Case: 14-10123 Date Filed: 03/11/2015 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-10123
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:11-cv-00490-VMC-TBS
ISAAC KELVIN ALLEN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN,
FCC COLEMAN-MEDIUM,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(March 11, 2015)
Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 14-10123 Date Filed: 03/11/2015 Page: 2 of 5
Isaac Kelvin Allen appeals the district court’s dismissal of his habeas corpus
petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. His petition raised multiple grounds
for relief, including that the court had wrongly imposed three-year terms of
supervised release for his convictions of aggravated identity theft, instead of the
statutory one-year maximum; he was wrongly ordered to pay restitution covering
losses and victims that were unrelated to his offenses; and his trial attorney had
rendered ineffective assistance during the plea colloquy that resulted in violations
of Fed.R.Crim.P. 11. In dismissing the instant § 2241 petition, the district court
concluded that Allen had not met the requirements under the savings clause of 28
U.S.C. § 2255(e).
On appeal, Allen argues that the district court failed to fully review the
arguments and evidence he had submitted to show that he met all of the
requirements of the § 2255(e) savings clause. He asserts that the court instead
simply concluded in its order that he could not demonstrate that § 2255 was
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention because “his challenge
to his sentence [was] foreclosed by” Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293 (11th
Cir. 2011). The fact that the court ignored the very evidence that would allow it to
hear the issues in the § 2241 petition constituted a denial of due process. Second,
Allen argues that his three-year terms of supervised release, which exceeded the
statutory maximum for convictions of aggravated identity theft, qualify as a
2
Case: 14-10123 Date Filed: 03/11/2015 Page: 3 of 5
“fundamental defect” in sentencing that ultimately would allow him to seek relief
under § 2241. Lastly, Allen argues that, for purposes of “opening the portal” to the
§ 2255(e) savings clause, a § 2255 motion would qualify as an “inadequate” or
“ineffective” remedy to address technical violations of Fed.R.Crim.P. 11, since the
Supreme Court barred such § 2255 claims in United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S.
780, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 60 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979).
The availability of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 presents a question
of law that we review de novo. Cook v. Wiley, 208 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir.
2000). Typically, collateral attacks on the validity of a federal conviction or
sentence must be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d
1363, 1365 (11th Cir. 2003). The “savings clause” of § 2255, however, permits a
federal prisoner, under very limited circumstances, to file a habeas petition
pursuant to § 2241. Sawyer, 326 F.3d at 1365. Under the savings clause, a court
may entertain a § 2241 petition attacking custody resulting from a federally
imposed sentence if the petitioner establishes that the remedy provided for under
§ 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e). We recently held that the savings clause is a jurisdictional provision,
such that a petitioner must show that § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” before
the district court has jurisdiction to review the § 2241 petition. Williams v.
3
Case: 14-10123 Date Filed: 03/11/2015 Page: 4 of 5
Warden, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 713 F.3d 1332, 1339-40 (11th Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, No. 13-1221 (Oct. 6, 2014).
In Williams, we noted two necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for a
sentencing claim to be viable under § 2255(e)’s savings clause. Id. at 1343-44.
First, the claim must be based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court
decision. Id. at 1343. Secondly, the Supreme Court “must have overturned a
circuit precedent that squarely resolved the claim so that the petitioner had no
genuine opportunity to raise it at trial, on appeal, or in his first § 2255 motion.”
Id..
In Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 738 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir.
2013), we faced the question whether a petitioner can use the savings clause to
“open the portal” to § 2241 where an erroneous application of the Armed Career
Criminal Act (“ACCA”) resulted in a sentence that exceeded the statutory
maximum. Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1256. We held that, in order to show that his prior
§ 2255 motion had been “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention,” Bryant had to establish that: (1) throughout his sentencing, on direct
appeal, and the first § 2255 proceeding, our binding precedent had specifically
addressed his distinct prior state conviction that triggered 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and
had squarely foreclosed his § 924(e) claim that he was erroneously sentenced
above the ten-year statutory maximum penalty in § 924(a); (2) subsequent to his
4
Case: 14-10123 Date Filed: 03/11/2015 Page: 5 of 5
first § 2255 proceeding, the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay v. United States,
553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008), as extended by us to his
prior conviction, overturned our precedent that had foreclosed his § 924(e) claim;
(3) the new rule announced in Begay applied retroactively on collateral review;
(4) as a result of Begay’s new rule being retroactive, Bryant’s current sentence
exceeded the ten-year statutory maximum authorized in § 924(a); and (5) the
savings clause in § 2255(e) reached his pure § 924(e)-Begay error claim of illegal
detention above his statutory maximum penalty in § 924(a). Id. at 1274.
Here, the district court did not err in dismissing Allen’s petition because he
had failed to open the portal to § 2241 relief. He has not shown that § 2255 relief
was inadequate or ineffective to challenge his sentences’ legality, as he did not
base his claims on retroactively applicable Supreme Court decisions. Bryant, 738
F.3d at 1274; Williams, 713 F.3d at 1343. Furthermore, Allen’s claim of a due-
process violation by the district court is meritless, as the court’s written order
restated all of Allen’s claims before reviewing the case law and discussing its
conclusions. Allen also has pointed to nothing else in the record to substantiate his
claim that the court deliberately ignored his arguments that he qualified for § 2241
relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED. 1
1
Allen’s Motion for Leave to File Out of Time Reply brief is GRANTED.
5