United States v. Keith Reed

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4835

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KEITH WILLIE REED,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 13-4836

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

STANLEY RAY WINSTON, a/k/a Stanley Wilson, a/k/a Rashaad
Winston,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 13-4837

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.
ANTHONY CANNON,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 13-4839

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TOBIAS RICHARD DYER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00048-CMH-1; 1:13-cr-00048-CMH-2;
1:13-cr-00048-CMH-3; 1:13-cr-00048-CMH-4)

Argued: December 11, 2014 Decided: March 11, 2015

Before AGEE, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Agee and Judge Diaz joined.

ARGUED: Melinda VanLowe, LAW OFFICE OF MELINDA L. VANLOWE,
Fairfax, Virginia; Lawrence Hunter Woodward, Jr., SHUTTLEWORTH,
RULOFF, SWAIN, HADDAD & MORECOCK, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia;
Alfred Lincoln Robertson, Jr., ROBERTSON LAW OFFICE, PLLC,
Alexandria, Virginia; Abram John Pafford, PAFFORD, LAWRENCE &
CHILDRESS, PLLC, Lynchburg, Virginia, for Appellants. Rebeca
Hidalgo Bellows, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Dana J. Boente,
United States Attorney, Patricia T. Giles, Assistant United

2
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

3
FLOYD, Circuit Judge:

Four masked men committed a string of robberies around

Alexandria and Arlington, Virginia, in December 2012. During

the third and final robbery, the thieves took $60,411.15 from a

credit union. They also unwittingly took three GPS tracking

devices embedded in the cash. The GPS devices led police to the

four appellants in this case: Keith Reed, Stanley Winston,

Anthony Cannon, and Tobias Dyer (collectively, “Appellants”).

Appellants were ultimately convicted at a jury trial for

multiple offenses. In this consolidated appeal, Appellants

challenge the admission of certain evidence and claim that there

is insufficient evidence to convict them for any of the charged

crimes. For the reasons stated below, we affirm their

convictions.

I.

At trial the government proffered evidence, viewed in the

light most favorable to the government’s case, that supports the

following narrative. United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 139

(4th Cir. 2014).

A.

At approximately 8:04 p.m. on December 7, 2012, three

African American men entered the premises of VVM, Inc., a

4
business that sells cell phones and international phone cards in

Alexandria, Virginia. When the men entered, a VVM employee was

serving a customer. The men--wearing ski masks and brandishing

firearms--ordered the employee and customer to the floor and

demanded that they not move. After unsuccessfully trying to

breach a closed Western Union office that shared the premises

with VVM, the men grabbed approximately $800 from the VVM cash

register. They then fled in a Jeep driven by a fourth

accomplice. Police recovered a Jeep the next morning,

approximately a half mile from the VVM store. The Jeep, which

had been reported stolen, was damaged from a punched-in

ignition, and the last four numbers of its license plate matched

those provided by a witness to the VVM robbery.

Camera footage of the robbery, along with witness

testimony, revealed that two of the robbers who entered VVM were

tall (approximately six feet), while the third was shorter

(approximately five feet, six inches). Two of the appellants–-

Cannon and Dyer--are six feet tall, while Winston is shorter at

approximately five feet, six inches. Moreover, all the

appellants are African American.

Cell-phone records show that Appellants had called each

other numerous times throughout the day of the robbery. There

were no calls between them after 6:00 p.m., however, implying

that they were together by that point. Phone records also show

5
Appellants had traveled to Alexandria by 6:30 p.m., were near

VVM at 8:00 p.m., and had returned to their hometown of

Washington, D.C., by 8:13 p.m. (just after the robbery), where

they remained for the rest of the night.

B.

Two days later, on December 9 at approximately 6:30 a.m.,

three masked men brandishing firearms entered a Shoppers Food

Warehouse in Alexandria, while a fourth man waited in a Jeep

outside. The robbers who entered the store were African

American, and again two of them were tall while the third was

shorter. One tall robber climbed a wall into a manager’s

office, while the other two ordered employees and a customer to

the ground while the robbers took money from cash registers.

The robbers fled the store with $15,695. Later that day, some

of the appellants used their phones to take pictures of stacks

of cash and themselves celebrating at a club. Police found a

stolen Jeep, which was also damaged from a punched-in ignition,

a week later in D.C. In the Jeep’s trunk, officers recovered

cash tills containing receipts from the Alexandria Shoppers Food

Warehouse.

