This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1603
State of Minnesota,
Appellant,
vs.
Amanda Nicole Williams,
Respondent.
Filed March 30, 2015
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge
Pennington County District Court
File No. 57-CR-14-87
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Alan G. Rogalla, Pennington County Attorney, Stephen R. Moeller, Assistant County
Attorney, Thief River Falls, Minnesota (for appellant)
Mark D. Nyvold, Fridley, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SCHELLHAS, Judge
In this pretrial appeal, the state asserts that the district court erred by suppressing
evidence and dismissing the complaint. We affirm.
FACTS
On July 21, 2013, Special Agent Ronald Woolever of the Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension (BCA) met with a confidential informant (CI), who reported having
observed respondent Amanda Nicole Williams in possession of a quantity of
methamphetamine. That same day, based on the CI’s information, SA Woolever began
drafting an affidavit to support a search warrant. At SA Woolever’s request, Officer Scott
Mekash and Investigator Marissa Adam of the Thief River Falls Police Department began
to conduct surveillance on Williams’s vehicle, which was located in a park area. After 10
to 15 minutes of surveillance, Williams and three young children left the park area in
Williams’s vehicle. Officer Mekash contacted SA Woolever, who instructed Officer
Mekash to stop Williams’s vehicle and detain Williams. Officer Mekash and Investigator
Adam stopped Williams’s vehicle, and Investigator Adam drove the vehicle to the law-
enforcement center with Williams and the children in the vehicle. At the law-enforcement
center, officers placed Williams in an interview room and the children in a different
room. SA Woolever then interviewed Williams and asked whether she would consent to a
search of her home. Williams said yes and signed a consent-to-search form. In the
subsequent search, officers discovered approximately 31.2 grams of methamphetamine.
More than six months later, appellant State of Minnesota charged Williams with
first-degree controlled-substance crime (possession of 25 or more grams of
methamphetamine) under Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1) (2012). Williams moved to
suppress any and all evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop and her arrest,
2
arguing that her consent to search her home was not voluntary. The district court granted
Williams’s motion to suppress and dismissed the complaint.
This appeal follows.1
DECISION
“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
the district court’s factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. But
legal determinations, such as whether there was a seizure and, if so, whether that seizure
was unreasonable, are reviewed de novo.” State v. Eichers, 853 N.W.2d 114, 118 (Minn.
2014) (citation omitted). Thus, “determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable
cause as they relate to searches and seizures should be reviewed de novo on appeal.”
State v. Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d 783, 787 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).
Both the U.S. Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution guarantee “[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” against
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10.
“A warrantless arrest is reasonable if supported by probable cause.” State v. Williams,
794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 2011).2 “Probable cause to arrest exists when a person of
ordinary care and prudence, viewing the totality of circumstances objectively, would
1
“In order for an appellate court to review a pretrial order, the State must show that the
district court’s ruling will have a critical impact on its case.” State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d
282, 286 (Minn. 2011). Here, the state asserted in its statement of the case, and Williams
concedes in her brief, that the district court’s order had a critical impact on the state’s
case against Williams.
2
No apparent relationship exists between appellant Amanda Williams in this case and
appellant Quenton Williams in the cited case.
3
entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a specific individual has committed a
crime.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted). “The ‘honest and strong suspicion’
standard requires more than mere suspicion, but less than the evidence required for a
conviction.” State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 364 (Minn. 2011). “The inquiry is
objective, and the existence of probable cause depends on all of the facts of each
individual case.” Williams, 794 N.W.2d at 871.
Whether information from an informant is sufficient to establish probable cause
“depends on the totality of the circumstances of the particular case, including the
credibility and veracity of the informant.” State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn.
1999); see also U.S. v. Stevens, 530 F.3d 714, 718 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Although ‘an
informant’s veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge are all highly relevant’ in
determining whether probable cause exists when an affidavit is based on hearsay
information, they are not ‘entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly
exacted in every case.’” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S. Ct. 2317,
2328 (1983)) (internal quotations omitted in original)). We consider six factors to
determine the reliability of an informant who is confidential but not anonymous:
(1) a first-time citizen informant is presumably reliable; (2) an
informant who has given reliable information in the past is
likely also currently reliable; (3) an informant’s reliability can
be established if the police can corroborate the information;
(4) the informant is presumably more reliable if the informant
voluntarily comes forward; (5) in narcotics cases, “controlled
purchase” is a term of art that indicates reliability; and (6) an
informant is minimally more reliable if the informant makes a
statement against the informant’s interests.
4
State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Minn. App. 2004). “If a case is close, the lack of a
warrant may weigh against finding probable cause.” Id.
