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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
HARRY JACKSON
Appellant No. 1082 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 27, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1135721-1982
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED APRIL 08, 2015
Appellant, Harry Jackson, appeals pro se from the order entered in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his serial
petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-9546. On March 26, 1983, a jury found Appellant guilty of first-
degree murder and possessing instruments of crime. The court sentenced
Appellant on July 14, 1983, to life imprisonment. This Court affirmed the
judgment of sentence on December 5, 1984. See Commonwealth v.
Jackson, 488 A.2d 1164 (Pa.Super. 1984). Our Supreme Court denied
allowance of appeal on April 4, 1985. On April 30, 1987, Appellant filed his
first petition for collateral relief, which the court dismissed on November 19,
1990. This Court affirmed the order denying relief on May 8, 1991, and our
Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on October 31, 1991. See
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Commonwealth v. Jackson, 595 A.2d 191 (Pa.Super. 1991), appeal
denied, 529 Pa. 617, 600 A.2d 534 (1991).
On May 8, 2012, Appellant filed the current, serial pro se PCRA
petition. The court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice on March 7, 2014;
Appellant responded on March 18, 2014. The court dismissed Appellant’s
petition as untimely on March 27, 2014. On April 9, 2014, Appellant timely
filed a pro se notice of appeal. No Rule 1925(b) statement was ordered, and
Appellant filed none.
The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite.
Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 1283 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied,
___ Pa. ___, 91 A.3d 162 (2014). A PCRA petition must be filed within one
year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final at the conclusion of direct review or
at the expiration of time for seeking review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
The three statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s timeliness provisions allow for
very limited circumstances under which the late filing of a petition will be
excused; and a petitioner asserting a timeliness exception must file a
petition within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), (b)(2). Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of
sentence became final on June 3, 1985, upon expiration of the time to file a
petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. See
U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 20.1 (effective August 1, 1984; allowing 60 days to file
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petition for writ of certiorari). Appellant filed the current petition on May 8,
2012, which is patently untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant
now attempts to invoke the “new constitutional right” exception to the
PCRA’s time bar under Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), claiming Lafler v. Cooper,
___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012) and Missouri v.
Frye, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) set forth newly
recognized constitutional rights, held to apply retroactively.1 Nevertheless,
this Court has specifically held that neither Lafler nor Frye created a new
constitutional right. See Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 69 A.3d 1270
(Pa.Super. 2013) (explaining Lafler and Frye simply applied Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and ineffectiveness test to circumstances where
counsel’s conduct resulted in plea offer lapsing or being rejected to
defendant’s detriment; petitioner’s reliance on these decisions to satisfy
Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) exception to PCRA’s time restrictions is unavailing).
Thus, the court properly dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely.
Order affirmed.
____________________________________________
1
The Supreme Court decided Lafler and Frye on March 21, 2012. Thus,
Appellant complied with the sixty-day rule per 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/8/2015
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