Phone records again show that Appellants (primarily Dyer

and Reed) made numerous calls to each other during the day of

the robbery--this time in the early morning from midnight to

6
5:21 a.m. These records also show that although Reed, Cannon,

and Dyer were all in D.C. before 5:30 a.m., at least Reed and

Cannon were in Alexandria and near the Shoppers Food Warehouse

by 6:15 a.m.--only 15 minutes before the robbery.

C.

Two weeks later, on December 22 at approximately 9:50 a.m.,

three masked men entered a Navy Federal Credit Union (“the

Credit Union”) in Arlington, Virginia, while a fourth waited in

a Jeep outside. Once again, two of the robbers were tall, the

other short. The short robber demanded money near the Credit

Union’s main entrance. The tall robbers--one of whom had a

semi-automatic handgun with a drum-style magazine--jumped over

the teller counter. One robber filled a trash can with money

from the teller drawer, while another went to the Credit Union’s

vault, where he took money and cash bags. The robbers fled with

$60,411.15 and--unbeknownst to them--three GPS tracking devices

hidden in the cash. A stolen Jeep matching the description of

the escape vehicle was found later, again damaged with a

punched-in ignition. In addition, the officers recovered a

trash can in the Jeep’s front passenger area, similar to one the

Credit Union robbers had reportedly used to transport the stolen

bags of money.

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 Phone records show that Dyer, Winston, and Reed called each

other several times in the hours before the robbery. Although

they were all in D.C. during the early morning, records show

that at least Winston was in Arlington near the Navy Federal

Credit Union by 9:32 a.m.--approximately 18 minutes before the

robbery.

D.

Law enforcement tracked the GPS signals to an area in

southeast D.C. A police officer canvassed the area for four to

six males. The officer saw Appellants walking on the street.

One of the men left the group to drop a blue bag--later found to

contain a hoodie and ski mask--across the street and then

returned to the group. The officer asked the group whether they

lived nearby and requested that they present identification.

Reed then fled into woods, and the others followed.

Additional police officers arrived and joined in the

pursuit. The officers apprehended each appellant one by one.

When the officers spotted Reed, he had a blue cell phone in his

hand and appeared to be talking on it. Despite orders to keep

his hands up, Reed kept dropping his hands. When officers

approached, an officer saw the phone and a black ski mask near

Reed. Another officer detained Reed and placed his belongings

(including the cell phone) in a property bag, which was

8
transported to a police station. 1 The police also transported a

bag labeled “Dyer” containing an iPhone 5 to the police station,

although at trial the government offered no testimony about how

this phone was seized. Officers found masks, money, and gloves

strewn on the ground throughout the woods where Appellants were

arrested.

After Appellants were apprehended, police found that the

third GPS tracker was emitting signals from Cannon’s residence.

In that house, police found three ski masks, two pairs of black

gloves, thousands of dollars in cash, the third GPS tracker, and

three firearms (including one with a drum-style magazine). In

total, officers seized eight masks, which analysts found

contained DNA consistent with Appellants’ DNA.

E.

On April 23, 2013, a federal grand jury indicted Reed,

Winston, Cannon, and Dyer on 12 counts stemming from the three

robberies: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act 2 robbery (Count 1);

Hobbs Act robbery (Counts 2 through 4, for each robbery); armed

robbery of a credit union (Count 5); using, carrying, and

1
It was standard practice for officers to place an
arrestee’s personal effects in a property bag labeled with the
arrestee’s name. FBI Special Agent Mark Hess later collected
all the bags from the police station.
2
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951.

9
brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of

violence (Counts 6 through 8, for each robbery); and being a

felon-in-possession of a firearm (Counts 9 through 12, for each

appellant). After a four-day trial, a jury convicted Appellants

on all counts. Winston and Cannon filed separate motions for

judgment of acquittal, which were denied. The district judge

sentenced each of the appellants to 720 months (60 years) in

prison.

II.

Appellants contest their convictions on several grounds.

First, they argue that the trial judge abused his discretion and

violated the Federal Rules of Evidence by admitting certain

evidence. Similarly, but separately, Dyer claims that admitting

evidence recovered from his cell phone violated the Sixth

Amendment because the government failed to offer any testimony

establishing how the phone was seized. Finally, Appellants

argue that there is insufficient evidence to sustain their

convictions. We assess each argument below.

A.