Arrest
“The ultimate test to be used in determining whether a suspect was under arrest is
whether a reasonable person would have concluded, under the circumstances, that he was
under arrest and not free to go.” State v. Beckman, 354 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn. 1984)
(citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983)). Here, the district court
determined, and the state apparently concedes, that Williams’s arrest occurred at the time
that officers stopped her vehicle. The evidence shows that after the officers stopped
Williams’s vehicle, Investigator Adam identified herself as a police officer, said, “I need
you to come to the Law Enforcement Center,” and drove Williams and the three children
to the law-enforcement center in Williams’s vehicle. Because a reasonable person under
such circumstances would have concluded that she was under arrest and not free to go,
we agree that Williams’s arrest occurred when officers stopped her vehicle. Cf. Wahl v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 354 N.W.2d 561, 562 (Minn. App. 1984) (stating that “[w]hen
the officer requested [driver] accompany him to the police station after he failed the field
sobriety tests, [driver] could not reasonably have believed he had a choice whether to
accompany the police officer”).
Both Officer Mekash and Investigator Adam testified that they stopped Williams’s
vehicle at the request of SA Woolever and that they had no independent basis for the
stop, such as a traffic or equipment violation. Williams’s arrest therefore was supported
by probable cause only if SA Woolever’s knowledge provided probable cause to arrest
5
Williams. See State v. Conaway, 319 N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn. 1982) (stating that “the entire
knowledge of the police force is pooled and imputed to the arresting officer for the
purpose of determining if sufficient probable cause exists for an arrest” (emphasis
omitted)). In addition to SA Woolever’s testimony about the information that he received
from the CI about Williams’s possession of methamphetamine, Woolever’s BCA report,
which was submitted to the district court, states in relevant part:
On July 21, 2013 SA Woolever met with BCA CI X-
2008 (hereinafter X-2008) and learned that X-2008 observed
Amanda WILLIAMS to be in possession of a quantity of
methamphetamine while driving a [vehicle identified by
color, year, make, model, and license plate number].
....
SA Woolever while searching WILLIAMS’s purse
[during the search of her home] found $700.00 in US
Currency. (This money matched photocopied money used
previously by a CRI while working under the direction of SA
Woolever to purchase 2 8balls of methamphetamine from
WILLIAMS earlier on the day of 07-21-13[.])
Because the state presented no evidence to show that the CI was a first-time
citizen informant, came forward voluntarily, or made a statement against the CI’s
interests, the first, fourth, and sixth reliability factors under Ross plainly are not
applicable. Nor does SA Woolever’s report state whether “a CRI” is the same CI who is
named elsewhere in the report as “BCA CI X-2008” or “X-2008.” Moreover, regardless
of who made the purchase mentioned in the report, the report does not refer to the
purchase as a “controlled purchase,” which “is a term of art that indicates reliability” in
6
narcotics cases. See Ross, 676 N.W.2d at 304 (quotation omitted). The fifth reliability
factor under Ross is not applicable.
The applicability of the only two remaining reliability factors hinges on whether
the CI gave reliable information to police in the past (second factor) and whether police
corroborated the information that the CI provided on July 21, 2013 (third factor). See id.
As to the second factor, the only indication that the CI gave past reliable information to
police is SA Woolever’s single testimonial reference to “a confidential reliable
informant.”3 The state argues that this reference is sufficient to satisfy the second factor
and cites, inter alia, Ross, 676 N.W.2d at 304, and State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 269
(Minn. 1985). Ross provides that “[t]he second factor is fulfilled by a simple statement
that the informant has been reliable in the past because ‘this language indicates that the
informant had provided accurate information to the police in the past’ and thus gives ‘. . .
reason to credit the informant’s story.’” 676 N.W.2d at 304 (quoting Wiley, 366 N.W.2d
at 269). Ross also provides that “[t]here is no need for law-enforcement officers to
provide specifics of the informant’s past veracity.” Id. But in Ross, “[t]he CRI had
previously provided accurate information resulting in successful arrests.” Id. at 303.
Likewise, in Wiley, the affidavit in support of a search warrant “stated that the informant
‘has been used over several years successfully.’” 366 N.W.2d at 269; see also Munson,
594 N.W.2d at 136 (stating that “further elaboration concerning the specifics of the CRI’s
veracity is not typically required,” where officer “testified that, by definition, a CRI was
3
SA Woolever’s report also makes a single reference to “a CRI,” but the report does not
indicate whether “a CRI” is the same CI who is named elsewhere in the report as “BCA
CI X-2008” or “X-2008.”
7
someone who had previously provided the police with information that led to an arrest
and that the particular CRI who provided the information about [defendant] had given the
police reliable information in the past”).
In contrast, this case involves a one-word label—“reliable”—applied to the CI,
without any accompanying statement that the CI “has been reliable in the past.” See Ross,
676 N.W.2d at 304; see also State v. Siegfried, 274 N.W.2d 113, 114 (Minn. 1978)
(stating that “it is not enough . . . [to] state[] in a conclusory fashion that [an informant] is
credible or reliable”). The second reliability factor under Ross is not applicable on these
facts.
