MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Mar 06 2015, 9:51 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Steven Knecht Gregory F. Zoeller
Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana
Katherine Modesitt Cooper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Derek Core, March 6, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
91A05-1406-CR-265
v. Appeal from the White Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert B. Mrzlack,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Cause No. 91D01-1310-FC-180
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Derek Core appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, for robbery, as a Class
C felony. He presents two issues for our review, which we revise and restate as
follows:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
certain evidence, which Core characterizes as the fruit of an
unconstitutional traffic stop.
2. Whether his sentence, which was enhanced after Core
pleaded guilty to being an habitual offender, is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and his character.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On October 3, 2013, Core, Omika Thurman, and Jason Roar traveled from
Indianapolis to White County, Indiana, to rob a bank. Core had previously
selected White County because Core believed that it would have fewer officers
than Indianapolis, which would translate into a longer police-response time to
the robbery. White County also has access to Interstate 65, which Core
believed would make it easier to flee from the crime. After Thurman had
scoped out two banks, Core selected Farmers State Bank (“the Bank”) in
Brookston as the three’s target because it had only two tellers, both of whom
were female. After Core had selected the Bank but before the three effected the
robbery, to help conceal Core’s identity Thurman bought Core an Indianapolis
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Colts baseball cap. The two then attempted, with limited success, to remove
the stitching on the cap “so it wouldn’t be identifiable.” Tr. at 276.
[3] Shortly before 1:00 p.m., Core and Roar entered through the Bank’s front
doors, while Thurman, the getaway driver, waited outside in a Chevrolet
Suburban. Once inside, Core—wearing sunglasses, embroidered jeans, gloves,
the Colts baseball cap, and dark tennis shoes with white soles—jumped onto the
counter and screamed at the tellers to “get back.” Id. at 209. Core and Roar
then took money from the tellers’ drawers, including certain sums of “bait”
money.1 Tr. at 14. The two did not have bags and stuffed the money into their
pockets. Core also took a bag that belonged to a teller, which, among other
things, contained her driver’s license and credit cards. Core and Roar then left
the Bank and fled in the Suburban. Core directed Thurman to southbound
State Road 43, which leads to Interstate 65.
[4] Indiana State Trooper Darrick Scott received a call at his post, located on State
Road 43 near Interstate 65, of a robbery in progress at the Bank. The call did
not include any information about the getaway vehicle, but a later transmission
stated that the two assailants were black males. Trooper Scott activated the
lights and siren of his police vehicle and drove northbound on State Road 43.
On his way to the Bank, Trooper Scott observed a number of vehicles pull off to
the side of the road and yield the right of way to him. Most drivers of the
1
Bait money means uncirculated currency with prerecorded serial numbers.
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yielding vehicles, he noticed, looked around inquiringly, but one driver, a
female in a southbound Suburban later identified as Thurman, attempted to
hide her face behind the vehicle’s steering wheel and her left arm. Trooper
Scott then checked his rearview mirror and noticed that the Suburban did not
have a license plate attached to its rear bumper. Trooper Scott could see a
silhouette in the Suburban’s darkly tinted rear window but could not discern
whether the vehicle had a license plate. At that time, Trooper Scott did not see
anyone but Thurman in the Suburban.
[5] Aware that a number of other officers were also in route to the Bank, Trooper
Scott decided to make a U-Turn and “inquire more about the vehicle
southbound that [he had] observed.” Tr. at 15. As he pulled behind the
Suburban, with lights and siren still activated, the vehicle reentered the roadway
and began to flee southbound on State Road 43. As Trooper Scott pursued the
vehicle, he eventually managed to get near enough to the rear of the vehicle to
detect the numbers of a temporary license plate in the rear window.
[6] During the pursuit, Trooper Scott observed the Suburban speed, cross the center
line, and fail to yield to him. Further, he saw the silhouettes of two men in the
backseat of the Suburban, “popping up and down, just peeking and looking and
observing to see what was going on.” Tr. at 19. After several miles of pursuit,
in which several other officers joined, officers disabled the Suburban. When the
vehicle came to a stop, Core and Roar fled on foot, but officers apprehended
both. Thurman remained in the Suburban.
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[7] When apprehended, Core was wearing gloves, and officers recovered $7,267.00
on his person, which included the Bank’s bait money. In a later inventory
search of the Suburban, among other items, officers recovered a Colts baseball
cap with the emblem partially removed, sunglasses, money ties with the Bank’s
emblem, a black leather bag, and several cards that evinced the name of the
Bank’s teller, whose bag was taken by Core during the robbery.
