STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A13-1302
Court of Appeals Anderson, J.
Robert Meeker, et al.,
Respondents,
vs. Filed: April 8 , 2015
Office of Appellate Courts
IDS Property Casualty Insurance Company,
Appellant.
________________________
E. Curtis Roeder, Roeder Smith Jadin, PLLC, Bloomington, Minnesota, for respondents.
Randall E. Gottschalk, Gottschalk Law, PLLC, Saint Louis Park, Minnesota, for
appellant.
SYLLABUS
An action is commenced under Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 2 (2014), when a
plaintiff makes substituted service on the Commissioner of Commerce by either sending
a copy of the process by certified mail to, or leaving a copy of the process at, the
Commissioner’s office. To preserve the effectiveness of the service, a plaintiff must
fulfill the other statutory requirements, including filing an affidavit of compliance in the
district court, before the return day of the process.
Affirmed.
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OPINION
ANDERSON, Justice.
We have before us a question of statutory interpretation in which the sole issue is
whether substituted service of process under Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 2 (2014), is
effective when a plaintiff makes service before the limitations period in an insurance
policy has expired, but then files the affidavit of compliance after the period has expired.
Respondents Robert and Jacqueline Meeker brought an action against appellant IDS
Property Casualty Insurance Company after the insurer denied their claim for property
damage. It is undisputed that the Meekers served IDS, but the district court dismissed the
action as untimely because the Meekers filed the affidavit of compliance after the
policy’s 2-year limitations period had expired. The court of appeals reversed, concluding
that filing the affidavit of compliance before the expiration of the limitations period was
not required for effective substitute service. Because the plain language of section
45.028, subdivision 2, requires only that process be served on the Commissioner of
Commerce to commence an action, we affirm the court of appeals.
I.
The Meekers held property insurance through IDS, and filed a claim with the
insurance carrier in July 2010, alleging damage to their home as a result of a June 17,
2010, storm. IDS denied the claim in January 2011 for failure to provide appropriate
documentation, and denied the claim for a second time in October 2011. The IDS
insurance policy stated that any lawsuit challenging a denial of a claim “must be brought
within two years after the date of loss or damage occurs.” Because IDS is a nonresident
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insurance company that conducts business in Minnesota, the Meekers were authorized to
commence an action against IDS under the substituted-service statute, Minn. Stat.
§ 45.028, subd. 2, which allows the Commissioner of Commerce to accept service of
process for foreign companies. Minn. Stat. § 60A.19, subds. 3-4 (2014). Section 45.028,
subdivision 2, provides that service of process may be made by either mailing or leaving
a copy of the process with the Commissioner, and is not effective unless the plaintiff
sends notice of the service and a copy of the process to the defendant and files an
affidavit of compliance with the court on or before “the return day of the process.”
On June 13, 2012, 4 days before the expiration of the limitations period in the
insurance policy, the Meekers sent copies of the summons and complaint by certified
mail to both the Commissioner of Commerce and IDS. On June 28, the Meekers’
attorney signed an affidavit of compliance attesting to service of the complaint by
certified mail, and, on June 29, filed the affidavit in the district court.
IDS moved for summary judgment in March 2013, claiming that the suit was
untimely because the Meekers did not file their affidavit of compliance until after the 2-
year limitations period in the insurance policy had ended. The district court granted
summary judgment to IDS, concluding that service of process under Minn. Stat. § 45.028,
subd. 2, is not effective until all of the requirements of the statute are satisfied, including
filing the affidavit of compliance with the district court. It is undisputed that the affidavit
was filed outside of the 2-year limitations period.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that under the plain language
of the statute the affidavit of compliance may be filed after a limitations period has
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expired, so long as it is filed on or before the return day of process. Meeker v. IDS Prop.
Cas. Ins. Co., 846 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App. 2014). We granted IDS’s petition for
review to decide whether the Meekers’ suit was untimely based on their failure to file the
affidavit of compliance before the expiration of the contractual limitations period.
II.
Whether the Meekers’ service of process under Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 2, was
effective to commence their suit against IDS is a question of law that we review de novo.
Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn. 2008). And specifically, the
issue of whether, under the plain language of the statute, a plaintiff must file an affidavit
of compliance within the contractual limitations period in order to obtain effective service
of process presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. See
City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley Coop. Power Ass’n, 830 N.W.2d 32, 36 (Minn.
2013). The text of the substituted-service statute provides:
Service of process under this section may be made by leaving a copy of the
process in the office of the commissioner, or by sending a copy of the
process to the commissioner by certified mail, and is not effective unless:
(1) the plaintiff, who may be the commissioner in an action or proceeding
instituted by the commissioner, sends notice of the service and a copy of
the process by certified mail to the defendant or respondent at the last
known address; and (2) the plaintiff’s affidavit of compliance is filed in the
action or proceeding on or before the return day of the process, if any, or
within further time as the court allows.
Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 2 (emphasis added). If the Legislature’s intent is clear from
the statute’s plain and unambiguous language, then we interpret the statute according to
its plain meaning. State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Minn. 2013). When construing a
statute, we “give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning.” Premier Bank v.
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Becker Dev., LLC, 785 N.W.2d 753, 759 (Minn. 2010) (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.08
(2008)).
There is no dispute that the Meekers performed the three acts necessary to
effectuate service of process under the substituted-service statute, Minn. Stat. § 45.028,
subd. 2, and there is also no dispute that they completed the last act after the limitations
period in the policy had expired. That is, the Meekers sent copies of the process to the
Commissioner of Commerce and to IDS before the expiration of the limitations period,
but they did not file the affidavit of compliance until after the limitations period had
expired. There also is no dispute, however, that the Meekers filed the affidavit before the
return day of the process under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.1 IDS argues that
the Meekers were required to complete all three acts before the limitations period
expired. The Meekers contend that so long as the three statutory requirements are met,
the affidavit of compliance need not be filed before the limitation period ends for the
substituted service to be timely.
A.
Typically, to determine if a civil action has been timely commenced, we look to
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 3.01, which generally provides that an action is
commenced against each defendant “when the summons is served upon that defendant.”
1
Section 45.028 does not define the “return day of the process,” but Minn. R. Civ.
P. 12.01 states that a defendant must serve an answer to a complaint within 20 days after
service of the summons. The parties agree that the return day of process was 23 days
after sending the summons and complaint to the Commissioner, because Minn. R. Civ.
P. 6.05 provides for an additional 3 days when, as here, the Meekers served the summons
and complaint on the Commissioner by mail.
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Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01(a); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.02 (providing that a copy of the
complaint also must be served with the summons). We have said that “in the absence of
a clear intention to the contrary . . . the ordinary rules of civil procedure apply [to a
claim] unless clearly inconsistent with the statute.” In re Civil Commitment of Lonergan,
811 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Thunderbird Motel Corp. v. Cnty. of
Hennepin, 289 Minn. 239, 242, 183 N.W.2d 569, 571 (1971)) (alterations in original).
Because Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 2, does not address when an action is commenced,
the ordinary rules of civil procedure apply; namely, an action is commenced when the
summons and complaint are served. The statute is consistent with the Rules of Civil
Procedure; the statute simply provides an alternative mechanism for how process may be
served on certain out-of-state defendants.
We look to the language of the statute to determine whether the Meekers timely
served IDS. The first clause of subdivision 2 states that “[s]ervice of process under this
section may be made” by delivering or sending by certified mail a copy of the process to
the Commissioner of Commerce. Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 2 (emphasis added). As
used in this provision, the common and approved usage of the word “made” is “[t]o cause
to exist or happen.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1059
(5th ed. 2011). Thus, under the plain meaning of the first clause of subdivision 2, service
of process exists—it has been made—at the point at which a plaintiff delivers or mails a
copy of the process to the Commissioner of Commerce. This means that a plaintiff
serving process under subdivision 2 commences litigation by providing the
Commissioner of Commerce with a copy of the summons and complaint.
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In addition, the very existence of the affidavit-of-compliance requirement assumes
that an action had already been commenced by the service of process on the
Commissioner. Specifically, the last clause of subdivision 2 states that a “plaintiff’s
affidavit of compliance is filed in the action or proceeding on or before the return day of
the process.” Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 2 (emphasis added). If a lawsuit were not
commenced through service of process, then there would be no “action or proceeding” in
which to file the affidavit of compliance. In other words, the references to “is filed” and
“the action or proceeding” in relation to the affidavit of compliance presuppose that an
action has been commenced and that there is an existing case.
Therefore, as related to the limitations period governing a cause of action, the
plain language of section 45.028, subdivision 2, provides that service of process is made,
and therefore, an action is commenced, when a plaintiff sends a copy of the process to the
Commissioner of Commerce by certified mail. Fulfillment of the other statutory
requirements—sending notice to the defendant and filing the affidavit of compliance—is
necessary only to preserve the effectiveness of the service. It is clear that service of
process under section 45.028, subdivision 2, is no longer effective to commence an action
if the affidavit of compliance is not filed by the return day of process, or such other
period as the court allows. But, the requirement for effective service is separate from a
limitations period. In other words, service of a complaint on the Commissioner is
sufficient to commence an action for purposes of a limitations period, but a lawsuit can
still be dismissed due to a plaintiff’s failure to file an affidavit of compliance before the
return day of process.
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Here, the Meekers commenced the lawsuit when they “made” service under Minn.
Stat. § 45.028, subd. 2, by sending, via certified mail, a copy of the complaint and
summons to the Commissioner of Commerce 4 days before the contractual limitations
period ended. Because the Meekers then sent a copy of the process to IDS and filed their
affidavit before the return day of that process, they satisfied the statutory conditions for
effective substitute service under Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 2.2
B.
