UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-7628
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JOHNNY SOZA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00278-JCC-1)
Submitted: March 27, 2015 Decided: April 1, 2015
Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Johnny Soza, Appellant Pro Se. Maureen Catherine Cain, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Johnny Soza appeals the district court’s order denying his
motion for return of property pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
41(g). * For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s
denial of a motion for return of property. United States v.
Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir. 1999). Under Rule 41, “[a]
person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property
or by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s
return.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g). “Property” is defined to
include “documents, books, papers, any other tangible objects,
and information.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(a)(2)(A).
Rule 41 may be utilized “to commence a civil equitable
proceeding to recover seized property that the government has
retained after the end of a criminal case.” Young v. United
States, 489 F.3d 313, 315 (7th Cir. 2007); see United States v.
Garcia, 65 F.3d 17, 20 (4th Cir. 1995). A Rule 41(g) motion “is
properly denied if the defendant is not entitled to lawful
possession of the seized property, the property is contraband or
subject to forfeiture or the government’s need for the property
*
Although Soza’s motion referenced Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(e),
following the 2002 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, “Rule 41(e) now appears with minor stylistic changes
as Rule 41(g).” United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg.,
497 F.3d 654, 663 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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as evidence continues.” Jackson v. United States, 526 F.3d 394,
396 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court’s order indicates that it denied Soza’s
motion largely on the basis of the Government’s continued need
for the property during the pendency of Soza’s successive 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. Although that motion has since
been resolved, we may affirm for any reason appearing on the
record. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952
(4th Cir. 1992). Our review of the record leads us to conclude
that Soza lacks an interest in the property he seeks to have
returned to him, both because he consented to its forfeiture
through his plea agreement and because he stipulated to its
status as derivative contraband subject to forfeiture under 18
U.S.C. § 2428(a)(1) (2012). See United States v. Alamoudi, 452
F.3d 310, 312-13 (4th Cir. 2006) (upholding forfeiture where
plea agreement specified forfeitable property and contained
waiver provision); United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 264 F.3d
1195, 1212 n.13 (10th Cir. 2001) (addressing forfeiture of
derivative contraband).
Soza also asserts that the court erred in denying his
motion without providing him an opportunity to reply to the
Government’s response. Assuming, without deciding, that the
court prematurely denied the motion, our review of the reply
Soza subsequently filed leads us to conclude that any such error
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was harmless. Finally, insofar as Soza attempts to challenge
the validity of his conviction and sentence, Rule 41(g) is not
an appropriate vehicle for raising such postconviction
challenges.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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