NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 14-3540
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ERIC J. JOHNSON,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 1-12-cr-00150-001)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 20, 2015
Before: SMITH, JORDAN, SLOVITER, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion filed: March 25, 2015)
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OPINION
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This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant, Eric Johnson, while represented by an Assistant Federal Public
Defender (“AFPD”), Thomas Thornton, pled guilty to drug-related offenses on July 16,
2013. He later sought to withdraw his guilty plea, but that motion was denied. He was
sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment. He now argues that his conviction should be
overturned because of ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons discussed below,
we will affirm the conviction and sentence.
I
The operative charging document was a superseding information that charged
Johnson with one count of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine between April, 2012,
and June 8, 2012, but did not specify the quantity of drugs or the specific conduct at
issue. The earlier indictment contained four counts and alleged offenses involving “at
least 280 grams of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount” of crack
cocaine, but did not specify the precise quantity or conduct at issue. App. at 259. At the
change of plea hearing, AUSA William Behe referred to the plea as a “charge bargain
plea agreement,” under which Johnson agreed to waive indictment and plead guilty to the
superseding information. App. at 246. The benefit of this agreement to Johnson was that
unlike the original indictment which contained four counts that “would have carried
mandatory minimum terms of ten years with a maximum imprisonment up to life,” by
pleading guilty to the superseding information, Johnson would “not face any mandatory
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minimum term of imprisonment,” and his maximum sentence would be capped at 20
years. Id. The plea agreement also included a recommendation of a three level reduction
in offense level for acceptance of responsibility.
At the change of plea hearing held before Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson, the
Government stated, based largely on statements Johnson had made at an earlier proffer
interview, that it would have proven several facts at trial, specifically that Johnson had
sold 135.5 grams of crack cocaine to a confidential source working for the Dauphin
County Police during a controlled buy on June 8, 2012, and that police recovered an
additional 797.8 grams of crack cocaine and a gun during a search of Johnson’s minivan.
Judge Carlson asked, “Mr. Johnson, setting aside any of these issues of drug quantities,
which I understand may be something the parties may be litigating, is that what happened
here?” App. at 255. Johnson answered, “Yes.” Id. The Judge conducted a thorough
colloquy to determine that Johnson’s plea was knowing and voluntary. The colloquy
included the following exchanges:
The Court: Have you seen a copy of that superseding
information?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: Do you wish to have Mr. Behe [the Assistant U.S.
Attorney] or Mr. Thornton read it out loud, or do you waive
the reading of it out loud in court?
The Defendant: I will waive it.
...
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The Court: And I take it, Mr. Behe, this case was previously
indicted and this information may charge a lesser offense.
[The Government]: Yes. This is essentially a charge bargain.
It takes count four of the original indictment, which was
returned in June of 2012, takes out any reference to drug
amounts, so there is no mandatory minimum that applies. But
it’s essentially count four of the original indictment.
The Court: I understand. And so we’re discussing this right
to waive the indictment, although you have been previously
indicted, Mr. Behe is representing to us, on charges of
somewhat greater gravity. But you understand you could
insist upon an indictment?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: But as part of this plea agreement you are
agreeing to waive indictment. Is that correct?
The Defendant: Yes.
...
The Court: . . . There is a plea agreement in this matter,
and . . . [i]f you look at the last page there, there’s a signature
on it. Did you sign that agreement?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: And did you sign it after you and Mr. Thornton
had a chance to go over each and every paragraph of the
agreement?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: Do you feel like you had enough time to review
the document before you signed it?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: And did you sign it voluntarily?
The Defendant: Yes.
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App. at 241-43; 245-46. The Government summarized the terms of the plea agreement
on the record, including the mandatory minimum sentence and potential life sentence that
the original indictment carried, and that by pleading guilty to the superseding information
Johnson would not face any mandatory term of imprisonment and would face a
maximum sentence of 20 years. After that explanation, the colloquy continued:
The Court: Mr. Johnson, does that sound like the agreement
you have with the [G]overnment?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: Other than the promises outlined in the plea
agreement described by Mr. Behe here in court, has anyone
promised you anything to get you to plead guilty here?
