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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-12354
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cr-00312-VMC-AEP-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANTHONY R. REEVES,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(March 18, 2015)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Anthony Reeves appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence of tax fraud found in a backpack during a warrantless search of his
vehicle for narcotics. The district court concluded that the officer lawfully
searched and seized the contents of the backpack under the “plain-view” doctrine
because it was immediately apparent that the contents of the backpack were
evidence of fraud. After the denial of his motion to suppress, Reeves waived his
right to a jury trial and was found guilty by the court, based on stipulated facts, of
multiple counts of wire fraud, theft of government property, and aggravated
identity theft. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the incriminating nature of
the objects within the backpack was immediately apparent to the officer
conducting the search. We conclude that it was and therefore affirm.
I.
The relevant factual background is undisputed. Reeves was lawfully
stopped by Florida Highway Patrol Trooper Michael Scott for committing various
traffic infractions. During the stop, Scott deployed his canine partner, who alerted
to the presence of narcotics near the driver’s front door. Scott then began
searching the vehicle. In the passenger compartment, he found marijuana residue
and burnt marijuana seeds. In the trunk, Scott found the backpack at issue.
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Scott began searching the backpack for evidence of narcotics. In the
backpack, according to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation on the
motion to suppress, which the district court adopted,
Trooper Scott found a laptop computer, a notebook, a
plastic bag containing approximately thirty credit cards,
and medical records. (See Hearing Exs. 2, 5.) The
notebook contained ledgers listing various names and
their corresponding social security numbers and dates of
birth. (See Hearing Exs. 3, 4.) Based on this evidence,
Trooper Scott Mirandized Defendant and informed
Defendant that he suspected Defendant was involved in
some type of fraud. During this initial interview, Trooper
Scott asked Defendant whether he was responsible for
the backpack, and Defendant responded in the
affirmative. Trooper Scott then conducted a more
thorough search of the backpack, looking through the
pages of the notebook and the compartments of the
laptop computer for both narcotics and evidence of fraud.
After reviewing the medical records found in the backpack, the Florida
Highway Patrol contacted the Department of Veteran’s Affairs, which sent an
agent to the scene to review the medical records and interview Reeves. The police
eventually allowed Reeves to leave the scene but seized the items in the backpack.
Reeves was later indicted on twenty-four counts of various offenses,
including wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; theft of government
property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641; and aggravated identity theft, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). He moved to suppress evidence of the warrantless
search of the backpack, arguing that the incriminating nature of the items was not
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readily apparent, such that Scott did not have probable cause to search the
backpack further or to seize the contents.1 In support, Reeves relied on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S. Ct. 1149
(1987), for the proposition that the officer was not authorized as part of his search
for drugs to manipulate the items in the backpack.
At the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, Scott testified that he
was familiar with the type of instruments required to commit what he referred to as
“TurboTax fraud.” Specifically, Scott described what he called a “starter kit” or a
“bundle” for such fraud, which includes a list of names, social security numbers,
and dates of birth; a computer; and a means by which to acquire the tax refund,
such as credit cards. Upon finding similar items in Reeves’s backpack during his
initial search for narcotics, Scott testified, he suspected that Reeves was involved
in some type of fraud or identity theft. Scott further testified that his suspicions of
fraud would have been aroused had he only discovered the laptop computer in
conjunction with the copious number of credit cards.
The magistrate judge recommended denying the motion to suppress. First,
the magistrate judge found, Scott was permitted to manipulate the items of the
backpack as part of his search for narcotics, for which there was probable cause.
As part of this search, the magistrate judge stated, Scott could have looked through
1
Reeves originally presented other bases for suppression but later expressly waived all
other issues before the hearing on his motion to suppress.
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the pages of the notebook and medical records in order to search for hidden
narcotics and thereby observed the writing on the pages in plain view during that
search. According to the judge, even a “cursory view” of the pages was sufficient
to reveal their incriminating nature. Second, the judge determined, the grouping of
the items in the backpack alone, without reference to their contents, combined with
Scott’s prior knowledge of TurboTax fraud was arguably sufficient to establish
probable cause of fraud.