As to the third reliability factor, the state asserts that the CI’s information was
corroborated when Officer Mekash and Investigator Adam “personally identif[ied
Williams] driving the vehicle described by” the CI.4 “Even corroboration of minor details
lends credence to an informant’s tip and is relevant to the probable-cause determination.”
State v. Holiday, 749 N.W.2d 833, 841 (Minn. App. 2008); see also Munson, 594 N.W.2d
at 136 (stating that “independent corroboration of even innocent details of an informant’s
tip may support a finding of probable cause”). But in light of the inapplicability of every
other informant-reliability factor, police corroboration of public, easily obtained
information about Williams’s vehicle was insufficient to establish probable cause in this
case. Cf. State v. Walker, 584 N.W.2d 763, 764, 768 (Minn. 1998) (disapproving this
4
The state also asserts that police corroborated information regarding the location of
Williams’s home. We summarily reject this assertion, as the record is devoid of any
indication that the CI ever mentioned Williams’s home to SA Woolever.
8
court’s “presuppos[ition]” of reliability of anonymous letter implicating defendant and
accomplice in murder and stating that “[e]vidence of the letter’s reliability is lacking
because the police did not corroborate any information in the letter beyond [defendant]’s
and [accomplice]’s identity and [defendant]’s address”); State v. Cook, 610 N.W.2d 664,
668 (Minn. App. 2000) (concluding that corroboration of confidential informant’s
“description of [defendant]’s clothing, physical appearance, vehicle, and present
location” did not establish “any link between [defendant] and illegal activity” reported by
informant), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000); State v. Albrecht, 465 N.W.2d 107, 109
(Minn. App. 1991) (concluding that “corroboration of [anonymous informant’s
information regarding defendant’s] address and car ownership, without more, is not
sufficient to support a finding of probable cause”).
The state did not demonstrate adequately the CI’s reliability and presented no
other evidence to support an honest and strong suspicion that Williams had committed a
crime. Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that SA Woolever did not
have probable cause to arrest Williams. Williams’s arrest therefore was unlawful.
Consent
Although Williams’s consent to a search of her home followed her unlawful arrest,
we address the consent issue because the state argues in the alternative that the taint of
the unlawful arrest was purged by Williams’s voluntary consent to search. “Established
exceptions to the warrant requirement include . . . searches conducted after obtaining
voluntary consent . . . .” State v. Johnson, 813 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Minn. 2012). “For a search
to fall under the consent exception, the State must show by a preponderance of the
9
evidence that the defendant freely and voluntarily consented.” State v. Brooks, 838
N.W.2d 563, 568 (Minn. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014).
The question whether a consent to a search was in fact
voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or
implied, is a question of fact. Therefore, the clearly erroneous
standard controls [appellate] review of a district court’s
finding of voluntary consent. Findings of fact are clearly
erroneous if, on the entire evidence, [the appellate court is]
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
occurred.
State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846–47 (Minn. 2011) (quotations and citations omitted).
“Whether consent is voluntary is determined by examining the totality of the
circumstances.” Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 568 (quotation omitted). The totality of the
circumstances “includ[es] the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is,
and what was said and how it was said.” Id. at 569 (quotation omitted).
In this case, police stopped Williams’s vehicle, drove her and the three children
who were with her to the law-enforcement center, and told her, “when you get to the Law
Enforcement Center, I’ll explain to you what’s going on.” Although officers allowed
Williams a brief visit with the children at the law-enforcement center, the children
otherwise were kept apart from Williams. The state asserts that SA Woolever recorded
his conversation with Williams and that it presented the district court with a recording of
that conversation. The state also asserts that “the record shows [Williams] wasn’t asked
one question about the possible presence of drugs in her residence.” In actuality, the
record shows no such thing because SA Woolever failed to record his interview of
Williams, except for the reading and signing of the consent-to-search form. Moreover,
10
the narrative portion of SA Woolever’s report states that Williams “advised” SA
Woolever that she “had a large quantity of methamphetamine in a shoe box in the master
bedroom area” of her home, suggesting that SA Woolever did ask Williams questions
about the presence of drugs in her home.
Due to SA Woolever’s failure to record his interview of Williams, the record is
essentially devoid of what was said and how it was said during the interview, leaving the
district court with no way to determine whether Williams’s consent was voluntary. We
conclude that the district court did not err in finding that the state failed to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Williams gave her consent voluntarily and without
coercion. Accordingly, we decline to address the state’s alternative argument that, even if
Williams’s arrest was unlawful, the taint of her unlawful arrest was purged by her
voluntary consent.
Affirmed.
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