The Defendant: No.
...
The Court: And do you understand that the statutory
maximum penalty for this offense as outlined in the plea
agreement is 20 years imprisonment[?] . . .
The Defendant: Yes.
...
The Court: And have you and Mr. Thornton talked about
those guidelines and how they might apply to your case?
The Defendant: Sort of, yes.
The Court: . . . Has anyone estimated for you what those
guidelines may be?
The Defendant: Not exactly.
...
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The Court: If someone has estimated for you what the
guidelines might be, that’s only their estimate and it’s not
binding on the Court. Do you understand that?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: . . . But at the end of that process, if it turns out
that the guidelines are different or higher than you expected,
you will still be bound by this plea agreement. Do you
understand that?
The Defendant: Yes.
App. at 247; 249-51.
After pleading guilty but before his sentencing, Johnson moved for appointment of
new counsel, which the District Court granted. Johnson moved to withdraw his guilty
plea, claiming that his former counsel (Thornton) had been ineffective for failing to
suppress evidence of all drug quantities other than that recovered during the controlled
buy. He also alleged that Thornton had promised him a sentence of 10-12 years, despite
the statutory maximum for his charged offense being 20 years. During his testimony,
Johnson claimed he had lied to Judge Carlson when he stated that no promises had been
made regarding his guideline range. He also claimed he had lied to Judge Carlson when
he stated that he had gone through every paragraph of the plea agreement with Thornton.
Thornton testified that he did not promise Johnson any specific sentence, and that he read
the entire plea agreement to Johnson. Johnson and Thornton also testified about their
discussion regarding the guidelines. They agreed that Thornton discussed the guidelines
to some extent, but Thornton testified that he did not provide any estimation of the
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guidelines range while Johnson testified that Thornton did provide an inexact estimate of
10-12 years. The District Court denied Johnson’s motion to withdraw his plea.
At sentencing, the District Court considered the Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSR”), in which Probation reported that the Government’s confidential source had
given the DEA an additional 179.1 grams of crack cocaine that he claimed he bought
from Johnson before the June 8, 2012 controlled buy. Johnson testified, and denied
having sold the additional 179.1 grams to the confidential source. Furthermore, despite
having admitted at his change of plea hearing that the minivan from which the police had
recovered 797.8 grams of crack cocaine and a gun belonged to him, at sentencing
Johnson claimed he had leased the minivan for a friend, and that he had no knowledge of
or responsibility for the drugs and gun recovered from the minivan. The District Court
also heard testimony from the two officers involved with Johnson’s proffer interview and
the controlled buy. They stated that at the proffer interview, Johnson admitted that he
knew about the drugs and the gun in the minivan, but claimed that they were not his.
They stated that the amounts of crack cocaine Johnson had possessed and trafficked were
much greater than the amounts involved with the controlled buy and recovered from the
minivan, and that they had seen Johnson operate the minivan and have access to the
minivan briefly before the buy.
After hearing the testimony at sentencing and reviewing the testimony from the
change of plea hearing, the District Court found that Johnson’s testimony that he did not
have a possessory interest in the minivan or know about the drugs in the minivan was not
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credible. The Court held that Johnson’s guidelines range should reflect the 135.5 grams
of crack cocaine from the controlled buy and the 797.8 grams recovered from the
minivan, as well as an enhancement for the gun that was also found in the minivan. The
Court did not make a determination about the additional 179.1 grams Johnson allegedly
sold to the confidential source before the controlled buy, because that additional quantity
would not have changed the guidelines range. The Court sentenced Johnson to 200
months in prison.