Appellants first challenge the trial court’s admission of

Exhibit 45, a collection of maps produced by the FBI Cellular

Analysis Detail Team and proffered by the government at trial.

10
The FBI produced the maps using data from Appellants’ cell

phones and their service providers’ cell towers. As explained

at trial, a cell phone communicates with towers (usually the

tower closest to the phone) when a person sends a text, makes or

receives a voice call, or uses cellular data. Service providers

record these communications. From these records, the FBI can

extrapolate a probable area in which the phone was located over

time. This process is known as a historical cell-site analysis.

In this case, the cell-site analysis from Appellants’ phone data

placed at least one of the appellants near the scene of each

robbery, close in time to when the robbery occurred. 3

On appeal, Appellants challenge the government’s use of

their names, rather than phone numbers, when showing the phones’

locations on the maps in Exhibit 45. For example, the map

indicated that it was detailing Cannon’s possible location at

8:12 p.m. on December 7, 2012, rather than showing the

whereabouts of the phone associated with the number

202.510.4853. The government expert testified before the jury

that this labeling would be erroneous for a certain defendant if

3
For example, Reed’s phone data showed that he was in
Washington, D.C. around 6:05 p.m. on December 7, 2012, but near
Alexandria and the VVM store a mere 20 minutes later. His phone
contacted a phone tower in Alexandria again around 8:04 p.m.--
the time of the robbery. A mere ten minutes after the robbery
occurred, Reed’s phone contacted a tower back in D.C.,
suggesting that he quickly returned to D.C. after committing the
VVM robbery.

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the defendant did not in fact possess the cell phone. Although

Appellants make several different arguments under the Federal

Rules of Evidence for why the trial judge abused his discretion

in admitting Exhibit 45, all the arguments lack merit.

1.

We review the trial court’s admission of Exhibit 45 for

abuse of discretion. United States v. Mouzone, 687 F.3d 207,

216 (4th Cir. 2012). In other words, we look to see whether the

evidentiary ruling was “arbitrary and irrational.” Hassan, 742

F.3d at 130 (quoting United States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153

(4th Cir. 2011)).

2.

Appellants first argue that the government failed to

authenticate Exhibit 45 under Rule 901(a) of the Federal Rules

of Evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) (“[T]he proponent must

produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item

is what the proponent claims it is.”). A proponent can

authenticate an item through various means, including

“[t]estimony that an item is what it is claimed to be” or “[t]he

appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other

distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all

the circumstances.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1), (4). “[T]he

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burden to authenticate under Rule 901 is not high,” as a

“district court’s role is to serve as gatekeeper in assessing

whether the proponent has offered a satisfactory foundation from

which the jury could reasonably find that the evidence is

authentic.” Hassan, 742 F.3d at 133 (quoting United States v.

Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 2009)).

Notwithstanding Appellants’ assertion to the contrary, the

district court did not violate Rule 901 by admitting Exhibit 45.

The government provided adequate reason for the jury to believe

(i) that phone data could be used to approximate the phones’

location at pertinent times and (ii) that each phone number was

associated with a certain appellant. First, as to providing a

foundation for the technical aspects of the cell-site analysis,

the government’s expert, Agent Kevin Horan of the FBI Cellular

Analysis Detail Team, detailed how he conducts a cell-site

analysis and how it reveals the area in which a phone is likely

located at a certain time. See J.A. 703-04, 710-18. This

testimony provided a foundation for how the maps were created

and allowed the jury to conclude that the maps reflected the

phones’ locations.

Second, the government proffered evidence that the jury

could use to attribute each phone to one of the four appellants.

The government tied the phone with number 202.339.9022 to Dyer

through photos of Dyer on the phone and text messages

13
attributing the number to Dyer, including several that used

variations on his first name, Tobias. See J.A. 650-52; S.J.A.

77 (“Tfoool”), 88 (“Tobb”), 120 (“UNCLE TOBYYY”), 123

(“Tobias”), 124 (“Tobias”), 125 (“Toby”), 127 (“Sup love dis

Toby”), 131-70. The government tied 202.594.4127 to Stanley

Winston through a text message that identified the owner as

“Stanley” and testimony that Winston handled the phone at issue

and assisted the officers in searching the phone. J.A. 481-82;

S.J.A. 97. The government tied 240.355.8256 to Reed through

testimony of Officer Harry Singleton, who said that he had seen

Reed talking on the associated blue phone, which was recovered

near where Reed was apprehended. J.A. 234-35, 237-38; see also

J.A. 240-41 (describing how Reed’s property was collected). And

finally, the government tied 202.510.4853 to Cannon, despite no

phone being found, through the labeling of that number in

Winston’s phone as “Cannon.” See S.J.A. 93, 97. Based on this

testimony and the phones’ data, the government provided a

foundation to authenticate each phone as belonging to a certain

appellant. Thus, the trial court’s admission of Exhibit 45 did

not violate Rule 901(a).

