13-3749
McCray v. County of Suffolk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 19th day of March, two thousand fifteen.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
8 Circuit Judges,
9 JESSE M. FURMAN,*
10 District Judge.
11
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
13 DARNELL McCRAY,
14 Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16 -v.- 13-3749
17
18 COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, NEW YORK,
19 Defendant-Appellee.
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21
22 FOR APPELLANT: A.J. BOSMAN, Bosman Law Firm,
23 L.L.C., Rome, New York.
*
Judge Jesse M. Furman, of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by
designation.
1
1 FOR APPELLEE: ARLENE S. ZWILLING, for Dennis
2 M. Brown, Suffolk County
3 Attorney, Hauppauge, New York.
4
5 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
6 Court for the Eastern District of New York (Feuerstein, J.).
7
8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
9 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
10 AFFIRMED.
11
12 Darnell McCray appeals from the judgment of the United
13 States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
14 (Feuerstein, J.), granting summary judgment in favor of
15 defendant-appellee, the County of Suffolk, New York.
16 McCray’s pro se lawsuit against the County of Suffolk, under
17 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York state law, alleges that the
18 County violated his constitutional rights pursuant to
19 policies and customs abrogating its responsibility to care
20 for prisoners’ medical needs. We assume the parties’
21 familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
22 history, and the issues presented for review.
23
24 McCray underwent a medical screening the day after he
25 arrived at the Suffolk County Correctional Facility in May
26 2010. The screening reflected that his fingers were broken
27 and had been evaluated and splinted at a hospital prior to
28 his incarceration. The prison housed McCray in its Medical
29 Tier, and provided an x-ray, a CT scan, a physical therapy
30 evaluation, instructions to exercise, and pain relief
31 medication. McCray alleges that the prison’s medical
32 director, Dr. Vincent Geraci, referred McCray to a hand
33 surgeon, but no surgery ensued. According to McCray, the
34 prison’s failure to provide surgery caused him physical
35 pain, emotional distress, and incomplete healing of the
36 fractures.
37
38 After discovery, the County moved for summary judgment.
39 McCray then moved for leave to amend his complaint by adding
40 Dr. Geraci as a defendant, and for an order directing the
41 County to identify the individuals who signed certain
42 medical records. The district court granted the County’s
43 motion for summary judgment, holding that McCray had not
44 identified a policy or custom as required by Monell v.
45 Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978);
46 declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
47 state law claims; denied leave to amend the complaint, on
2
1 the ground that amendment would be futile; and declined to
2 order the disclosure of potential witnesses’ identities
3 after the close of discovery.
4
5 We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
6 judgment. Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir.
7 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate only if “there is no
8 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
9 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P.
10 56(a). To establish municipal liability for
11 unconstitutional acts by municipal employees, a plaintiff
12 must show that the violation of his constitutional rights
13 was caused by a municipal policy, custom, or practice.
14 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. For purposes of that
15 requirement, “[a]ctions by an individual with final
16 decision-making authority in a municipality constitute
17 official policy.” Anthony v. City of New York, 339 F.3d
18 129, 139 (2d Cir. 2003). McCray urges that the prison’s
19 failure to arrange surgery satisfies Monell’s requirement
20 due to the involvement of Dr. Geraci, who may have had final
21 decision-making authority. The summary judgment record,
22 viewed in the light most favorable to McCray, indicates that
23 Dr. Geraci referred McCray to a hand surgeon; it is silent
24 as to any other actions by Dr. Geraci. There is no record
25 support to charge the County with a policy of negligence or
26 deliberate indifference based on the affirmative and
27 salutary action of Dr. Geraci. We therefore affirm the
28 grant of summary judgment for the County.
29
30 As to McCray’s motion to amend his complaint, we
31 generally “review denial of leave to amend under an ‘abuse
32 of discretion’ standard”; however, “[w]hen the denial of
33 leave to amend is based on a legal interpretation, such as a
34 determination that amendment would be futile, a reviewing
35 court conducts a de novo review.” Hutchison v. Deutsche
36 Bank Sec. Inc., 647 F.3d 479, 490 (2d Cir. 2011). McCray
37 sought to add Dr. Geraci as a defendant in this litigation,
38 without specifying whether he sought to name Dr. Geraci in
39 his official or personal capacity. Official-capacity
40 liability would have required proof of a municipal policy or
41 custom, whereas personal liability would have required only
42 that Dr. Geraci himself caused the deprivation of a federal
43 right while acting under color of state law. See Kentucky
44 v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985). In view of our
45 obligation to construe pro se submissions liberally, see,
46 e.g., Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474
47 (2d Cir. 2006), we consider both possibilities. First, if
3
1 McCray had intended to sue Dr. Geraci in his official
2 capacity, the absence of a relevant policy or custom would
3 have defeated the cause of action, just as it defeated the
4 action against the County. Second, if McCray had intended
5 to sue Dr. Geraci in his personal capacity, the absence of
6 any evidence other than that Dr. Geraci referred McCray to a
7 hand surgeon would have defeated any inference that Dr.
8 Geraci’s actions were inconsistent with any federal right.
9 In either case, the proposed amendment would have been
10 futile, so the motion was properly denied.
11
12 Finally, as to McCray’s post-discovery motion for an
13 order directing the County to identify individuals who
14 signed his prison medical records, which we regard as a
15 motion for additional discovery, “we will review the
16 district court’s denial of additional discovery for an abuse
17 of its discretion.” First City, Tex.-Houston, N.A. v.
18 Rafidain Bank, 150 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 1998). McCray
19 submitted this motion approximately nine months after the
20 close of discovery. McCray wanted to know who signed his
21 medical records because he “may need to call them as
22 witnesses.” (App. 45.) The district court denied the
23 motion on account of its untimeliness. Even giving “extra
24 leeway” to this pro se motion in complying with procedural
25 rules, Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir.
26 1993), the motion’s late timing and thin justification bring
27 the district court’s denial well within the range of
28 permissible decisions.
29
30 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in
31 McCray’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of
32 the district court.
33
34 FOR THE COURT:
35 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
36
4