IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-20893
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOEY LAMONT ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-00-CR-869-1
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June 13, 2002
Before JONES, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Juges.
PER CURIAM:*
Joey Lamont Anderson appeals from his conviction for
possession with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of cocaine
base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and carrying a
firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Anderson argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction for both offenses.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 01-20893
-2-
we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury
to conclude that Anderson knew there was 50 grams or more of
cocaine base involved in the drug transaction and that Anderson
carried the firearm in relation to the drug trafficking offense.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Smith v.
United States, 508 U.S. 223, 237-38 (1993); United States v.
Tolliver, 116 F.3d 120, 126 (5th Cir. 1997).
Anderson also argues that his sentence was improper under
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because the district
court did not instruct the jury to find a drug quantity as an
essential element of the offense. Apprendi is inapplicable to
Anderson's term of imprisonment because Anderson was not
sentenced above the 20-year statutory maximum for offenses
involving an unspecified amount of cocaine. See United States v.
Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1177 (2001); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). With respect to
Anderson's term of supervised release, we conclude that any
Apprendi error was harmless because there was no evidence from
which the jury could rationally conclude that the quantity of
drugs was less than the specific quantity alleged in the charges
of the indictment for which the jury found him guilty. See
United States v. Clinton, 256 F.3d 311, 314-15 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 122 S. Ct. 492 (2001); United States v. Green, 246 F.3d
433, 436-37 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 280 (2001).
AFFIRMED.