3.

Second, Appellants argue that Exhibit 45 was irrelevant

under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 401

14
provides that “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any

tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be

without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in

determining the action.” The “fact” at issue here is whether

Appellants committed the robberies. Put simply, Exhibit 45

shows Appellants’ proximity to the scenes of the robberies close

to the times the robberies occurred, as well as Appellants’

respective proximity to one another on the days of the

robberies. This evidence makes it more probable that they

committed the robberies. Thus, Exhibit 45 was plainly relevant

under Rule 401.

4.

Finally, Appellants argue that Exhibit 45 was unfairly

prejudicial, confused the issues, and misled the jury under Rule

403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 403 provides that a

“court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice,

confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury.” We employ a

“highly deferential” standard of review, in which a “decision to

admit evidence over a Rule 403 objection will not be overturned

except under the most extraordinary circumstances, where that

discretion has been plainly abused.” Hassan, 742 F.3d at 132

15
(quoting United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 265 (4th Cir.

2008)).

Appellants’ argument is based on Exhibit 45 (i) purportedly

not being drawn to scale and (ii) using Appellants’ names rather

the phones’ numbers as labels. As to whether Exhibit 45’s scale

caused unfair prejudice or misled the jury, Appellants rely on

bare conclusions. Thus, they have failed to show that the maps

in Exhibit 45 were in fact not drawn to scale or that the scale

caused any unfair prejudice.

Appellants’ argument regarding the use of their names

rather than the phones’ numbers is somewhat stronger, but

likewise without merit. As Appellants correctly note, for the

labeling to be accurate, the jury was required to conclude that

each appellant in fact possessed the phone attributed to him.

Appellants argue that the use of names, not numbers, usurped the

jury’s prerogative to make this determination. The record,

however, shows otherwise. Indeed, the government’s expert and

Appellants’ counsel repeatedly noted at trial (i) that Exhibit

45 was not dispositive of whether Appellants in fact possessed

the phones and (ii) that the use of names would be inaccurate if

the government mistakenly attributed the phones to Appellants.

See, e.g., J.A. 713, 715-18, 734-35, 742-45, 829-30, 835, 849.

This testimony mitigated any likelihood of unfair prejudice,

confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. Therefore, any

16
prejudice from using names rather than numbers does not

substantially outweigh Exhibit 45’s probative value, and the

trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the

evidence.

B.

Appellant Dyer posits his own argument for why the trial

court improperly admitted data retrieved from the cell phone

attributed to him. 4 He argues that admitting this evidence

violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause because not

everyone in the phone’s chain of custody testified at trial.

FBI Special Agent Mark Hess testified only that he took a bag--

labeled “Dyer”--of items found at the police station and used

the contents to produce a case against Dyer and others. Dyer

emphasizes that there was no testimony about who initially

seized the phone and from where it was taken.

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that

“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the

right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”

U.S. Const. amend. VI. Evidence implicates the Confrontation

4
Dyer also argues that the phone and its contents were not
properly authenticated. As discussed in Part II.A of this
opinion, however, this argument is without merit, as there was
an adequate foundation for the jury to conclude that he used the
phone.

17
Clause only if it constitutes a testimonial statement--that is,

a statement made with “a primary purpose of creating an out-of-

court substitute for trial testimony.” Michigan v. Bryant, 131

S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). If a statement’s primary purpose is

“not to create a record for trial,” then the Confrontation

Clause does not apply. Id. Even if a witness’s statement is

testimonial and the witness is absent from trial, however, the

Confrontation Clause permits the statement’s admission if

(1) “the declarant is unavailable” and (2) “the defendant has

had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” Mouzone, 687 F.3d at

213 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004)).

