J-S18032-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DAMAL CLARK
Appellant No. 1870 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 29, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0002113-2013
CP-39-CR-0004198-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, J., and MUNDY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED MARCH 13, 2015
Appellant, Damal Clark, appeals from the May 29, 2014 aggregate
judgment of sentence of 12 to 25 years’ imprisonment, imposed after he
pled guilty to one count of possession of a firearm prohibited and pled nolo
contendere to eight counts of robbery and one count of criminal conspiracy.1
After careful review, we affirm.
We summarize the relevant procedural history of this case as follows.
On March 28, 2014, Appellant entered the above pleas in the trial court.
Appellant and the Commonwealth entered into a partial negotiated plea
agreement insofar that the minimum sentence would be 12 years. However,
there was no agreement as to the maximum sentence. On May 29, 2014,
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18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 3701(a)(1)(ii), and 903(c), respectively.
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the trial court honored the plea agreement and sentenced Appellant to an
aggregate sentence of 12 to 25 years’ imprisonment. On June 9, 2014,
Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied
the next day, June 10, 2014. On June 30, 2014, Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal.2
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review.
I. Whether there is a substantial question for
which this Honorable Court should grant
allowance of appeal from [the] discretionary
aspects of sentencing?
II. Whether the trial court erred in sentencing
[Appellant] to a harsh and excessive sentence
when the [trial] court failed to consider
mitigating factors contained within
[Appellant]’s pre-sentence investigation report
[(PSI)]?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
At the outset, we note that Appellant’s arguments on appeal pertain to
the discretionary aspects of his sentence. It is axiomatic that in this
Commonwealth, “[t]here is no absolute right to appeal when challenging the
discretionary aspect of a sentence.” Commonwealth v. Tobin, 89 A.3d
663, 666 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). When an appellant forwards
an argument pertaining to the discretionary aspects of the sentence, this
Court considers such an argument to be a petition for permission to appeal.
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Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
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Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(en banc) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014). “[A]n
[a]ppeal is permitted only after this Court determines that there is a
substantial question that the sentence was not appropriate under the
sentencing code.” Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042 (Pa.
Super. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary aspects of sentencing
issue, this Court is required to conduct a four-part analysis to determine
whether a petition for permission to appeal should be granted.
Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1039 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted), appeal denied, 99 A.3d 925 (Pa. 2014). Specifically, we
must determine the following.
(1) [W]hether appellant has filed a timely notice of
appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 902, 903; (2) whether the issue
was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion
to reconsider and modify sentence, Pa.R.Crim.P.
[708]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
substantial question that the sentence appealed from
is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
[Pa.C.S.A.] § 9781(b).
Id.
In the case sub judice, we note that Appellant filed a timely post-
sentence motion and notice of appeal. We further observe that Appellant
has included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. In this case, Appellant
avers that the trial court abused its discretion when it “sentenced him in the
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aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines in nine of ten counts without
stating legitimate reasons for doing so and without taking into consideration
the possible mitigating factors contained within his [PSI].” Appellant’s Brief
at 10. To the extent Appellant argues that the trial court did not state its
reasons for sentencing in the aggravated range, Appellant did not raise this
issue in either his post-sentence motion or his Rule 1925(b) statement.
Therefore, his argument pertaining to said issue is waived.3 See generally
Commonwealth v. Hill, 16 A.3d 484, 494 (Pa. 2011) (stating, “[a]ny
issues not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement will be deemed
waived[]”); accord Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating,
“[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal[]”). Therefore, the only preserved issue in
Appellant’s post-sentence motion and his Rule 1925(b) statement is that the
trial court failed to consider Appellant’s young age. Thus, we proceed to
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In addition, it is axiomatic that the sentencing guidelines only speak to
minimum sentences. Commonwealth v. Kleinicke, 895 A.2d 562, 573
(Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc), appeal denied, 929 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 2007);
accord 204 Pa. Code § 303.9(e) (stating, “[a]ll numbers in sentence
recommendations suggest months of minimum confinement pursuant to 42
Pa.C.S. § 9755(b) (partial confinement) and § 9756(b) (total
confinement)”).
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determine whether this argument has raised a substantial question for our
review.4
“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d
323, 330 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 81 A.3d 75
(Pa. 2013). “A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances
a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1)
inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary
to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Id.
(citations omitted). “Additionally, we cannot look beyond the statement of
questions presented and the prefatory 2119(f) statement to determine
whether a substantial question exists.” Commonwealth v. Provenzano,
50 A.3d 148, 154 (Pa. Super. 2012).
As noted above, Appellant’s sole preserved argument is that the trial
court failed to take into account Appellant’s young age. Appellant’s Brief at
10. This Court has consistently held that the trial court’s alleged failure to
consider mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question for our
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We reject the Commonwealth’s argument that Appellant’s claim is
unreviewable on the ground that he received a negotiated minimum
sentence. Although that is true, all parties acknowledge there was no
agreement as to the maximum sentence. When this happens, this Court has
explicitly permitted challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing
regarding the maximum sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Brown,
982 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 930 A.2d 726 (Pa.
2010).
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review. Commonwealth v. Ratushny, 17 A.3d 1269, 1273 (Pa. Super.
2011); accord Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super.
2010). Therefore, we cannot address the merits of Appellant’s claim. See
Edwards, supra.
Based on the foregoing, we deny Appellant’s petition for permission to
appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence.5 Accordingly, the trial
court’s May 29, 2014 judgment of sentence is affirmed.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/13/2015
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Even if we were to address the merits, we note that the trial court did have
the benefit of a PSI and stated on the record that it had considered the
same. N.T., 5/29/14, at 2. When a trial court has the benefit of a PSI
report, we presume that it “was aware of the relevant information regarding
the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with
mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 967
n.7 (Pa. 2007). Therefore, we would conclude Appellant’s argument is
without merit.
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