NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 19, 2015
Decided March 20, 2015
Before
DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 14‐2722
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellee, Court for the Central District of Illinois.
v. No. 12‐cr‐10142
OLLIE W. HOWELL, Joe Billy McDade,
Defendant‐Appellant. Judge.
O R D E R
Ollie Howell robbed three banks in Illinois during September 2012, two in Peoria
(Heritage Bank and South Side Bank), and another in Aurora (Old Second National
Bank). The following month he was charged by indictment with bank robbery, see 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a), but only for the South Side Bank robbery. He was not taken into
custody in the Central District of Illinois, however, until after he was arrested in
California in March 2013. A year after that Howell was charged by information with the
other two robberies under a separate case number. Howell pleaded guilty to all three
counts. In his plea agreement—covering all three pleas—Howell waived the right to
appeal his convictions or sentence. The district court imposed 94 months’ imprisonment
on each count to be served concurrently.
No. 14‐2722 Page 2
Howell has filed a notice of appeal applicable only to the case charged by
indictment (the South Side Bank robbery). His appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal
is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of the case and addresses issues
that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. We invited Howell to comment
on counsel’s submission, see CIR. R. 51(b), but Howell has not done so. Because the
analysis in counsel’s brief appears to be thorough, we limit our discussion to the issues
identified in counsel’s brief. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014);
United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).
An appeal waiver stands or falls with the guilty plea, so Howell’s waiver
forecloses relief unless he can undermine his plea to the South Side Bank robbery.
See United States v. Gonzalez, 765 F.3d 732, 741 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d
511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sakellarion, 649 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2011).
Counsel does not tell us whether Howell seeks to have that guilty plea set aside, but that
omission is harmless because the record reveals that the district court complied with
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure when accepting the plea, making an
appeal frivolous. See United States v. Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 617–18 (7th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012). The court explained the
elements of the charge, the statutory maximum penalty (20 years, see 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)),
the role of the sentencing guidelines and the judge’s discretion in applying them, the
trial rights Howell was waiving by entering his guilty plea, and the nature of the appeal
waiver to which he agreed. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1). The court also ensured that
Howell’s guilty plea was supported by an adequate factual basis and was made
voluntarily. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2), (3). Indeed, the court recognized Howell’s
struggles with mental illness and received confirmation from Howell that he understood
why he was in court and the nature of the proceeding, and that his medicine would not
interfere with those understandings.
Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion and DISMISS the appeal.