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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-13967
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:13-cr-00267-CEM-DAB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
THOMAS COLLINS HALL,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(March 30, 2015)
Before HULL, ROSENBAUM and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Thomas Hall appeals his 60-month sentence for possession of child
pornography on the grounds that the sentence does not serve the sentencing goals
articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and is substantively unreasonable. Because we
must review his sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, we
affirm.
Mr. Hall pled guilty to one count of possession of child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2), after downloading images and
videos that displayed sexual violence against children under the age of 12. At
sentencing, the district court calculated a guideline range of 70 to 87 months’
imprisonment. 1 The district court then varied downward to impose a sentence of
60 months’ imprisonment, but it provided no explanation for the variance other
than to confirm its own judgment that “[a]fter considering the advisory sentencing
guidelines and all factors identified in Title 18, U.S. Code, 3553(a)(1) through (7),
. . . the sentence imposed is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply
with the statutory purposes of sentencing.” Doc. 54 at 58-59.
On appeal, Mr. Hall argues that the district court’s downward variance was
too small. In support of this argument, he recites mitigation evidence that he
contends places him among the least culpable and dangerous perpetrators of child
1
This range reflected a three-level reduction in Mr. Hall’s offense level for acceptance of
responsibility as well as enhancements for distribution through a peer-to-peer file sharing
network, material involving prepubescent minors, portrayal of sadistic or masochistic conduct or
other depictions of violence, use of a computer, and the number of video files involved in the
offense.
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pornography offenses: his childhood was marred by an absent father, an alcoholic
mother, and an abusive step-grandmother and bipolar brother; he has a history of
hallucinations and depression, and he once attempted suicide; in committing the
convicted offense, he only fleetingly used inculpatory search terms and deleted
much of the content he downloaded; he immediately cooperated with investigators;
he inspired positive reports from the mental health professionals who evaluated
him after his arrest; diagnostic tests confirmed that he had never committed a
contact offense against a minor and had no interest in doing so; and he was
engaged to be married and steadily employed at the time of his arrest. Although
the content of the images and videos in this case is particularly deplorable, Mr.
Hall argues that a 60-month sentence does not further the goals articulated in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) given his low risk of recidivism and his willingness and ability to
undergo mental health treatment. He also argues that the only offense
characteristics the district court emphasized at sentencing apart from the gruesome
nature of the content were the deliberate nature of his actions and the purpose of
self gratification, two offense characteristics that are present in essentially every
child pornography case.
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard, vacating the sentence only if we “are left with the
definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
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judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United
States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting United
States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, “nothing . . . requires the district court to state on the record
that it has explicitly considered each of the section 3553(a) factors or to discuss
each of the section 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786
(11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). Further, although the district court
must evaluate all the § 3553(a) factors, it is free to assign “great weight” to any one
of the factors over the others. United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Bound by these constraints on our review, we cannot say the district court
abused its discretion in sentencing Mr. Hall to 60 months’ imprisonment,
particularly given that the district court varied downward from a guidelines range
of 70 to 87 months’ imprisonment and imposed a sentence well below the statutory
maximum. At sentencing, the district court heard the mitigation evidence Mr. Hall
presented, stated that it had considered the parties’ statements, and discussed the
evidence that informed its decision. Regardless of whether we might have decided
differently how best to serve Congress’s sentencing goals set forth in § 3553(a),
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“[t]he fact that [we] might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was
appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
AFFIRMED.
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