Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 219
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-14-1085
MONICA JANE GRITTON Opinion Delivered April 8, 2015
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE POPE COUNTY
V. CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. J-13-235]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE KEN D. COKER, JR.,
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE
CHILD
APPELLEES AFFIRMED; MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GRANTED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
This appeal arises from an order of the Pope County Circuit Court terminating
appellant Monica Gritton’s parental rights to her daughter, L.G. (born October 24, 2013).
Gritton’s attorney has filed a no-merit brief pursuant to Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Department
of Human Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004) and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule
6-9(i), asserting that there are no issues of arguable merit to support the appeal and requesting
to be relieved as counsel. The motion is accompanied by an abstract and addendum of the
proceedings below and a brief explaining why none of the trial court’s rulings present a
meritorious ground for appeal. The clerk of this court notified Gritton that she had the right
to file pro se points for reversal under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(i)(3), but she did
not do so. We affirm the order of termination and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 219
On October 24, 2013, Gritton gave birth to L.G. That same day, she tested positive
for marijuana. The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) exercised a 72-hour hold
on the baby based on Gritton’s positive drug test, her history with DHS, and her
noncompliance with previously offered services.1 On October 28, 2013, an emergency
petition for custody and dependency neglect was filed, and an order for ex parte emergency
custody was entered later that day.
On November 4, 2013, the court found probable cause and set the case for
adjudication. In its February 14, 2014 adjudication order, the court found by a preponderance
of the evidence that L.G. was dependent-neglected. The court specifically noted, in its order,
that Gritton previously had her rights terminated to two other children because of her drug
addiction, and that L.G. was at substantial risk of serious harm due to neglect because of
Gritton’s continued drug use. The goal of the case was set for reunification, but no services
were ordered for Gritton except for reasonable and supervised visitation.
On June 9, 2014, the court held a permanency-planning hearing and a no-
reunification- services hearing. The permanency-planning goal was changed to adoption and
termination of parental rights. In a separate order, DHS was relieved from providing
reunification services with a finding of clear and convincing evidence that there was little
likelihood that any services to the parent would result in a successful reunification and that the
mother had made no effort to improve her situation.
1
DHS had a history with Gritton before October 24, 2013. On May 28th of that year,
Gritton’s parental rights to her older two daughters, Z.G. and A.C., were terminated.
2
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 219
On July 15, 2014, DHS filed a petition for termination of Gritton’s parental rights. In
the petition, DHS alleged four grounds for termination: (1) that Gritton had abandoned L.G.
(Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(iv)); (2) that other factors arose subsequent to the filing
of the original petition that demonstrated that return of L.G. to Gritton was contrary to her
health, safety, and welfare and that despite the offer of appropriate family services, Gritton had
manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors that
prevented the return of L.G. to her custody (Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a)); (3)
that Gritton had been sentenced in a criminal proceeding for a period of time which would
constitute a substantial part of L.G.’s life (Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(viii)(a)); and
(4) that Gritton had been found by a court of competent jurisdiction to (i) have subjected any
juvenile to aggravated circumstances, (ii) had her rights involuntarily terminated as to a sibling
of the child and (iii) had abandoned an infant. (Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)).
On August 25, 2014, the court held the termination hearing and found that DHS had
proved by clear and convincing evidence all four grounds alleged in the petition. The order
terminating Gritton’s parental rights was entered on September 17, 2014.2 Gritton filed a
notice of appeal on October 7, 2014. On January 15, 2015, Gritton’s counsel filed a motion
to withdraw as set forth above. Counsel contends that this appeal is without merit.
An order forever terminating parental rights must be based on clear and convincing
evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A).
2
At the time of the termination hearing, the putative father Camron Jolly’s paternity had not
been established. The order terminated Gritton’s parental rights and any unknown father’s
parental rights. Gritton is the sole appellant in this case.
3
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 219
In determining whether termination is in the child’s best interest, the circuit court must
consider the likelihood that the child will be adopted if the termination petition is granted and
the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child,
caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent, parents, or putative parent or
parents. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A)(ii) (Repl. 2009).
Additionally, DHS must prove at least one statutory ground for termination by clear
and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B) (Supp. 2013). Clear and
convincing evidence is defined as that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a
firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Dinkins v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001). This court does not reverse a termination order
unless the circuit court’s findings were clearly erroneous. Meriweather v. Ark. Dep’t of Health
&Human Servs., 98 Ark. App. 328, 255 S.W.3d 505 (2007). In determining whether a finding
is clearly erroneous, an appellate court gives due deference to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Dinkins, supra.
In this case, termination of Gritton’s parental rights was appropriate. At the time the
termination order was entered, Gritton was in the custody of the Arkansas Department of
Correction. She had been arrested in December 2013 for breaking into a storage building in
an attempt to find a place to sleep. She remained homeless and unemployed throughout the
case. Gritton admitted on the stand that she was just as “lost in her addiction” to drugs as she
had been in the last case that resulted in the termination of her parental rights of her other two
children.
4
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 219
The court found that L.G. was adoptable based on the testimony of Jennifer
Blassingame, a DHS caseworker. Gritton had not seen L.G. since she was 24 hours old, and
the court noted that the “mother is a stranger to this child and this is the choice of the
mother.” Throughout the entire case, Gritton never visited L.G. or stayed in contact with
DHS.
Having carefully examined the record and the brief presented to us, we find that
counsel has complied with the requirements established by the Arkansas Supreme Court for
no-merit appeals in termination cases. We also conclude that the appeal is wholly without
merit. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the order terminating
Gritton’s parental rights.
Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.
KINARD and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.
Suzanne Ritter Lumpkin, Arkansas Public Defender Commission, Dependency-Neglect
Appellate Division, for appellant.
No response.
5