Although we review an alleged Confrontation Clause

violation de novo, id., a violation may be found harmless on

appeal if “the beneficiary of the constitutional error can prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not

contribute to the verdict obtained,” United States v. Williams,

632 F.3d 129, 133 (4th Cir. 2011) (brackets and ellipsis

omitted) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24

(1967)). In finding harmless error, we need not hold that any

error actually occurred; instead, we can assume error. United

States v. Tyler, 943 F.2d 420, 423 (4th Cir. 1991). Indeed, we

should avoid deciding whether there was a violation of the

Confrontation Clause if any error was harmless, as “the

principle of constitutional avoidance . . . requires the federal

18
courts to strive to avoid rendering constitutional rulings

unless absolutely necessary.” Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. City of

Alexandria, 608 F.3d 150, 156-57 (4th Cir. 2010).

We decline to address whether labeling the bag so as to

attribute its contents to Dyer constituted a testimonial

statement. Instead, we simply find that even if the statement

was testimonial and there was error, any error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. In our view, even if the bag had not

been labeled, the government could still connect the phone to

Dyer based on its data, namely its stored photos and text

messages, which demonstrated that he owned and possessed the

phone. See supra Part II.A. Thus, assuming that there was a

violation of the Sixth Amendment, it was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.

C.

We next address whether the trial court correctly denied

Appellants’ motions for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. As explained below,

there was sufficient evidence to convict Appellants on every

charged offense.

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 1.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for

judgment of acquittal de novo. Hassan, 742 F.3d at 139.

“Applying that standard, it is well settled that ‘the verdict of

a jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence,

taking the view most favorable to the government, to support

it.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Glasser v. United States,

315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942)). Substantial evidence is that which “a

reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting United States v. Moye, 454

F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc)).

2.

Appellants deny that they committed any robbery and thus

claim that they were wrongfully convicted on all the charged

offenses. They emphasize that no witness of the robberies could

identify them as the assailants. This purported hole in the

government’s case is unsurprising, however, given that the

perpetrators used masks during the robberies. In any event, the

evidence against Appellants that they committed the robberies is

substantial, notwithstanding the lack of positive identification

by eyewitnesses.

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 The strongest case against them is in regard to the third

robbery. Within 30 minutes of the robbery at the Credit Union,

the GPS devices hidden in the stolen cash guided officials to

the area of D.C. where Appellants were found. Once confronted

by an officer, Appellants fled into the woods. There, law

enforcement found Appellants, two of the GPS devices, and cash

and masks strewn on the ground. Then, in Cannon’s home, law

enforcement found the last GPS device, piles of cash, three

firearms that matched witnesses’ descriptions of the firearms

used at the robbery, and additional masks. Through DNA

evidence, law enforcement connected the recovered masks to

Appellants. This evidence was more than enough to convict

Appellants for the offenses related to the third robbery (Counts

1, 4, 5, and 8 through 12).

As to the first and second robberies, the evidence against

Appellants is less overwhelming but nevertheless substantial.

Evidence suggests that all three robberies involved a getaway

driver, use of a stolen jeep, and three masked African Americans

(one short and two tall) entering the businesses. True, these

similarities could in theory amount to mere coincidences. But a

reasonable jury could also fairly connect the first two

robberies to Appellants based on (i) the substantial evidence

that implicated Appellants in the third robbery, (ii) the

substantial similarity between the third robbery and the first

21
two, and (iii) the close temporal and geographical proximity

between all the robberies. Indeed, phone data buttressed the

reasonableness of connecting the third robbery to the first two

based on their similarities.

As to the VVM robbery on December 7, each appellant had at

least 15 phone calls with co-conspirators on the day of the

robbery, while they made no calls to each other within the two-

and-a-half hours before the robbery. A reasonable jury could

conclude that this suggests a great deal of coordination on the

day of the robbery and that Appellants were with each other when

the robbery was committed. Additionally, all the cell phones

attributed to Appellants contacted towers in Alexandria--where

the robbery occurred--in the few hours preceding the robbery.

This evidence was enough for a reasonable jury to convict

Appellants for the offenses related to the VVM robbery (Counts 2

and 6).

Phone data also connected Appellants to the Shoppers Food

Warehouse robbery. Although there was less contact between

Appellants than for the first robbery, the high number of early

morning phone calls between Appellants was nevertheless

significant. Moreover, phones associated with Cannon and Reed

placed them in Alexandria near the time of the robbery. Lastly,

the record contains numerous pictures of stacks of cash and

celebration--pictures recovered from Appellants’ phones and

22
taken within hours of the second robbery-–that implicate

Appellants. 5 Thus, as with the other robberies, the government

proffered sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to convict

Appellants on the offenses related to the Shoppers Food

Warehouse robbery (Counts 3 and 7).

