FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 10 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JESUS MUNOZ, No. 12-56440
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-00300-BLM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
A. M. GONZALES, Acting Warden;
JEFFREY BEARD,
Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Barbara Lynn Major, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 2, 2015**
Pasadena California
Before: PREGERSON, FERNANDEZ, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Jesus Munoz appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
petition. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
California Court of Appeal’s denial of Munoz’s claim was neither contrary to, nor
an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court
precedent, we affirm. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(2); Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86 (2011).
1. The California Court of Appeal’s September 6, 2011 decision adjudicated
the merits of Munoz’s federal due process claim. While the Court of Appeal’s
decision does not expressly reference Munoz’s federal due process claim, the
“conjoined nature of [Munoz’s] state and federal claims, the similar legal analysis
underpinning their resolution, and the Court of Appeal’s obligation to dutifully
comply both with state law and the federal Constitution,” supports the presumption
that the claim was adjudicated on the merits. Bell v. Uribe, 748 F.3d 857, 864 (9th
Cir. 2014). Therefore, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”) applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
2. Munoz argues that the trial court’s admission of his prior auto theft
violated his due process rights. Even if the evidence was improperly admitted to
show that Munoz committed the crime for which he was on trial, this claim would
not be grounds for relief. Under the strict standards of AEDPA, the Court of
Appeal’s denial of Munoz’s claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly
established Supreme Court precedent. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5
2
(1991) (reserving the question of whether admission of prior crimes evidence to
show propensity would violate the Due Process Clause); see also Holley v.
Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining the Supreme Court
“has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial
evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the
writ [of habeas corpus]”).
AFFIRMED.
3