J-S19043-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
JOSEPH E. WALLACE, III, :
:
Appellant : No. 2868 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered on September 24, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County,
Criminal Division, No. CP-15-CR-0001266-2000
BEFORE: STABILE, JENKINS and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MARCH 31, 2015
Joseph E. Wallace, III (“Wallace”), pro se, appeals from the Order
dismissing his first Petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
The PCRA court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history as
follows:
On February 28, 2000, [Wallace] stabbed his wife Eileen as
she slept in her bed. Eileen Wallace died as a result of her
wounds. On December 6, 2000, [Wallace] entered a plea of
guilty but mentally ill to the charges of third[-]degree murder,
possessing an instrument of crime and tampering with physical
evidence. He was sentenced that day to a term of imprisonment
of twenty-three and one-half to forty-seven years. [Wallace] did
not appeal his sentence. On September 3, 2013, [Wallace] filed
a pro se PCRA [P]etition. Because this was [Wallace’s] first
PCRA [P]etition, [the PCRA court] appointed Robert Brendza,
Esquire [“Attorney Brendza”] as [Wallace’s] counsel. [Attorney]
Brendza reviewed [Wallace’s] claims and court file, determined
1
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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that [Wallace’s] PCRA [Petition] was not timely, and moved to
withdraw his appearance as PCRA counsel. [The PCRA court]
also reviewed the file and record, [and] also determined that
[Wallace’s] PCRA [Petition] was untimely, and on June 18, 2014,
[the PCRA court] gave [Wallace] [N]otice of [the court’s] intent
to dismiss his [P]etition without a hearing. [Wallace] responded
to this [N]otice with two pro se filings. On July 17, 2014, [the
PCRA court] directed that [Attorney] Brendza review these
submissions, and inform the [c]ourt of his findings. [Attorney]
Brendza complied with this [O]rder, and after [the PCRA court’s]
review revealed that [Wallace] was entitled to no post-conviction
relief, [the court] dismissed [Wallace’s] PCRA [P]etition on
September 24, 2014 [and granted Attorney Brendza’s Motion to
withdraw].
PCRA Court Opinion, 11/25/14, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
Wallace, acting pro se, filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-
ordered Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal.
On appeal, Wallace raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the [PCRA] court commit legal error in failing to
acknowledge, respond to, and/or grant Wallace’s request to
invoke his right to self-representation?
2. Did the [PCRA] court commit legal error in failing to
adequately and exclusively consider and respond to Wallace’s
pro se claims/requests: (unlawfully-induced guilty plea claim,
after-discovered evidence claim, request for the appointment
of a psychopharamacologist, and request for an evidentiary
hearing)?
Brief for Appellant at 2 (capitalization omitted). We will review Wallace’s
claims together, as they both require a determination as to whether the
PCRA court properly concluded that Wallace’s Petition is untimely, and that
he failed to plead and prove any exception to the PCRA’s timeliness bar.
We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA
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level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court
and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s
ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal
error.
Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted).
Initially, under the PCRA, any PCRA petition “shall be filed within one
year of the date the judgment becomes final[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)
(emphasis added). A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion
of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the
United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of
time for seeking the review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s timeliness
requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not address the
merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed.
Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).
Here, Wallace’s judgment of sentence became final on January 5,
2001, when the thirty-day period of time in which to file an appeal with our
Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P 903(a).
Accordingly, Wallace had until January 7, 2002, to file the instant PCRA
Petition, but he did not do so until September 3, 2013. Thus, Wallace’s
Petition is facially untimely.
Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition if the
appellant can explicitly plead and prove one of three exceptions set forth
under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Any PCRA petition invoking one of these
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exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have
been presented.” Id. § 9545(b)(2); Albrecht, 994 A.2d at 1094.
In this case, Wallace has invoked the exception provided by section
9545(b)(1)(ii), pertaining to newly-discovered evidence. Brief for Appellant
at 7. This exception requires Wallace to allege and prove that there were
facts that were unknown to him, and that he could not have ascertained
those facts by the exercise of due diligence. See Commonwealth v.
Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa. 2008); see also id. (stating that the
focus of the exception is “on [the] newly discovered facts, not on a newly
discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.”) (citation
omitted).
Here, Wallace asserts that one of the defense psychologists who
evaluated him, Dr. Gerald Cooke (“Dr. Cooke”), was unaware of the
prescription medications that Wallace was taking when he murdered his
wife, including Ambien, Ritalin and Paxil. Brief for Appellant at 10-11.
Wallace has presented the supplemental opinion of Dr. Cooke, wherein Dr.
Cooke posits that the medication may have exacerbated Wallace’s psychosis,
and may provide Wallace with a partial defense of involuntary intoxication.
Brief for Appellant at 11; see also Supplemental Opinion, 8/4/14, at 1-2.
However, Dr. Cooke defers to a psychopharmacologist to provide expert
opinion on this issue. Id. We conclude that these are not “newly discovered
facts,” but merely “a newly willing source for previously known facts.” See
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Marshall, 947 A.2d at 720. Such a claim does not invoke the timeliness
exception at section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Therefore, we conclude that the PCRA
court properly dismissed Wallace’s Petition as untimely.
Order affirmed.
Stabile, J., joins the memorandum.
Jenkins, J., concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/31/2015
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