3.

In addition to Appellants’ general denial that they

committed the robberies, they specifically challenge their

convictions for the first robbery under the Hobbs Act, codified

at 18 U.S.C. § 1951. This offense requires the government to

prove “(1) that the defendant coerced the victim to part with

property; (2) that the coercion occurred through the ‘wrongful

use of actual or threatened force, violence or fear or under

color of official right’; and (3) that the coercion occurred in

such a way as to affect adversely interstate commerce.” United

States v. Buffey, 899 F.2d 1402, 1403 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting

United States v. De Parias, 805 F.2d 1447, 1450 (11th Cir.

1986)). Appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in

proving the third element--that is, they claim there was no

5
We note that there is less evidence implicating Reed
compared to his co-conspirators. Most notably, there was no
conclusive eyewitness testimony about a getaway driver at the
robberies. Nevertheless, the evidence against him was
substantial and sufficient to sustain his conviction on all
charged counts.

23
evidence that the first robbery adversely affected interstate

commerce.

Notwithstanding Appellants’ arguments to the contrary, the

government established that VVM was the victim of the first

robbery and that VVM’s business affected interstate commerce. A

VVM employee testified that he was selling an international

phone card when the robbery occurred, that the robbers took

money from his cash register, and that all other stores on the

premises were closed at the time of the robbery. In other

words, evidence showed that VVM conducted business in interstate

commerce and that the business was interrupted by Appellants.

Thus, we affirm Appellants’ convictions under the Hobbs Act for

the first robbery.

4.

Finally, Appellants challenge their convictions under 18

U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(c) by arguing that the government

presented no evidence that the firearms found at Cannon’s house

traveled in interstate commerce or were used in the robberies.

We find, however, that their convictions under each respective

statute were proper.

24
 a.

Counts 9 through 12 charged Appellants under 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) with being felons in possession of a firearm. To

prove a violation of § 922(g)(1), the government must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that:

(1) the defendant previously had been
convicted of a crime punishable by a term of
imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) the
defendant knowingly possessed, transported,
shipped, or received, the firearm; and
(3) the possession was in or affecting
commerce, because the firearm had travelled
in interstate or foreign commerce at some
point during its existence.

United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995) (en

banc). Appellants do not dispute that they are all convicted

felons. Instead, they contest whether the government proffered

sufficient evidence proving the second and third elements.

The convictions under § 922(g)(1) arose from the third

robbery. Witnesses described the firearms used in this robbery

as having unique features (such as a drum-style magazine) that

matched features of the firearms found at Cannon’s house. Based

on the similarity of the firearms and their discovery in

Cannon’s house within hours of the robbery, a reasonable jury

could conclude that the firearms were the same. The natural

result of that conclusion is that the firearms traveled in

interstate commerce by going from D.C. to Virginia and back.

See 18 U.S.C. § 10 (defining “interstate commerce” as including

25
“commerce between one State” and “the District of Columbia”);

United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 471 (4th Cir. 2009)

(noting that travel across a state line constitutes interstate

commerce). Although the government did not prove that each co-

conspirator actually held a firearm on December 22, their

constructive possession of the firearms is sufficient to support

a § 922(g)(1) conviction. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d

328, 343 (4th Cir. 2008). As a result, a reasonable jury could

convict Appellants under § 922(g)(1).

b.

Counts 6 through 8 charged Appellants under 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c) with possessing firearms in furtherance of a crime of

violence--that is, each of the three robberies. To prove a

violation of § 924(c), the government was required to “present

evidence indicating that the possession of a firearm furthered,

advanced, or helped forward a crime of violence.” Hassan, 742

F.3d at 142 (quoting United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 489

(4th Cir. 2006)). “A defendant may be convicted of a § 924(c)

charge on the basis of a coconspirator’s use of a gun if the use

was in furtherance of the conspiracy and was reasonably

foreseeable to the defendant.” United States v. Wilson, 135

F.3d 291, 305 (4th Cir. 1998).

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 As discussed supra Part II.C.2, there was sufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Appellants committed

each robbery. The evidence shows that each robbery involved the

use of a firearm. As a result, a reasonable jury could find

that Appellants used a firearm in furtherance of each of the

robberies, and their convictions for those charged offenses were

proper.

III.

For the aforementioned reasons, none of the challenges

raised on appeal have merit, and we affirm Appellants’

convictions.

AFFIRMED

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