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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-11688
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cr-00001-JES-CM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LOUIS MICHAEL PASQUAZZI,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 14-11822
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cr-00138-JES-DNF-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
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versus
LOUIS MICHAEL PASQUAZZI,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(April 9, 2015)
Before HULL, ROSENBAUM, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Defendant Louis Pasquazzi appeals both his
71-month sentence, imposed after pleading guilty to passing or uttering a
counterfeit $100 bill in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 472 and 2, and his consecutive
24-month sentence, imposed following the revocation of his supervised release.
Defendant argues that it was substantively unreasonable for the district court to
sentence him to the high-end of the applicable guideline ranges for both his
supervised release violation and criminal conviction and to run those sentences
consecutively. After review, we affirm.
I. Background
In 2011, Defendant pled guilty to seven counts of uttering counterfeit $50
and $100 bills, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 472 and 2. As part of his 2011 offense
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conduct, Defendant manufactured and passed (and had unindicted co-conspirators
also pass) counterfeit $20, $50, and $100 bills. After serving a 33-month sentence,
Defendant was released from prison in June 2013 and began his three-year term of
supervised release.
Shortly after his release from prison, Defendant began manufacturing $100
bills. From August 1 to August 27, 2013, Defendant, along with a half-dozen other
individuals, passed the counterfeit bills. Defendant and his cohorts used the
counterfeit $100 bills to make small purchases for which they then received
genuine currency as change. Defendant’s fellow participants then gave their
change to Defendant.
In August 2013, Defendant’s probation officer filed a petition for revocation
of supervised release. The petition alleged that Defendant had violated the
conditions of his supervised release by: (1) having two positive drug tests for
cocaine and amphetamines on July 8 and 22, 2013 and (2) failing to submit to two
periodic drug tests on July 29 and August 6, 2013. In September 2013, Defendant
was indicted for one count of passing or uttering a counterfeit $100 bill, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 472 and 2. The probation officer filed a superseding
revocation petition, in which he added the allegation that Defendant had violated a
condition of supervised release by engaging in new criminal conduct.
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After Defendant pled guilty to passing or uttering a counterfeit $100 bill, the
district court held a joint revocation and sentencing hearing. Defendant admitted
the violations of his conditions of supervised release, and the district court revoked
Defendant’s supervised release. Defendant requested that a 24-month total
sentence, with significant mental health treatment, be imposed for both his
supervised release violations and criminal conviction.1 He argued that such a
downward variance was warranted based on his mental health issues. He further
claimed that he had used cocaine to self-medicate his untreated Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder and bipolar disease and that he had engaged in criminal
activity in order to get cocaine. Defendant contended that he would no longer use
cocaine, and thus not engage in future criminal conduct, if he received
psychological and medical treatment. The district court declined Defendant’s
request for a downward variance and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment
for violating the conditions of his supervised release and to 71 months’
imprisonment for his conviction for uttering a counterfeit $100 bill, to be served
consecutively, for a 95-month total sentence.
1
Defendant’s guideline range for his supervised release violations was 21 to 24 months’
imprisonment. His guideline range for his uttering a counterfeit $100 bill conviction was 57 to
71 months’ imprisonment.
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II. Discussion
On appeal, Defendant argues that both the length of his sentences and their
consecutive nature are substantively unreasonable because the district court did not
adequately account for his expressed desire to receive effective mental health
treatment. We review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion
using a two-step process. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir.
2008). We look first to whether the district court committed any significant
procedural error and then to whether the sentence is substantively unreasonable in
light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. 2 Id.
Likewise, we review sentences imposed upon revocation of supervised release for
reasonableness. United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106-07 (11th Cir.
2006).
The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that it is
unreasonable. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1189. We will reverse only if “left with the
definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
2
The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for
deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the
Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9)
the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to
victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at
1191 (quotation marks omitted).
Whether a term of imprisonment imposed for supervised release violations is
to be served concurrently or consecutively to another sentence is a question
entrusted to the district court’s discretion. United States v. Quinones, 136 F.3d
1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 1998). In determining whether sentences should run
consecutively or concurrently, the district court must consider the § 3553(a)
factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b).
Here, Defendant has not shown that the length of his sentences or the
imposition of consecutive sentences is substantively unreasonable. Defendant’s
71-month sentence for his conviction for passing counterfeit currency is within the
advisory guideline range of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment, and well below the
20-year statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 472. See United States v. Hunt, 526
F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that, while we do not apply a
presumption, we ordinary expect a sentence inside the advisory guidelines range to
be reasonable); United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008)
(citing the fact that the sentence imposed was well below the statutory maximum
as an indication of reasonableness). Likewise, Defendant’s 24-month revocation
sentence is within the advisory guideline range of 21 to 24 months’ imprisonment
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and does not exceed the 24-month statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3).
At the sentencing hearing, Defendant presented evidence, including a report
and testimonial evidence from a doctor who had evaluated him, in an effort to
show that his previously untreated mental health issues had led to his cocaine use
and past criminal activity. Defendant argued that medical treatment would break
this cycle of drug addiction and criminal activity. In imposing sentence, the
district court specifically acknowledged that it had heard and considered
Defendant’s arguments and evidence, including the doctor’s report and testimony,
and that it had considered all of the § 3553(a) factors. Responding to Defendant’s
argument about his need for mental health treatment, the court recommended that
Defendant serve his sentence in a facility that had the ability to address those
medical needs. As to the appropriate sentence, however, the district court noted
that Defendant’s violent and lengthy criminal history suggested that it was unlikely
Defendant’s behavior would change, even with medical treatment.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making this
determination. See United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007)
(stating that “[t]he weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter
committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” (quotation marks
omitted)). Defendant’s criminal history spans 25 years and includes numerous
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violent offenses, such as battery, assault, aggravated battery with a firearm, and
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant also has a prior federal
conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, as well as a federal
conviction for possession of cocaine. Moreover, Defendant admitted that he
violated the terms of his supervised release less than three months after he was
released from prison. Indeed, Defendant committed the very same offense for
which he was on supervised release.
We also conclude that it was well within the district court’s discretion to
impose consecutive sentences after considering Defendant’s criminal history. See
Quinones, 136 F.3d at 1295. We note that the Sentencing Guidelines provide, in a
policy statement, that a sentence resulting from a supervised release violation
“shall be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that
the defendant is serving, whether or not the sentence of imprisonment being served
resulted from the conduct that is the basis of the revocation of probation or
supervised release.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f). On these facts, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by complying with this policy statement.
For all of these reasons, Defendant has not carried his burden to show that
his two sentences are substantively unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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