FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 17 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AKRAM SABAR CHAUDHRY, AKA No. 12-71057
Mohammad Akram Sabar,
Agency No. A072-119-226
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 13, 2015**
San Francisco, California
Before: BERZON, BYBEE, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
The facts and procedural posture of this case are known to the parties, and
we do not repeat them here. Petitioner Akram Sabar Chaudhry (a.k.a. Mohammad
Akram Sabar) petitions for review of the BIA’s decision affirming an IJ’s
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
termination of his previous grant of asylum under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.24(a)(3). “We
review the IJ’s factual findings regarding changed country conditions for
substantial evidence.” Sowe v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1281, 1285 (9th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(1), and we deny the petition for review.
Chaudhry argues that the BIA erred in upholding the IJ’s decision to
terminate his asylum status because that termination was based on a charge that
was not specified in the government’s Notice of Intent to Revoke Asylum. But we
lack jurisdiction to consider this procedural issue because Chaudhry failed to raise
it before the BIA. “It is a well-known axiom of administrative law that ‘if a
petitioner wishes to preserve an issue for appeal, he must first raise it in the proper
administrative forum.’” Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 1980)); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d) (stating that a court of appeals “may review a final order of removal only
if . . . (1) the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available”). We lack
jurisdiction to consider even a due process challenge so long as it involves a “mere
procedural error that an administrative tribunal could remedy.” Barron, 358 F.3d
at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2
Chaudhry next argues that he still has a well-founded fear of persecution
based on his continued political support of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and
the ongoing violence and persecution of PPP supporters in Pakistan. But
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s contrary conclusion. The status of an
asylee who, like Chaudhry, applied before April 1, 1997, may be terminated if the
government shows “by a preponderance of evidence” that “the alien no longer has
a well-founded fear of persecution upon return due to a change of country
conditions in the alien’s country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.24(a)(3), (f). The
evidence before the BIA adequately supported the BIA’s finding that conditions
have changed dramatically in Pakistan since Chaudhry’s request for asylum in
1993—based on his status as a PPP supporter—and since his eventual grant of
political asylum in 1999. The State Department’s 2008 Country Report on
Pakistan reflected that the widower of assassinated PPP leader Benazir Bhutto,
Asif Ali Zardari, became the President of Pakistan in September of 2008. That
same year, Pakistan’s February 18, 2008 elections “brought to power former
opposition parties, led by the PPP, in a coalition government.” By the end of 2008,
the PPP and its coalition partners “controlled the executive and legislative branches
of the national government and three of the four provincial assemblies.” These
political events supported the BIA’s finding of changed country conditions, such
3
that Chaudhry no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution. Furthermore,
Chaudhry admitted that he returned to Pakistan voluntarily after he was granted
asylum and remained there for as long as five weeks. While there, he was
photographed meeting with a Pakistani military general. These facts also
contributed to the substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s determination that
Chaudhry no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution due to changed
conditions in Pakistan. Cf. Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 1035, 1038 (9th
Cir. 2014) (holding that the BIA must consider changed country conditions for
purposes of a motion to reopen “in light of” “a change in the petitioner’s personal
circumstances”).
DENIED.
4