FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 16 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-50219
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 8:07-cr-00052-CJC-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SAFIEH FARD, AKA Safieh Fard
Bahrami, AKA Safieh F. Bahramian, AKA
Safieh Bahramianfard, AKA Safieh
Bahraman Bahramianfard, AKA Safieh
Faird, AKA Bafish Fard, AKA Safieh B.
Fard, AKA Safieh Rahraman Fard, AKA
Saieh Fard, AKA Sasieh Fard, AKA
Sophia Fard, AKA Safieh B. Kikalaye,
AKA Fard Safifeh, AKA Safieh Sard,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 3, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT, N.R. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Safieh Fard appeals her convictions for conspiracy to defraud the United States
and conspiracy to commit money laundering. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1956(h). She
argues that the district court erred by denying her request, made on the penultimate
day of trial, to call a previously undisclosed expert witness. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
1. Fard contends that the district judge erred in denying her request to call the
expert witness for failure to comply with the notice provisions of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16, rather than continuing the trial to allow the government to
prepare for examination of the expert. Even assuming that the witness should not
have been excluded, we do not reverse for an abuse of discretion if the error was
harmless. United States v. Peters, 937 F.2d 1422, 1424, 1426 (9th Cir. 1991).
2. The proposed expert would have testified generally about money laundering
and IRS investigative procedures. The proposed testimony was designed to show that
the IRS had not followed its own policies in investigating this case. Fard’s attorney,
however, had already vigorously cross-examined the testifying IRS agent on this
topic. Moreover, there was no dispute that substantial taxes were owed, and the
expert’s proposed testimony was not relevant to Fard’s defense that she lacked the
requisite means rea to commit the charged offenses. Because the verdicts were
strongly supported by the evidence and the expert’s would-be testimony was not
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probative of the key issue of intent, we conclude that even if it were error to exclude
the expert’s testimony, any such error was harmless.
AFFIRMED.
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