J-S12005-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MICHAEL CARTAGENA,
Appellant No. 1518 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 10, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003463-2010
BEFORE: BOWES, SHOGAN and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 18, 2015
Michael Cartagena appeals from the judgment of sentence of a
mandatory sentence of five to ten years incarceration imposed by the trial
court after a jury found him guilty of possession with intent to deliver
(“PWID”) and criminal conspiracy to commit PWID. After careful review, we
are constrained to vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remand for
resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm.
The trial court delineated the following salient facts.
At approximately 9:00 a.m. on December 28, 2009,
Officers Timothy Linahan and John Fleming set up surveillance
for the sale of narcotics in an unmarked police vehicle on the
2600 block of North Waterloo Street. Officers Linahan and
Fleming parked their car on the west side of 2700 block of North
Waterloo Street, facing southbound toward the 2600 block. The
Officers observed the Appellant and Luis Melendez standing on
the west side of 2600 Waterloo Street.
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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At approximately 9:30 a.m., Officers Linahan and Fleming
saw an unidentified Hispanic female approach Melendez, have a
brief conversation with him, and hand him money. In response,
Melendez crossed to the east side of the street, went to a parked
2003 Buick, and bent down to retrieve small objects located
underneath the car on the curb side. He then returned to the
female, spoke to her, and handed her small objects. Officers
were unable to stop the female.
At approximately 9:55 a.m., a male later identified as
Douglas Stansbury approached Melendez. After a brief
conversation, Stansbury handed money to Melendez. Again,
Melendez crossed to the east side of the street, retrieved objects
from near the same Buick, and returned to Stansbury. Melendez
gave Stansbury small objects, and Stansbury left the area.
Officer Linahan radioed for other officers to stop Stansbury.
Sergeant Lonnie Clausson stopped Stansbury and found a yellow
tint packet of cocaine in his mouth.
At approximately 10:15 a.m., Melendez and the Appellant
entered the Buick parked on the east side of the street. The
Appellant sat in the driver's seat. Then, Melendez exited the
Buick and crossed over to the west side of the block. At
approximately 10:20 a.m., two unknown white males
approached Melendez. After a brief conversation, the two males
handed Melendez money. Again, Melendez crossed from the
west side to the east side of the street, retrieved small objects,
returned to the two males, and handed them the objects. The
males then left the area. Officers were unable to locate the
males.
At approximately the same time, two unknown black males
approached Melendez, spoke to him, and handed him money.
Melendez put one finger up in the air, indicating "one minute."
Melendez then knocked at the door of 2640 Waterloo Street.
After approximately thirty seconds, Rolando Hernandez
answered the door and let Melendez into the house. Two to three
minutes later, Melendez exited the house, crossed to the east
side of the street, and bent down. Melendez set an object down
near the rear of the parked Buick. Melendez then walked over to
the two black males and handed them small objects. The males
left the scene. Officers were unable to stop these males. At
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approximately 10:45 a.m., Melendez again entered the Buick
with the Appellant.
At approximately 11:00 a.m., the Appellant exited the
Buick, crossed the street, and stood on the west side of 2600
Waterloo Street. An unknown Hispanic male and female
approached the Appellant. The individuals handed the Appellant
money. Like Melendez, the Appellant crossed to the east side of
the street, retrieved small objects from behind the Buick,
returned, and handed them the objects. Back-up officers were
unable to locate the buyers.
At approximately 11:15 a.m., Officer Linahan radioed for
available backup officers to stop the Appellant and Melendez.
Sergeant Lonnie Clausson and Officer Swift responded to the call
and stopped the Appellant and Melendez. Officer Linahan exited
his vehicle, walked toward 2600 Waterloo Street, and
approached the Buick. Officer Linahan looked through the car
window and observed a clear baggie containing yellow tint
packets of crack cocaine.
Sergeant Clausson and Officer Linahan then walked to
2640 Waterloo Street and knocked on the front door. Rolando
Hernandez poked his head out of a second floor front bedroom
window and said that he would be right down. After two to three
minutes, Hernandez answered the front door. The police
subsequently detained Hernandez for investigation pending a
search warrant.
The Officers later called in a K-9 dog to sniff for drugs in
the parked Buick. After the dog gave a positive indication for
drugs near the doors, the Officers secured the car. Officers then
conducted a walk-through of 2640 Waterloo to secure the house
while they waited for the search warrant. The Officers
1
subsequently contacted Lieutenant Robert Otto [sic ] and Officer
Michael Spicer of the Narcotics Field Unit.
Officer Spicer and Lieutenant Otto [sic] obtained a search
warrant for the Buick and for 2640 Waterloo Street and
confiscated the drugs in the car and the house. In the Buick,
Spicer and Otto confiscated a marijuana blunt from inside the
1
The officer’s last name, according to the trial transcript, was Ott.
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ashtray. They also found a clear packet of marijuana on the
front seat and plastic with 28 yellow Ziploc packets of crack
cocaine. In the console between the two front seats, Spicer and
Otto further confiscated $33.00, and two bills addressed to the
Appellant.