The district court overruled Reeves’s objections and adopted the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation. Based on stipulated facts, the district court at
a bench trial found Reeves guilty of the various tax-fraud and identity-theft
offenses. Reeves was sentenced to a total term of 87 months of imprisonment.
This appeal followed.
II.
In an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district
court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of the law to those facts
de novo. United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2010). We
construe all facts in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below—here,
the government. United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000).
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III.
Reeves argues that the plain-view doctrine does not support the search and
seizure of the backpack’s contents. He contends that, under Hicks, Trooper Scott
exceeded the permissible scope of his search of the backpack for drugs by moving
and manipulating the items in the backpack and then conducting a more thorough
second search of the backpack. Reeves also asserts that Scott had only reasonable
suspicion, not probable cause, to believe that the backpack contained evidence of
fraud based on the items that were in plain view.
The plain-view doctrine permits the warrantless seizure of an object where
an officer is lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly
viewed, the officer has a lawful right to access the object, and the incriminating
character of the object is “immediately apparent.” United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d
1276, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006); see Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37, 110
S. Ct. 2301, 2308 (1990). The plain-view doctrine applies, for example, when,
during the course of a lawful search for certain objects, the police come across
other items of incriminating character. Smith, 459 F.3d at 1290. Where an object
may lawfully be seized under the plain-view doctrine, it also may validly be
searched. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326, 107 S. Ct. at 1153. For an item’s incriminating
character to be “immediately apparent,” police must have probable cause to believe
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the object in plain view is contraband or evidence of a crime. Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993).
Probable cause exists when, based on the totality of the circumstances,
“there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.” United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)).
Although probable cause is ultimately a legal determination reviewed de novo,
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996), it is
also a common-sense assessment based on “the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life,” Smith, 459 F.3d at 1291 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310 (1949)). Therefore, a police officer may draw
inferences based on his own training and experience in deciding whether probable
cause exists, and we give “due weight” to the district court’s finding that the
officer was credible and the inference was reasonable. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699-
700, 116 S. Ct. at 1163; see Smith, 549 F.3d at 1291.
Reeves primarily relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hicks. In Hicks,
the police had entered the defendant’s apartment to investigate a bullet fired
through the defendant’s floor that had injured a man in the apartment below. 480
U.S. at 323, 107 S. Ct. at 1151-52. One of the officers noticed two sets of
expensive stereo equipment, otherwise out of place in the “squalid” and “ill-
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appointed” apartment, leading the officer to suspect that they were stolen. Id. at
323, 107 S. Ct. at 1152. The officer then moved a turntable to write down its serial
number, which subsequently revealed that the item was stolen. Id.
The Court held that the officer’s “moving of the equipment” constituted a
search independent from the search that was the basis for entry into the apartment.
Id. at 324-25, 107 S. Ct. at 1152. The Court explained that merely looking at a
suspicious object in plain view during a lawful search would not constitute an
independent search. Id. at 325, 107 S. Ct. at 1152. “But taking action, unrelated
to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, which expose[s] to view concealed”
information, creates a new invasion of the defendant’s privacy that must be
independently justified. Id. Thus, the search of the turntable would have been
authorized if the officer had probable cause to believe that the turntable was stolen,
but because the State had conceded the absence of probable cause, the Court held
that the search was not authorized under the plain-view doctrine. Id. at 326-29,
107 S. Ct. at 1153-55.
Here, we agree with the magistrate judge that Reeves’s reliance on Hicks is
unavailing. Reeves’s general contention that Scott had no basis to move,
manipulate, and search the contents of the backpack is meritless. Because Scott
had probable cause to search the car for narcotics based on the canine alert, as
Reeves concedes, United States v. Tamari, 454 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2006)
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(“We have long recognized that probable cause arises when a drug-trained canine
alerts to drugs.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), he also was permitted to
“search all parts of the vehicle, and any containers therein, where the object of the
search might be found,” United States v. Baldwin, 774 F.3d 711, 720 (11th Cir.