Our conclusion, under the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 2, that the
Meekers timely filed their action against IDS is consistent with Carlson v. Hennepin
County, 479 N.W.2d 50 (Minn. 1992), in which we analyzed a similar, although not
identical, service-of-process provision. Carlson considered the timeliness of the
commencement of a civil action under Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01(c), which provides that a
civil action is commenced when “the summons is delivered to the sheriff in the county
2
The court of appeals emphasized the Legislature’s use of the word “unless,” rather
than “until,” in section 45.028, subdivision 2, in concluding that filing the affidavit of
compliance before the expiration of the limitations period was not required for effective
substitute service. See Meeker, 846 N.W.2d at 471. The plain language of the statute
provides that service of process, once made, is “not effective unless” the plaintiff sends
notice of the service and a copy of the process by certified mail to the defendant and files
the affidavit of compliance on or before the return day of process. Minn. Stat. § 45.028,
subd. 2. The district court concluded that the phrase “not effective unless” means that
service is not effective until all three requirements of the statute are satisfied. The court
of appeals determined that the word “unless” cannot be equated with the word “until,” the
latter of which includes a temporal component. See Meeker, 846 N.W.2d at 471.
We need not resolve whether the court of appeals’ distinction between “unless”
and “until” is dispositive, because the plain language of the statute makes clear that the
Meekers commenced the litigation before the limitations period expired.
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where the defendant resides for service; but such delivery shall be ineffectual unless
within 60 days thereafter the summons is actually served on that defendant or the first
publication thereof is made.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01(c) (emphasis added).
In Carlson, the issue was whether two related entities shared an identity of interest
such that a complaint served on one would be effective as to the other if served before the
expiration of the limitations period. 479 N.W.2d at 55-56. One day before the 2-year
statute of limitations expired on a medical malpractice claim, the plaintiff “commenced
[the] action” by delivering to the Hennepin County Sheriff a summons and complaint to
be served upon one defendant. Id. at 52. The summons and complaint were served on a
second defendant, a related entity, 16 days after the statute of limitations had expired. Id.
at 53-54. Despite the fact that the service of process on the second defendant was
completed only after the limitation period had ended, we determined that the plaintiff’s
suit was timely commenced as to the second defendant because the plaintiff had timely
delivered the summons and complaint to the county sheriff before the limitations period
expired, even if the remaining requirements of process under the rule were not completed
before the period expired. Id. at 56. We imputed the service of process on one defendant
to the other, holding that both “received notice of the . . . action within the period
provided by law.” Id. We stated:
Under Rule 3.01(c), an action is commenced when the summons and
complaint are delivered to the county sheriff, who then has 60 days to serve
them. As a result of the grace period, it is possible for a plaintiff to
commence an action on the final day of the limitations period and for the
defendant to hear nothing of it until 60 days later. The lateness of notice
does not invalidate the lawsuit, so long as the action is commenced within
the limitations period.
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Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
To be sure, Rule 3.01(c) and Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 2, provide for different
types of service (the former allowing for the commencement of an action by delivering
the complaint and summons to the county sheriff), but the provisions use nearly identical
language—a negative phrasing of “effective” and use of the word “unless”—to describe
the service requirements. Thus, our reasoning in Carlson that litigation was commenced
so long as the complaint and summons were delivered to the county sheriff before the
statute of limitations ended, applies with equal force to the delivery of process to the
Commissioner under Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 2. See 479 N.W. 2d at 56; see also
Johnson v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 463 N.W.2d 894, 898 (Minn. 1990) (describing Rule
3.01(c) as “plainly [stating that] the action is commenced when the summons is delivered
to the sheriff of the proper county for service, not when the sheriff subsequently serves
the papers”). We have determined that delivery to the defendant within the grace period
“is necessary to preserve the effectiveness of the delivery date as the date of
commencement of the action.” Johnson, 463 N.W.2d at 898. Just as a lawsuit brought
under Rule 3.01(c) does not become untimely if the sheriff serves the summons and
complaint during the 60-day grace period, but after the limitations period has expired, a
lawsuit does not become untimely under Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd 2, when the affidavit
of compliance is filed after the end of the limitations period, but on or before the return
day of process.
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IV.
We therefore hold that an action is commenced under Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd.
2, when a plaintiff leaves a copy of the process in the office of the Commissioner of
Commerce or sends a copy of the process to the Commissioner by certified mail. The
service is effective so long as a copy of the process is sent to the defendant and the
plaintiff’s affidavit of compliance is filed in the action on or before the return day of
process. Because the Meekers filed the affidavit of compliance before the return day of
the process, the service of process was effective, and the Meekers’ suit is not barred by
the 2-year limitations period in the IDS insurance policy.
Affirmed.
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