Inside the house, Officer Spicer and Lieutenant Otto [sic]
recovered 92 packets of marijuana and 55 orange packets of
powder cocaine in a bedroom. The Officers recovered 364
yellow tinted Ziploc packets of crack cocaine near a .40 [caliber]
semiautomatic handgun with 3 live rounds in the basement. The
Officers also recovered 61 Xanax pills, 11 packets of heroin,
marijuana, and various drug paraphernalia in the living room.
Additionally, the Officers recovered money in the basement,
living room, and bedroom totaling $1,837.00. In the bedroom
and the living room, the Officers found unused Ziploc packets
and jars. They also found a lease, access card, Comcast bill, a
payment card, and mail in Hernandez's name.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/14, 2-6 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
Police charged Appellant with the aforementioned offenses. Appellant,
Rolando Hernandez, and another individual, Suhay Rodriguez,2 were jointly
tried in September of 2012. The jury convicted Appellant of both PWID and
conspiracy to commit PWID. Appellant filed a motion for extraordinary
relief.3 The court heard argument on the motion on March 15, 2013, and
denied it on May 10, 2013. The court then sentenced Appellant to a
2
The facts relevant to Ms. Rodriguez relate to a later incident not material to
the disposition of this case.
3
The filing of such a motion is ordinarily improper since motions for
extraordinary relief are intended to be oral. Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(B); see also
Commonwealth v. Howe, 842 A.2d 436, 441 (Pa.Super. 2004); but
compare Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(C).
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mandatory minimum sentence of five to ten years incarceration under 18
Pa.C.S. § 7508 followed by two years probation.
This timely appeal ensued. The trial court directed Appellant to file
and serve a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal. Appellant complied, and the trial court authored its Rule 1925(a)
opinion. The matter is now ready for this Court’s review. Appellant’s sole
issue on appeal is “Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion by
denying Appellant’s motion for extraordinary relief based on evidence that a
police officer involved in the instant matter had been disavowed by the
Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office after Appellant was convicted?
Appellant’s brief at 2.
Appellant’s claim implicates the law governing after-discovered
evidence. In Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356 (Pa.Super. 2010),
this Court opined that a petitioner must show the evidence “(1) could not
have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial by the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) will
not be used solely to impeach the credibility of a witness; and (4) would
likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted.” Id. at 363.
Failure to satisfy any of these aspects of the test results in the claim failing.
Padillas, supra at 363.
With respect to determining the diligence aspect of the test, a
petitioner cannot show diligence if he declined “to question or investigate an
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obvious, available source of information[.]” Id. In addition to
demonstrating that the evidence could not be ascertained despite reasonable
diligence, a petitioner must prove that the evidence is not merely cumulative
or corroborative of other evidence introduced at trial. Evidence that
supports a defense leveled at trial may be considered corroborative and/or
cumulative. Id. at 365.
In considering the prejudice prong of the after-discovered evidence
test, courts are to look to “the integrity of the alleged after-discovered
evidence, the motive of those offering the evidence, and the overall strength
of the evidence supporting the conviction.” Padillas, supra at 365.
Moreover, the after-discovered evidence must be admissible.
Commonwealth v. Castro, 93 A.3d 818 (Pa. 2014).
Appellant argues that because he learned after his trial that the
Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office no longer prosecuted drug cases
involving Officer Spicer and several other narcotics officers, including an
Officer Betts,4 all of whom had been transferred from the narcotics unit, he
should be awarded a new trial. According to Appellant, on December 3,
2012, Philadelphia District Attorney R. Seth Williams notified the Philadelphia
Police Commissioner that he would no longer use Officer Spicer, Officer
Betts, and four other officers in drug cases or accept narcotics cases where
4
Although briefly mentioning Officer Betts in his brief, Appellant’s focus is on
Officer Spicer, who had more extensive involvement in the case.
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those officers were necessary witnesses. In addition, the correspondence
indicated that the District Attorney’s Office would no longer approve
warrants where any of the officers were affiants or provided averments
necessary to establish probable cause.
Several articles from the Philadelphia Inquirer from December 5, 2012,
December 7, 2012, and January 31, 2013, appeared in relation to the
District Attorney’s decision. Those newspaper articles asserted that Officer
Spicer, Officer Betts, and their colleagues could no longer be considered
credible witnesses and had been the target of Internal Affairs investigations
and federal lawsuits relative to false arrests, fraudulent reports, and the use
of excessive force. According to the January 31st article, the Philadelphia
District Attorney’s Office had withdrawn 260 cases where the officers were
involved.
Appellant maintains that the fact, which the Commonwealth does not
dispute, that it no longer prosecutes drug cases where Officer Spicer is an
essential witness could not have been discovered before or during his trial.
Specifically, the Commonwealth tried Appellant in September of 2012,
before the District Attorney’s notification to the Police Commissioner.
Appellant continues that the evidence would not be used solely to
impeach Officer Spicer and Officer Betts because such evidence would also
“call into question the validity of the search warrant that Officer Spicer
prepared and obtained.” Appellant’s brief at 13. In Appellant’s view,
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attacking Officer Spicer’s reliability would go “directly to establish appellant’s
innocence at least with respect to the drugs found in the house[.]” Id.
