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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
SHAHEED HAYNES, :
:
Appellant : No. 47 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 25, 2013,
Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0007107-2012
BEFORE: DONOHUE, OLSON and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED MARCH 24, 2015
Shaheed Haynes (“Haynes”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered following his convictions of persons not to possess firearms, firearms
not to be carried without a license, carrying firearms on public streets of
Philadelphia, and resisting arrest.1 On appeal, Haynes challenges only the
trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
At approximately eleven in the morning on May 28, 2012, Officer
William Yancer of the Philadelphia Police Department was on patrol in a
marked police vehicle with his partner. Officer Yancer was driving
southbound in the 4500 block of Tackawanna Street when he observed
Haynes and two other males walking northbound. Haynes and his
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105, 6106, 6108, 5104.
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companions were walking in the street as opposed to on the sidewalk.2
Haynes was walking with a bicycle while his two friends were just behind
him. As Haynes drew near the police vehicle, he mounted the bicycle and
began riding it. Officer Yancer noticed that the pockets of Haynes’ shorts
were weighed down with objects that Officer Haynes believed could be a
firearm. Once Haynes passed the police vehicle, Officer Yancer opened the
driver’s door and looked back at Haynes. As he did so, Haynes suddenly
sped away. Officer Yancer chased Haynes, calling out for him to stop as he
did so. After approximately half of a block, Officer Yancer caught up to
Haynes and grabbed him in order to make him stop. A struggle ensued,
during which time Officer Yancer observed an ammunition magazine hanging
out of Haynes’ pocket. Officer Yancer recovered this magazine from Haynes
and subsequently recovered a firearm from Haynes’ other pocket. The
firearm was not loaded but the magazine contained ten live rounds of
ammunition.
Haynes was arrested and charged with the above-listed offenses. He
filed a motion seeking to suppress the gun and the ammunition magazine,
which the trial court denied after a hearing. Yancer elected to waive his
right to a jury trial. Following a bench trial upon stipulated facts, the trial
court found Haynes guilty of all offenses and sentenced him to a term of five
2
Tackawanna is a one-way street and on the day in question, cars were
parked on both sides of the road.
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to ten years of imprisonment. Haynes filed a timely post-sentence motion,
which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
As noted above, Haynes is challenging only the denial of his
suppression motion.
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to
the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the suppression court's factual
findings are supported by the record and whether
the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed
before the suppression court, we may consider only
the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of
the evidence for the defense as remains
uncontradicted when read in the context of the
record as a whole. Where the suppression court's
factual findings are supported by the record, we are
bound by these findings and may reverse only if the
court's legal conclusions are erroneous. The
suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding
on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine
if the suppression court properly applied the law to
the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts
below are subject to our plenary review. Moreover,
appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the
evidence presented at the suppression hearing when
examining a ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress.
Commonwealth v. Ranson, 103 A.3d 73, 76 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Presently, Haynes takes issue with Officer Yancer’s initial
determination to stop him. Our law recognizes three levels of police
interaction with civilians. “The first is a mere encounter, which requires no
level of suspicion at all. The second level is an investigative detention,
which must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Finally, the third level is
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an arrest or custodial detention, which must be supported by probable
cause.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 53 A.3d 889, 892-93 (Pa. Super. 2012).
Haynes argues that when Officer Haynes attempted to stop him, he did not
have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, and therefore,
had no legitimate basis for a stop. Haynes’ Brief at 9.
The determination of whether an officer had
reasonable suspicion that criminality was afoot so as
to justify an investigatory detention is an objective
one, which must be considered in light of the totality
of the circumstances. In assessing the totality of the
circumstances, a court must give weight to the
inferences that a police officer may draw through
training and experience. Also, the totality of the
circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an
examination of only those facts that clearly indicate
criminal conduct. Rather, even a combination of
innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant
further investigation by the police officer.
Commonwealth v. Davis, 102 A.3d 996, 1000 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal
citations omitted). Furthermore, relevant to this appeal, unprovoked flight
in a high-crime area from persons identifiable as police officers is sufficient
to establish reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory detention.
Commonwealth v. Washington, 51 A.3d 895, 898 (Pa. Super. 2012).
When initially denying Haynes’ motion, the trial court stated that
Haynes’ unprovoked flight was the basis for its decision. N.T., 5/30/13, at
3. In its opinion issued pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court
expanded its rationale for finding that Officer Yancer had reasonable
suspicion to stop Haynes as follows:
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Here, Officer Yancer stated a clear and articulate
reason for his initial suspicion. He was patrolling in a
high crime area and noticed an object that was
consistent with [Haynes] having a firearm in his
pocket. After [Haynes] passed him, Officer Yancer
simply opened his door and looked to see if he could
determine what the object was. At that point, the
Officer had not stopped [Haynes] or made any
attempt to pursue him. He was simply stopped in
the street observing [Haynes] in a public area.
[Haynes] immediately “fled” on his bicycle, at which
point Officer Yancer had reasonable suspicion to
pursue and detain [him]. Officer Yancer then
detained [Haynes] and found the firearm and
magazine clip on his person. Our Supreme Court
has plainly stated that unprovoked flight in a high
crime area is sufficient to give an officer reasonable
suspicion for a Terry stop. That is exactly what
happened here. Officer Yancer was in a high crime
area and simply stopped and looked at [Haynes] who
then fled. That is sufficient under Pennsylvania case
law … .”
Trial Court Opinion, 4/15/14, at 4.
We can find no error in the trial court’s ruling. The evidence of record
supports the trial court’s findings of fact. Officer Yancer testified that the
block on which this incident occurred was in a high-crime area that was
especially notorious for shootings. N.T., 5/16/13, at 9. When Officer Yancer
observed Haynes’ weighed-down pockets, he suspected, due to his
experience as a police officer, that Haynes was in possession of a firearm.
Id. at 8. Haynes was walking in the street; more specifically, in the area
between the cars parked on the street and the police vehicle. Id. at 7.
When Haynes walked past the police vehicle, he was within two feet of it.
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Id. at 14, 16. Just as Haynes passed the police vehicle, Officer Yancer
opened the door so that he could make a better determination of whether
Haynes could be in possession of a firearm.3 Id. at 6, 10. At that moment,
Haynes fled. Id. at 6. As Officer Yancer chased, he ordered Haynes to stop
but Haynes did not comply. Id. at 17, 20. Pursuant to Washington,
Haynes’ unprovoked flight in broad daylight from Officer Yancer, who was
identifiable as a police officer, in a high-crime area was sufficient to establish
reasonable suspicion so as to permit Officer Yancer to lawfully stop and frisk
Haynes. Washington, 51 A.3d at 898. Accordingly, in light of our standard
of review, we will not disturb the trial court’s determination. Ranson, 103
A.3d at 76.
Haynes does not address this Court’s holding in Washington. Instead,
he points to testimony that he believes establishes that he was acting in a
completely normal manner and argues that there is no basis for a finding
that Officer Yancer had reasonable suspicion based thereon. Haynes’ Brief
at 11-14. This argument is essentially a challenge to the trial court’s
findings of fact. As stated above, we are bound by the trial court’s findings
of fact if they are supported by the record. Ranson, 103 A.3d at 76. We
3
Officer Yancer was driving the police vehicle, which was a “wagon” that
“sit[s] higher up.” N.T., 5/16/13, at 16. Officer Yancer testified that because
of the vehicle’s construction, he had to open the door to see Haynes’ shorts
after Haynes passed. Id.
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have determined that the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by the
evidence, and so we are bound by them. Haynes’ argument cannot succeed.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/24/2015
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