Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 182
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-14-1025
ABRAM HEFLIN Opinion Delivered March 11, 2015
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 23JV-13-116]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE DAVID M. CLARK,
HUMAN SERVICES and MINOR JUDGE
CHILD
APPELLEES AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED
KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge
Appellant Abram Heflin appeals from the termination of his parental rights to his four-
year-old son, A.H.1 Mr. Heflin’s counsel has filed a no-merit brief and motion to withdraw,
stating that this appeal is without merit and that she should be relieved as counsel. We affirm
and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
Pursuant to Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194
S.W.3d 739 (2004), appellant’s counsel has ordered the relevant portions of the record,
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(c), and concluded that after a review of the record there
are no issues of arguable merit for appeal, Rule 6-9(i). Mr. Heflin was provided with a copy
of his counsel’s brief and motion and informed of his right to file pro se points, which he did.
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The child’s mother’s parental rights were terminated as to both A.H. and A.H.’s two-
year-old half-brother. The mother is not a party to this appeal. Nor is A.H.’s half-brother’s
father, whose parental rights were also terminated.
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 182
We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Carroll v. Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 199. At least one statutory ground must exist, in addition to
a finding that it is in the child’s best interest to terminate parental rights; these must be proved
by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341 (Supp. 2013); M.T. v. Ark.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 58 Ark. App. 302, 952 S.W.2d 177 (1997). Clear and convincing
evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the factfinder a firm conviction as to the
allegation sought to be established. Anderson v. Douglas, 310 Ark. 633, 839 S.W.2d 196
(1992). The appellate inquiry is whether the trial court’s finding that the disputed fact was
proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. J.T. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997).
On March 6, 2013, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a
petition for emergency custody of both A.H. and his younger brother, who had been living
with their mother. In an attached affidavit of a family service worker, it was stated that A.H.
had recently received medical treatment for two cigarette burns to his left thumb. Upon
investigation, A.H.’s mother admitted that she had used methamphetamine on the same day
she was interviewed, and she tested positive for methamphetamine, THC, and benzos. The
mother could not explain the burns on her son, and she told investigators that she had been
contemplating suicide. The emergency petition noted that A.H.’s father, Abram Heflin, was
incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On March 11, 2013, the trial court
entered an order for emergency DHS custody.
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The trial court entered a probable-cause order on March 12, 2013, and an order
adjudicating the children dependent-neglected on April 4, 2013. Mr. Heflin remained
incarcerated and did not appear at either the probable-cause hearing or the adjudication
hearing. Mr. Heflin was also absent from a fifteen-month review hearing held on June 10,
2014.
DHS filed a petition to terminate Mr. Heflin’s parental rights on June 18, 2014.
Although still incarcerated, Mr. Heflin appeared for the termination hearing held on August
19, 2014.
On September 2, 2014, the trial court entered an order terminating Mr. Heflin’s
parental rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of
parental rights was in A.H.’s best interest, and the court specifically considered the likelihood
of adoption, as well as the potential harm of returning him to the custody of his father as
required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). The trial court also found
clear and convincing evidence of two statutory grounds. First, the trial court found that
A.H. had lived outside the home of the parent for twelve months and that Mr. Heflin had
willfully failed to maintain meaningful contact with the child. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-
341(b)(3)(B)(ii). Next, the trial court found, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section
9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(viii), that Mr. Heflin was sentenced in a criminal proceeding for a period
of time that would constitute a substantial period of the juvenile’s life.
At the termination hearing, the DHS family service worker assigned to the case gave
her opinion that it was in both of the children’s best interest to have parental rights
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terminated. An adoption specialist indicated that the children were adoptable and that the
goal was to have them adopted together. Over appellant’s objection, the adoption specialist
gave the opinion that, based on her years of experience, she believed there was a good
likelihood that the children could be adopted together.
Mr. Heflin testified that he was placed on probation in 2011 for stealing a vehicle and
that his probation was revoked in 2012. Beginning in February 2012, Mr. Heflin began
serving a twelve-year prison sentence to be followed by a five-year suspended sentence.
Mr. Heflin stated that he was eligible for parole in January 2015, and that if he got out of
prison he planned to go to a halfway house or a rehabilitation center.
In appellant’s counsel’s no-merit brief, counsel correctly asserts that there can be no
meritorious challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination of
Mr. Heflin’s parental rights. Only one ground is necessary to terminate parental rights, and
in this case the evidence demonstrated that Mr. Heflin was sentenced in a criminal proceeding
for a period of time that would constitute a substantial period of A.H.’s life. Mr. Heflin was
serving a twelve-year prison term that began in February 2012, and A.H. is now four years
old. Although Mr. Heflin thought he might be paroled within several months of the
termination hearing, we look at the length of the prison sentence, not the potential release
date, when reviewing whether this statutory ground was met. Moses v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 466, 441 S.W.3d 54. That being so, the trial court did not clearly err
in finding that appellant’s twelve-year prison sentence was a substantial portion of A.H.’s life.
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Nor can a meritorious challenge be made to the best interest of the child. There was
testimony that A.H. was adoptable, and Mr. Heflin’s relationship with his son had been
severely compromised by Mr. Heflin’s imprisonment beginning when A.H. was barely one
year old. On this record, we agree with counsel that the trial court’s decision to terminate
Mr. Heflin’s parental rights was not clearly erroneous, and that any appeal challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence would be wholly without merit.
There was only one other adverse ruling at the termination hearing, and it occurred
when the trial court overruled appellant’s objection to the adoption specialist’s testimony
that she thought A.H. and his half-brother could be adopted together. Given the adoption
specialist’s years of experience in this field, there was no abuse of discretion in admitting this
testimony. Moreover, as appellant’s counsel asserts in her no-merit brief, the adoption
specialist had already testified without objection that A.H. was adoptable, and any possible
error in this regard would not have been reversible.
In Mr. Heflin’s pro se points, he raises multiple issues that can be fairly characterized
as challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination of his parental rights.
Mr. Heflin asserts that he wrote letters to the child from prison, that he attempted to better
himself while he was in prison, that he expected to be paroled soon, and that he was not
responsible for A.H.’s emergency removal from the child’s mother’s custody. However, as
we previously discussed, the trial court did not clearly err in finding grounds for termination,
nor did it clearly err in finding that termination was in A.H.’s best interest. Mr. Heflin also
complains that the rights of his family to visit A.H. have been severed, but this is not an
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adverse ruling or a basis to appeal the termination of his parental rights. We conclude that
Mr. Heflin’s pro se points provide no grounds for reversal, and that appellant’s counsel has
adequately addressed each of the adverse rulings in counsel’s no-merit brief.
After examining the record, the no-merit brief, and the pro se points, we have
determined that this appeal is wholly without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the order
terminating appellant’s parental rights and grant his counsel’s motion to be relieved from
representation.
Affirmed; motion granted.
ABRAMSON and HOOFMAN, JJ., agree.
Leah Lanford, Arkansas Public Defender Commission, for appellant.
Tabitha B. McNulty, Arkansas Department of Human Services; and Chrestman Group,
PLLC, by: Keith L. Chrestman, for appellees.
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