2014). Reeves does not contest that Scott lawfully accessed the trunk and the
backpack. Thus, Scott was permitted to search any part of the backpack in which
drugs may be found, which necessarily involves some manipulation and
examination of the objects in the backpack in order to complete the search. See
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2170-71 (1982) (“A
lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the
object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate
acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search.”).
Reeves’s more specific contention appears to be that Scott was not permitted
to open the notebook or to flip through the pages of the medical records as part of
his search for narcotics.2 But Scott testified, and the magistrate judge found
credible, that he did an “initial look” through the notebook to determine if there
were any drugs hidden within it. And the magistrate judge found, based on Scott’s
testimony, that through his training and experience Scott was aware that
2
Reeves’s argument on appeal is not developed with specificity. Rather, his contentions
refer only generally to the “manipulation” and “movement” of the “items” or “contents” of the
backpack, not to specific actions. Nonetheless, we are guided by the magistrate judge’s order,
which states that “the true issue is whether or not Trooper Scott could manipulate the contents of
Defendant’s backpack, i.e. open the notebook or flip through the pages of the medical records.”
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individuals will sometimes conceal narcotics between pages or even secrete
narcotics into the pages themselves. Based on his initial look, Scott was able to
“obviously” see a handwritten list of names and dates of birth. The magistrate
judge elaborated that the notebook also contained corresponding social security
numbers. Reeves calls Scott’s belief that the notebook could contain evidence of
drugs “unsubstantiated,” but other than this conclusory statement, he has not
explained why we should not defer to the magistrate judge’s findings that Scott
was credible and that, based on Scott’s experience, Scott reasonably believed that
the notebook could contain evidence of drugs. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699-700,
116 S. Ct. at 1163; Smith, 549 F.3d at 1291.
Therefore, in contrast to the search of the turntable in Hicks, which was
unrelated to the initial authorized intrusion, we cannot say that the cursory view of
the pages in the notebook fell outside of the scope of the officer’s search of the
backpack for drugs. See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325, 107 S. Ct. at 1152. In other
words, no new invasion of the defendant’s privacy was committed because Scott’s
actions were related to the “objectives of the authorized intrusion.” See id. And
the laptop computer, approximately thirty credit cards, and a notebook with a list
of names, dates of birth, and social security numbers, all in close proximity in the
backpack, were sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that the backpack
contained evidence of tax fraud or identity theft. See Baldwin, 774 F.3d at 720
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(holding that “mail from the IRS not addressed to [the defendant] or the other
passenger in the vehicle, debit cards not in their names, and currency within plain
view” were sufficient to establish probable cause to search the vehicle for evidence
of identity theft and tax fraud). In any case, even without knowing the contents of
the notebook or the medical records, a reasonable officer with Scott’s training and
experience with TurboTax fraud could conclude that the backpack contained
evidence of fraud based primarily on the huge number of credit cards and the
laptop computer.
Finally, we reject Reeves’s remaining arguments for suppression. Scott did
not need prior knowledge that Reeves was involved in any kind of fraud because,
as explained above, it was immediately apparent that the backpack contained
evidence of fraud. Nor is it relevant that Scott did not suspect Reeves of fraud
before he opened the backpack, because this is precisely the type of situation in
which the plain-view doctrine applies—where, during the course of a lawful
search, the officer discovers evidence of another crime that was not the object of
the search. See Smith, 459 F.3d at 1290.
IV.
In short, the magistrate judge properly determined that the officer found in
plain view, during the course of a lawful search of Reeves’s backpack, items
whose incriminating character was immediately apparent. See id. Therefore, the
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district court did not err in denying Reeves’s motion to suppress, and we affirm his
convictions.
AFFIRMED.
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