Next, Appellant contends that since there was no evidence at trial that
Officer Spicer or Officer Betts were no longer being utilized as witnesses in
drug cases, the evidence was not cumulative or corroborative of that
presented at trial. Lastly, Appellant asserts that, had the jury been aware
that the District Attorney’s Office was not prosecuting drug cases where
Officer Spicer was a material witness, it would likely have reached a different
verdict.
The Commonwealth responds that Appellant’s proffered evidence
consisted of newspaper articles which, in Castro, supra, were held
insufficient to constitute after-discovered evidence. In Castro, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a decision by this Court that had
remanded for additional proceedings on the basis of after-discovered
evidence in the nature of newspaper articles. Those articles indicated that
the Philadelphia police officer involved in the undercover drug investigation
in that matter had engaged in serious misconduct in other cases. The
Castro Court concluded that the newspaper articles were not admissible
evidence.
The Commonwealth also posits that Appellant cannot demonstrate that
a different verdict would be likely if the jury were apprised of Officer Spicer’s
issues. In leveling this aspect of its response, the Commonwealth notes that
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Officer Spicer had limited involvement in the case. The evidence supporting
Appellant’s convictions stemmed from eyewitness observations from Officer
Linahan and Officer Fleming. It points out that the officers observed
numerous hand-to-hand drug transactions, and that Appellant’s co-
conspirator was seen restocking a stash of drugs from another conspirator’s
house. Further, police arrested one buyer who had a yellow-tinted packet of
crack cocaine in his mouth. This cocaine was consistent with that viewed by
Officer Linahan and Officer Clausson inside the Buick that Appellant and
Melendez were seen utilizing.
The Commonwealth adds that Officer Spicer’s testimony regarding
additional cocaine and mail with Appellant’s name inside the Buick was
cumulative of the overwhelming additional evidence that Appellant used the
vehicle when distributing drugs. It points out that other officers also
testified that Appellant’s conspirator, Roberto Hernandez, lived in the house
that was being used to supply Appellant and Melendez with drugs. Finally,
the Commonwealth assails Appellant’s position with respect to Officer
Spicer’s involvement with securing the search warrant. It submits that the
affidavit for that warrant was based on information provided by Officer
Linahan.
We find that, based on the additional evidence supplied by other
officers, the revelation of Officer Spicer’s removal from the narcotics unit
and the District Attorney’s refusal to prosecute cases in which he was a
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material witness, would not have altered the verdict. Here, Officer Spicer
was not an essential witness as to the elements of the offenses. Although
Officer Spicer was the affiant on the search warrant, the information used to
establish probable cause came from other officers. Evidence that Appellant
was involved in hand-to-hand cocaine transactions was extensive and had
no relation to Officer Spicer. Officers, other than Officer Spicer, observed
Appellant inside the Buick in question and engaging in frequent interactions
that, viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, were plainly
drug sales. A drug sniffing dog alerted on the vehicle prior to Officer
Spicer’s involvement. Moreover, evidence that the house in question was
being used as a drug operations base was supported by officers other than
Officer Spicer.
Since the evidence, even excluding the evidence discovered by Officer
Spicer,5 was overwhelming that Appellant was selling cocaine and doing so
with other individuals, there is no probability that the jury would have found
Appellant not guilty of PWID and conspiracy based on information regarding
potential corruption on the part of Officer Spicer. Accordingly, his issue fails.
Nonetheless, and although Appellant does not raise the issue, we are
constrained to vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence since he was
sentenced under a mandatory sentencing statute that has been struck down
5
We note that Officer Spicer was not the only officer collecting evidence
from the house.
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as unconstitutional as a whole. See Commonwealth v. Vargas, 2014 PA
Super 289 (en banc); Commonwealth v. Fennell, 105 A.3d 13 (Pa.Super.
2014); compare also Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa.Super.
2014) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801 (Pa.Super.
2014); Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 105 A.3d 748 (Pa.Super. 2014);
Commonwealth v. Bizzel, 2014 PA Super 267; Commonwealth v.
Wolfe, 2014 PA Super 288; Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 2015 PA Super
1.6
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/18/2015
6
Writing solely for myself, I note that in recent cases I have criticized this
Court’s severability and separation of powers analysis relative to mandatory
minimums, Commonwealth v. Bizzel, 2014 PA Super 267 (Bowes, J.,
concurring); Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 2014 PA Super 288 (Bowes, J.,
concurring) (joined by Jenkins, J.), and suggested that we re-visit our
legality of sentence paradigm as it relates to Alleyne mandatory minimum
questions. See Wolfe, supra. Further, I have been reluctant to sua sponte
overturn a mandatory sentence without adequate briefing. See Wolfe,
supra at *9 (noting that our Pennsylvania Supreme Court has declined to
address illegal sentencing questions not raised or adequately argued in that
court). I continue to adhere to those views, but I am currently bound by the
decisions cited in the body of this memorandum.
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