On appeal, Johnson argues that his conviction should be overturned because of
ineffective assistance of counsel by his original attorney, AFPD Thornton.1 He claims
that he believed he was only pleading guilty to conspiracy to sell the 135.5 grams of
crack cocaine from the controlled buy, and that pleading to that offense would have
resulted in a guideline sentence between 110 and 137 months, rather than the 200 months
he received. Therefore, Johnson claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
move to suppress the additional crack cocaine that the confidential source turned over
and the evidence seized from the minivan. Johnson argues these failures were denials of
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Johnson also claims that AFPD Thornton was
ineffective because he advised Johnson to accept the proposed guilty plea because he was
1
We note that Johnson’s appellate brief is written entirely in underlined, bold font,
in contravention of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(6). Counsel is advised
that bold text should be reserved for adding emphasis.
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afraid that Johnson would receive a sentence greater than twenty years, despite the fact
that the statutory maximum for the charged offense was twenty years.
II
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Whether we construe this appeal as an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim (as Johnson argues) or a challenge to the District Court’s denial of
Johnson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea (as the Government suggests), Johnson
cannot prevail.
A. Ineffective assistance claims
The Government urges us not to consider Johnson’s ineffective assistance claims
because “[c]laims of ineffective assistance of counsel generally are not entertained on
direct appeal.” United States v. Haywood, 155 F.3d 674, 678 (3d Cir. 1998). “There is,
however, a narrow exception to the rule that defendants cannot attack the efficacy of their
counsel on direct appeal. Where the record is sufficient to allow a determination of
ineffective assistance of counsel, an evidentiary hearing to develop the facts is not
needed.” United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991). We find that the
record here is sufficient to decide the issue of AFPD Thornton’s effectiveness because
the District Court explored the issues Johnson raises on appeal at the hearing on
Johnson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Both Johnson and Thornton testified at
that hearing. “We exercise plenary review over the legal component of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. We review the underlying facts for clear error, but exercise
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independent judgment on whether those facts, as found by the District Court, show that
counsel rendered ineffective assistance.” United States v. Davenport, 775 F.3d 605, 608
(3d Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted).
A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea based on ineffective counsel “only if (1)
the defendant shows that his attorney’s advice was under all the circumstances
unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, [and that (2)] he suffered ‘sufficient
prejudice’ from his counsel’s errors.” United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 253-54 (3d
Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). Thornton appears to have done a sufficient job on
Johnson’s behalf. He negotiated a plea based on the superseding information, which
carried no minimum sentence and a significantly lower maximum sentence than Johnson
may have faced under the original indictment. Johnson’s argument that Thornton’s
concerns about him receiving a higher sentence than the maximum sentence allowable
under the superseding information is misplaced. The basis of the plea deal was to secure
the superseding information itself, which significantly lowered the possible penalties
Johnson could have faced. Johnson has presented no credible evidence suggesting that a
motion to suppress the additional drugs and gun could have succeeded. Indeed, the
District Court found that at least 933.3 grams were attributable to Johnson, a factual
determination that the record supports and which we will not disturb. Thus, Thornton’s
conduct does not appear to have been unreasonable, and we will not vacate Johnson’s
conviction on ineffective assistance grounds.
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B. Motion to withdraw guilty plea
Analyzing this appeal as a challenge to the District Court’s denial of Johnson’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea renders the same result. “A defendant may withdraw
a plea of guilty . . . after the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence if . . .
the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). When evaluating a motion to withdraw, a district court must
consider “(1) whether the defendant asserts his innocence; (2) the strength of the
defendant’s reasons for withdrawing the plea; and (3) whether the government would be
prejudiced by the withdrawal.” Jones, 336 F.3d at 252. We review the District Court’s
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Martinez, 785 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1986).
The District Court found Johnson’s testimony as to his reasons for withdrawing
his guilty plea not to be credible. Given that Johnson’s testimony was at odds with his
own prior statements, and that he admitted to lying extensively under oath at his change
of plea hearing, we agree. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Johnson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
III
For the reasons discussed, we will affirm.
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