[8] On October 3, 2013, the State charged Core with two counts of robbery, one
count as a Class C felony and one count as a Class B felony. And, on
November 4, 2013, the State filed a third count that sought to have Core
adjudicated an habitual offender.2
[9] After the State had charged him, on January 14, 2014, Core moved to suppress:
all the property seized by arresting officers, all observations made
by the arresting officers, all statements made by [Core], and all
evidence taken from [Core] after he was detained and arrested
into the White County Jail.
Appellant’s App. at 29. As the basis for his motion, Core stated that:
the initial stop of the [Suburban, of which Core was a passenger,]
by arresting officers violated [Core’s] rights under the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article
I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution because officers had no
2
The State amended Count II twice and Count III once. As amended, Count II alleged that three officers
had suffered injuries as a result of the robbery.
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reasonable suspicion or probable cause to make the initial stop of
the vehicle.
Id.
[10] Core acknowledged in his memorandum in support of his motion to suppress
that Trooper Scott had
testified that he thought the driver was trying to hide from
him . . . [and] that he also noticed that the [Suburban] did not
have a license plate on the rear bumper. He testified that[,] for
this reason, he turned around and decided to stop the vehicle. [3]
Id. at 34. Nevertheless, Core “conten[ded] that the Officer stopped the
[Suburban] based on the fact that there was a black female driving the vehicle
and lacked any probable cause that the vehicle committed any crime nor [sic]
having any reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.” Id. at 35.
[11] The trial court, however, found that “Trooper Scott and other police officers
had reasonable suspicion to pursue the driver of the SUV[] for several reasons,”
including, among others, “to investigate whether the occupants of the SUV
were involved in the bank robbery . . . ; [and] to investigate the infraction of
improper display of a license plate.” Id. at 40. Thus, the court denied Core’s
3
Similarly, at trial, Trooper Scott testified that “[he] notice[d] [the Suburban] did not have a license plate on
[the] vehicle, the rear part of the vehicle. So, that was going to be my reason to stop the vehicle.” Tr. at 293.
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motion, and the case proceeded to jury trial, which was held from April 29
through May 1.4
[12] At trial, Core renewed his objections to the admissibility of the evidence
obtained after the initial stop of the Suburban. The court noted Core’s
objection as a continuing one that “renew[ed] [the] grounds set forth in the
Motion to Suppress,” but it “overrule[d] the objection and again denie[d] the
Motion to Suppress.” Tr. at 293. The court further informed Core that he had
preserved the issue for appellate review.5
[13] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Core of robbery, as a Class C
felony, but acquitted him of robbery, as a Class B felony, and Core admitted
that he was an habitual offender. On May 28, the court held a sentencing
hearing. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the court found in
aggravation that (1) Core had seven prior convictions as an adult, five of which
were felonies, including convictions for auto theft, robbery, and confinement;
(2) Core committed the October 1 robbery while on parole for his prior robbery
and confinement convictions;6 (3) previous attempts at rehabilitation, both as a
juvenile and as an adult, had failed; and (4) Core’s conduct in the White
County Jail while awaiting trial had resulted in a loss of privileges and a
4
On the first day of Core’s trial, he elected to proceed pro se but have standby counsel present. On the
second day of his trial, Core elected to have standby counsel conduct the remainder of the proceedings.
5
Thus, we disagree with the State that Core has waived this issue for appeal.
6
Core was released on parole from the Indiana Department of Correction on August 21, 2013.
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pending battery charge. The court found in mitigation that (1) Core had
expressed remorse; (2) Core had obtained a GED despite having a learning
disability; and (3) Core had issues with his health. The court found that the
aggravators outweighed the mitigators, and it sentenced Core to eight years
executed in the Department of Correction, which it enhanced by an additional
twelve years for a total aggregate term of twenty years executed. This appeal
ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Admission of Evidence
[14] Core first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
certain evidence against him. As he did in his motion to suppress and at trial,
core asserts that Trooper Scott lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial
stop of the Suburban, which violated Core’s rights to be free of an unreasonable
seizure. Everything else—pursuit included—Core argues, would not have
occurred but for the initial, unconstitutional stop of the Suburban. We cannot
agree.
[15] “The general admission of evidence at trial is a matter we leave to the discretion
of the trial court.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259-60 (Ind. 2013). As we
explained in J.K. v. State, 8 N.E.3d 222, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), “[a] trial
court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against
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the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or when the trial court has
misinterpreted the law.”
