UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JEROME JULIUS BROWN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 14-2065 (BAH)
)
METRO TRANSIT )
POLICE DEPARTMENT et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The plaintiff, Jerome Julius Brown, filed this action pro se in the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia against the “Metro Transit Police Department” and two of its officers. See
Compl., ECF No. 1-3. He claims “false arrest” and seeks $30,000 in damages. Id. Construing the
complaint as brought against the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”)
and two of its officers, the defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1441(a), 1446 and the WMATA Compact, D.C. Code § 9-1107.01(81), which confers original
jurisdiction over claims against WMATA in the United States district courts. See Not. of
Removal, ECF No. 1 , ¶¶ 2, 6; Barksdale v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 512 F.3d 712,
714 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
The defendants now move for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Mot. by Defs. Metro Transit Police Dep’t, Price and Woods for Summ. J.,
ECF No. 9. On February 9, 2015, the Court issued an order advising the plaintiff about his
obligation to respond to the defendants’ motion by March 31, 2015. See Order, ECF No. 10.
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The plaintiff has not provided a cogent response to the motion. See FRCP Rule 55 Default,
Default Action Defendant Failed to Plead Other Defend Proposed Schedule or Dispositive
Motion, ECF No. 13.1 The docket shows that the two orders mailed to the plaintiff at his
address of record were returned to the Clerk’s Office “as undeliverable.” See Feb. 26, 2015 and
Mar. 12, 2015 docket entries. Ordinarily, this may prompt a dismissal for failure to prosecute
due to the plaintiff’s failure to maintain a current address. But the plaintiff has continually
submitted documents to the Clerk’s Office listing the same address, which is “conclusively taken
as the last known address” unless “changed by notice filed with the Clerk[.]” LCvR 11.1. In
addition, the Court has been informed by the Clerk’s Office that the plaintiff presents his
documents in person; thus, it is reasonably safe to conclude that the plaintiff has, or should
have, received notices of the orders. Therefore, the Court will address the defendants’
summary judgment motion and “state on the record the reasons for granting . . . the motion.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56, summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247
(1986); Estate of Parsons v. Palestinian Auth., 651 F.3d 118, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Tao v. Freeh,
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The Court has liberally construed this one-page document, accompanied by an assortment
of inexplicable attachments, as the plaintiff’s opposition since it was filed within the March 31,
2015 deadline and begins with “ ‘opposition’ motion.” Otherwise, the document is in line with
the plaintiff’s prior submissions that the Court has rejected for filing as frivolous, superfluous,
or harassing. See January 8, 2015 Order (denying leave to file the plaintiff’s assorted
documents).
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27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994). To determine which facts are material, the Court looks to the
substantive law on which each claim rests. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Summary judgment is
properly granted against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). See Grimes v.
District of Columbia, 923 F. Supp. 2d 196, 198 (D.D.C. 2013) (“The 2010 Amendments to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 . . . and the accompanying Advisory Committee Notes do not prohibit
this Court from granting summary judgment where, as here, the nonmovant fails to
demonstrate a genuine dispute as to any material fact.”).
II. DISCUSSION
“A false arrest . . . claim turns first on whether the plaintiff was unlawfully detained. If
the arrest was legally justified--for example, if supported by probable cause or a valid warrant--
the conduct of the arresting officer is privileged and a claim will not lie.” Liser v. Smith, 254 F.
Supp. 2d 89, 95-96 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing Tillman v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 695
A.2d 94, 96 (D.C. 1997); Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
The plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence to rebut the defendants’ evidence
that one of the two officers he has sued “did not participate in [the] [p]laintiff’s arrest,” Aff. of
Fred Price, ECF No. 9-2, ¶ 10, and that the arresting officer, also a defendant, had probable
cause to arrest the plaintiff. The arresting officer states that while on foot patrol at the Metro
Center Metrorail station, he received a radio communication “to be on the lookout for a
passenger with a black ‘F.B.I’ visor and black ‘F.B.I’ hoodie who was reported to be screaming
and yelling at passengers.” Aff. of Joseph Strassner, ECF No. 9-1, ¶ 3. The officer approached
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the plaintiff because he “match[ed] the description.” Id. ¶ 4. During “the course of
conversation,” the plaintiff voluntarily provided his identification. Id. ¶ 7. A check of the
Metro Transit Police Department’s criminal databases revealed an outstanding warrant for the
plaintiff, and the officer received a code signaling that “for officer safety, the [plaintiff] should
be put in handcuffs.” Id. ¶¶ 8-9. The plaintiff complied with the officer’s directions to be
handcuffed and “appeared to have knowledge of the warrant.” Id. ¶ 10. Because the warrant
was issued by authorities in “Prince George’s County,” the officer confirmed “that the warrant
was extraditable,” transported the plaintiff “to District 1D of the Metropolitan Police
Department,” and completed “the arrest paperwork.” Id. ¶¶ 11-12.
Based on the foregoing undisputed facts, the Court finds that the WMATA officer had
probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, and was well within his authority to do so. See Myers v.
United States, 15 A. 3d 688, 691 (D.C. 2011) (“WMATA has its own police force, the Metro
Transit Police, which, while on Metro property in the District of Columbia, has the same powers
as the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia.”). Therefore, the Court
concludes that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 2 A separate order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/ Beryl A. Howell
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATE: April 1, 2015
2
Given the disposition of this case on summary judgment, the Court will not address the
defendants’ valid arguments for dismissal on immunity grounds. See Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. at
7-8 (WMATA’s immunity); id. at 9-10 (officers’ qualified immunity). It is worth noting, however,
that “WMATA is immune from suit when its actions are governmental,” and “the District of
Columbia Circuit [has] held that the WMATA function is governmental in nature when the
Metro Transit Police are involved.” Myers v. United States, 15 A.3d 688, 691 (D.C. 2011) (citing
Morris v. WMATA, 781 F.2d 218, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
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