien requirement of section 57.085,
Florida Statutes (2013). However, we find the portion of the Appellant’s petition
that argued eligibility for a work release program is a collateral criminal proceeding
subject to the lien exemption to be without merit.
In order for the lien exemption to apply, work release eligibility would have
to be a collateral criminal proceeding. To determine whether an action is a collateral
criminal proceeding, the Florida Supreme Court has developed a bright line
test. McNeil v. Cox, 997 So. 2d 343, 348 (Fla. 2008) (citing to Schmidt v. Crusoe
(Schmidt I), 878 So. 2d 361, 367 (Fla. 2003)); see also Scott v. McDonough, 946
So. 2d 1161, 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“An action that directly affects an inmate’s
time in prison is collateral criminal in nature.”). If the challenged action has an effect
on the amount of time an inmate has to actually spend in prison, it is deemed a
collateral criminal challenge. Schmidt I, 878 So. 2d at 367; see Schmidt v.
McDonough (Schmidt II), 951 So. 2d 797, 802 (Fla. 2006) (finding that a claim
regarding reinstatement in prison computer classes was unrelated to the length of
time the inmate would actually serve in prison and as such, was a civil claim
ineligible for the lien exemption).
Here, the Appellant’s loss of the work release option did not have an effect on
the amount of time he had to actually spend in confinement because the work release
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program does not affect the actual time the inmate remains confined. Section
945.091, Florida Statutes (2013), provides as follows:
(1) The department may adopt rules permitting the extension of the
limits of the place of confinement of an inmate as to whom there is
reasonable cause to believe that the inmate will honor his or her trust
by authorizing the inmate, under prescribed conditions and following
investigation and approval by the secretary, or the secretary's designee,
who shall maintain a written record of such action, to leave the confines
of that place unaccompanied by a custodial agent for a prescribed
period of time to:
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(b) Work at paid employment, participate in an education or a training
program, or voluntarily serve a public or nonprofit agency or faith-
based service group in the community, while continuing as an inmate
of the institution or facility in which the inmate is confined, except
during the hours of his or her employment, education, training, or
service and traveling thereto and therefrom.
The language in the statute shows that work release is merely an extension of the
limits of the place of confinement. As such, the loss of the option of work release
did not affect the actual time the Appellant remained confined. Because the actual
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amount of confinement was unaffected, this was not a collateral criminal proceeding,
and the lien exemption did not apply. As such, we AFFIRM. McNeil v. Cox, 997
So. 2d 343, 348 (Fla. 2008) (finding that a petition involving a collateral criminal
proceeding and a civil proceeding is a mixed petition that is not eligible for
exemption from the lien requirement).
LEWIS, C.J., and WOLF, J., CONCUR.
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