[16] Further, as our supreme court has stated:
Because a traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment,
police may not initiate a stop for any conceivable reason, but
must possess at least reasonable suspicion that a traffic law has
been violated or that other criminal activity is taking place. An
officer’s decision to stop a vehicle is valid so long as his on-the-
spot evaluation reasonably suggests that lawbreaking occurred.
Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 869-70 (Ind. 2009) (citations omitted).
[17] Here, Core argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it held that
reasonable suspicion supported the initial stop of the Suburban. But our
supreme court has previously held that Indiana law requires license plates,
interim or permanent, “be displayed upon the rear of the vehicle, securely
fastened, in a horizontal position.” Id. at 870 (quotation marks omitted).
“[P]lacing a license plate on the inside of the back window clearly does not
satisfy the requirement that license plates be displayed upon the rear of the
vehicle.” Id. at 872 (emphasis in original) (quotation marks omitted). And, if
one’s plate is “not displayed appropriately,” an officer may properly stop that
person. Id. at 871, 873. This is so even if the “officer would [not] have
otherwise made the stop but for ulterior suspicions or motives.” Turner v. State,
862 N.E.2d 695, 699-700 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
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[18] At the suppression hearing, Trooper Scott testified that he pulled in behind the
Suburban “[t]o inquire more about the plate.” Tr. at 35. And, at trial, Trooper
Scott testified that he planned to stop the Suburban because “[he] notice[d the
vehicle] did not have a license plate.” Tr. at 293. Thus, we hold that “the
initial stop [of the Suburban] due to the suspected license plate display violation
was proper and the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the resulting
evidence on this basis.”7 Meredith, 906 N.E.2d at 873.
Issue Two: Sentencing
[19] Core also argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and his character. Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana
Constitution “authorize[] independent appellate review and revision of a
sentence imposed by the trial court.” Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007) (alteration in original). This appellate authority is implemented
through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. Revision of a sentence under Rule
7(B) requires the appellant to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of his offenses and his character. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B);
Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We assess the
trial court’s recognition or non-recognition of aggravators and mitigators as an
7
For the same reasons Core cannot demonstrate error under the federal constitution he cannot demonstrate
error under the Indiana Constitution. See, e.g., Sowers v. State, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591-92 (Ind. 2000); see also
Turner, 862 N.E.2d at 699-700 (holding that, under the Indiana Constitution, “[p]olice officers may stop a
vehicle when they observe minor traffic violations. . . . If there is an objectively justifiable reason [for the
stop], then the stop is valid whether or not the police officer would have otherwise made the stop but for
ulterior suspicions or motives.”).
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initial guide to determining whether the sentence imposed was inappropriate.
Gibson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However, “a
defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met
th[e] inappropriateness standard of review.” Roush, 875 N.E.2d at 812
(alteration original).
[20] Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate
sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should
receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222, 1224
(Ind. 2008). The principal role of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven the
outliers.” Id. at 1225. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the
end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the
severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that
come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.
[21] Here, Core contends that we should revise his sentence because his “actions
were no worse than those involved in any other case of this kind.” Appellant’s
Br. at 30. In support, he points out that he was unarmed and that he did not
physically harm anyone at the Bank. But we are not persuaded. Core, with the
help of two others, planned a bank robbery and executed it in the middle of the
day, during the Bank’s operating hours. He and his confederates then fled
along a well-traveled road in their vehicle. The fact that these actions did not
result in another’s physical injury does not detract from the seriousness of
Core’s crime. Indeed, as the trial court stated at Core’s sentencing hearing,
Core inflicted “devastating” fear on the Bank’s employees that “they will carry
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with them [for] the rest of their lives.” Tr. at 567-68. Core’s sentence is not
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense.
[22] Core also asserts that his sentence is inappropriate because he has a
“redeemable character.” Appellant’s Br. at 30. Core’s criminal history,
however, does not support that assertion. Core has a juvenile history and seven
adult convictions, including five felony offenses. He has been adjudicated an
habitual offender. Moreover, Core was on parole for a prior robbery that he
had committed when he committed the current robbery. And, while in jail for
his current crime, Core’s conduct resulted both in a loss of privileges and in the
filing of more charges against him. As the trial court noted, Core has had a
number of opportunities to rehabilitate himself, both as a juvenile and as an
adult, but he has not done so. Thus, we cannot say that Core’s sentence is
inappropriate in light of his character.
[23] Affirmed.
[24] Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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