FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 20 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIE BOLDS, No. 14-15176
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:12-cv-01754-GSA
v.
MEMORANDUM*
J. CAVAZOS, Chief Warden; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Gary S. Austin, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted March 10, 2015***
Before: FARRIS, WARDLAW, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Willie Bolds, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
Bolds consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
violations in connection with the confiscation and disposal of his television. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Ramirez v. Galaza,
334 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v.
Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
The district court properly dismissed Bolds’s free exercise claim because he
failed to allege facts showing that the confiscation of his television substantially
burdened the practice of his religion. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85
(9th Cir. 2008) (test for determining whether Free Exercise Clause is implicated).
The district court properly dismissed Bolds’s claim alleging an unreasonable
search of his cell and seizure of his property because “the Fourth Amendment
proscription against unreasonable searches [and seizures] does not apply within the
confines of the prison cell.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 528 n.8 (1984).
The district court properly dismissed Bolds’s due process claim alleging
deficiencies in the grievance process. See Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860 (“inmates lack
a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure”).
To the extent that Bolds attempted to state a due process claim based on an
alleged unauthorized deprivation of property, the district court properly dismissed
the claim because Bolds had an adequate post-deprivation remedy under California
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law. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994).
Bolds’s due process claim alleging an authorized deprivation of property
was properly dismissed because he presented only conclusory allegations of a
deprivation pursuant to “established state procedures.” See Hudson, 468 U.S. at
532 (“postdeprivation remedies do not satisfy due process where a deprivation of
property is caused by conduct pursuant to established state procedure”). However,
dismissal of this claim without leave to amend was improper at this early stage in
the case because it is not clear that Bolds cannot cure the defect through
amendment. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(explaining that leave to amend should be granted unless it is clear that amendment
would be futile).
We do not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
We vacate the dismissal of the due process claim alleging an authorized
deprivation of property and remand to allow Bolds an opportunity to amend that
claim. We affirm the dismissal of all other claims.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
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