Case: 14-11032 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-11032
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
Agency No. A086-978-329
WALTER JOSE RUIZ,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(April 8, 2015)
Before HULL, JULIE CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 14-11032 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 2 of 4
Walter Jose Ruiz, a native of Nicaragua, seeks review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s
(“IJ”) removal order. The IJ found, and the BIA agreed, that Ruiz was removable,
pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), based on Ruiz’s Florida conviction for possession of
cocaine. On appeal, Ruiz argues that his cocaine possession conviction does not
qualify as a removable offense. After review, we deny the petition for review. 1
As a threshold matter, we note that, although we lack jurisdiction to review a
final removal order against an alien who has committed a controlled substance
offense, we retain jurisdiction to review Ruiz’s claim because its raises a question
of law. See INA § 242(a)(2)(C), (D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D).
The BIA and the IJ did not err in concluding that Ruiz’s cocaine possession
conviction was a qualifying conviction under INA § 237(a)(2)(B). An alien may
be removed if he is convicted of “a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a
State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance,”
unless the alien’s sole offense is possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana for
personal use. INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
1
Because the BIA explicitly agreed with the IJ’s finding of removability, we review the
decisions of both the BIA and the IJ. Ayala v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 948 (11th Cir.
2010). We defer to the BIA’s interpretation of a statute if it is reasonable and does not contradict
Congress’s clear intent. Quinchia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 552 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008).
2
Case: 14-11032 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 3 of 4
At his removal hearing, Ruiz admitted that he was convicted of possessing
cocaine under Florida Statutes § 893.13(6)(a), which prohibits an individual from
possession a controlled substance, including cocaine, unless obtained under a valid
prescription. See Fla. Stat. § 893.13(6)(a). Cocaine is a controlled substance
under federal law. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (listing cocaine and other extracts from
coca leaves as a Schedule II controlled substance). Thus, possession of cocaine in
violation of Florida Statutes § 893.13(6)(a) qualifies as an offense “relating to a
controlled substance,” within the meaning of INA § 237(a)(2)(B).
Ruiz argues that because he possessed only a small amount of cocaine, his
Florida cocaine possession conviction is analogous to a federal misdemeanor.
However, INA § 237(a)(2)(B) plainly and unambiguously applies to all offenses
relating to a controlled substance, other than the marijuana offenses specifically
excluded, regardless of whether they are misdemeanors or felonies. It is
unnecessary for the BIA to look for an analogous federal offense and apply the
categorical approach, as Ruiz suggests. Cf. Moncrieffe v. Holder, __ U.S. __, __,
133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684-87 (2013) (employing the categorical approach to determine
whether state marijuana possession conviction was an “aggravated felony” under
INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)).
Ruiz contends that the exclusion of minor marijuana offenses should be read
also to exclude similarly minor cocaine offenses. When Congress enumerates
3
Case: 14-11032 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 4 of 4
specific exceptions, however, we infer “that Congress considered the issue of
exceptions and . . . limited the statute to the ones set forth” and are not free to read
additional exceptions into the statute. Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 681 F.3d 1236, 1240
(11th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, neither we nor the BIA may
construe INA § 237(a)(2)(B) to exclude Ruiz’s cocaine possession conviction as a
removable offense.
For these reasons, the BIA and the IJ did not err in determining that Ruiz’s
cocaine possession conviction was for an offense “relating to a controlled
substance” under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).2
PETITION DENIED.
2
Ruiz does not challenge the IJ’s denial of his request for a waiver of removability
pursuant to INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), except for a statement in the conclusion of his
appeal brief that he is eligible for such a waiver because his cocaine possession conviction is not
a felony under federal law. Because Ruiz makes only a passing reference to his waiver request,
he has abandoned this issue. See Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1352 (11th
Cir. 2009).
4