NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAR 18 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-50181 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 8:08-cr-00209-JVS-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TIM JAMES COLLINS,
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 2, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: GOULD, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,
Senior District Judge.**
Tim James Collins pled guilty to one count of possession of child pornography
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and waived his right to appeal the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Edward R. Korman, Senior United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
1
residency restriction condition of supervised release. On appeal, Collins claims not
to challenge the length of his term of supervised release or the residency restriction
condition. Instead, he argues that the residency restriction, taken together with
restrictions that California Penal Code § 3003.5(b) would impose on him as a federal
sex offender, renders the sentence unreasonable. Moreover, he also challenges the
constitutionality of the California statute at issue. We assume for the purposes of this
appeal that Collins did not waive his right to raise this issue on appeal, but we
nonetheless reject it.
The Attorney General of California has consistently taken the position that the
California law at issue only applies to state parolees. Brief for Respondent, People
v. Mosley, No. S187965, --- P.3d ---- , 2015 WL 858216 (Mar. 2, 2015), available at
2011 WL 1762429, at *11-12. Collins is not a state parolee and he admits that the
state has “[made] clear that it will not seek to apply Section 3003.5(b) to Mr. Collins,
or any other person other than those under California parole supervision.” Indeed, the
Supreme Court of California recently declined to rule on the law’s applicability to
nonparolees “in advance of any concrete evidence of prosecutors’ intent to press
charges against nonparolee sex offender registrants for noncompliance with the
residency restrictions.” People v. Mosley, No. S187965, --- P.3d ----, 2015 WL
858216, at *11 (Mar. 2, 2015).
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We decline to do so for similar reasons. When considering the ripeness of
challenges to terms of supervised release, we have drawn a line between challenges
to directly imposed terms of release and challenges to the prospective effects of those
terms. Compare United States v. Streich, 560 F.3d 926, 932 (9th Cir. 2009), with
United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, even if the
California law at issue applies to Collins, it was not imposed upon him as a condition
of supervised release, but is rather a collateral consequence of his conviction for
possessing child pornography. Absent some showing that the restriction embodied
in the California law will apply to him, Collins’s challenge is not ripe. Because the
challenge is not ripe, we also decline to address Collins’s argument on the
constitutionality of § 3003.5(b).
Collins also claims that the district judge committed procedural and substantive
errors when sentencing him. To the extent that these claims are ripe and not barred
by his appellate waiver, they are unavailing. His procedural error claims are wholly
unsupported by the record. Moreover, the district judge did not abuse his discretion
in imposing the substantive terms of the sentence. See United States v. Daniels, 541
F.3d 915, 928 (9th Cir. 2008).
AFFIRMED.
3