Case: 14-11419 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-11419
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:13-cr-60218-DTKH-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TEDRIC JAMEIL CHIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(April 9, 2015)
Before MARTIN, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
Case: 14-11419 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Tedric Chin appeals his convictions and sentences for sex trafficking of a
minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(1), and (b)(2). On appeal, Chin
argues that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was
violated when the district court, under Federal Rule of Evidence 412, limited
Chin’s cross-examination of victim-witness K.B. to exclude evidence that K.B.
engaged previously in prostitution.1 No reversible error has been shown; we
affirm.
Chin was charged with sex trafficking of two underage girls, K.B. and S.M.
Briefly stated, Chin’s theory of the defense was that he was “merely present”
during K.B. and S.M.’s prostitution activities and that K.B. was the person who
was actually directing her own prostitution business. In support of his theory, Chin
sought, pursuant to Rule 412(b)(1)(C), to cross-examine K.B. about her past
involvement in prostitution.
1
Chin also makes the following arguments on appeal: (1) the district court erred in instructing
the jury (a) that Chin did not have to know his acts affected interstate commerce and (b) that
Chin could be found guilty if he recklessly disregarded that K.B. and S.M. were under 18 years
old; (2) Chin’s mandatory-minimum sentence was unconstitutional under Alleyne v. United
States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), without a finding by the jury that Chin knew that S.M. was under
14 years old; and (3) Chin’s below-guideline sentence was substantively unreasonable. Having
reviewed the pertinent law and the record, we conclude that these arguments are without merit
and warrant no further discussion. Thus, we focus our discussion only on the district court’s
exclusion of evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 412.
2
Case: 14-11419 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 3 of 6
Following an in camera hearing (during which K.B. testified that she had, in
fact, engaged in two instances of prostitution more than two years before she met
Chin), the district court excluded evidence of K.B.’s prior acts of prostitution. The
court concluded that the proposed evidence “simply indicates . . . a propensity or a
willingness to engage in prostitution” and that the evidence was not pertinent to the
charges against Chin.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s application of Rule 412.
United States v. Culver, 598 F.3d 740, 749 (11th Cir. 2010). But, “[w]hether the
exclusion of evidence violated a constitutional guarantee is a legal question
reviewed de novo.” United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1209 n.24 (11th Cir.
2009).
Rule 412 provides that, in a “criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual
misconduct,” the following evidence is inadmissible: “(1) evidence offered to
prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) evidence offered to
prove a victim’s sexual predisposition.” Fed.R.Evid. 412(a). The district court
may, however, admit “evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s
constitutional rights.” Fed.R.Evid. 412(b)(1)(C). Rule 412(b)(1)(C) is “a narrow
exception” to the “broad general principle” that evidence of a victim’s prior sexual
history is inadmissible. Culver, 598 F.3d at 749.
3
Case: 14-11419 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 4 of 6
In determining whether evidence is admissible under Rule 412(b)(1)(C)’s
“narrow exception,” we start with the premise that a defendant has a right, under
the Sixth Amendment, to confront witnesses against him. See id.; U.S. Const.
amend. VI. “The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the
defendant the opportunity of cross-examination.” United States v. Baptista-
Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1366 (11th Cir. 1994) (alteration omitted). Still, a
“defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses is not without limitation.” Id.
“[T]he Sixth Amendment guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish.” United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412,
1424 (11th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original) (quotations omitted). We have said
that “[c]ross-examination of a government ‘star’ witness is important, and a
presumption favors free cross-examination on possible bias, motive, ability to
perceive and remember, and general character for truthfulness, but cross-
examination must be relevant.” United States v. Phelps, 733 F.2d 1464, 1472
(11th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
“The test for the Confrontation Clause is whether a reasonable jury would
have received a significantly different impression of the witness’ credibility had
counsel pursued the proposed line of cross-examination.” United States v. Taylor,
17 F.3d 333, 340 (11th Cir. 1994). “A defendant’s cross-examination rights are
4
Case: 14-11419 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 5 of 6
satisfied when the cross-examination permitted exposes the jury to facts sufficient
to evaluate the credibility of the witness and enables defense counsel to establish a
record from which he properly can argue why the witness is less than reliable.”
Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d at 1371. “[O]nce there is sufficient cross-examination
to satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, further questioning is
within the district court’s discretion.” Taylor, 17 F.3d at 340.
Chin has failed to demonstrate that his Sixth Amendment rights were
violated when the district court excluded evidence about K.B.’s earlier acts of
prostitution. First, Chin had ample opportunity to cross-examine K.B. and to
impeach K.B.’s credibility effectively. 2 On cross-examination, K.B. admitted that
she had lied to the police about several aspects of her involvement in the
prostitution business. Chin’s lawyer was also able to highlight inconsistencies in
K.B.’s testimony, including whether K.B. had paid a homeless woman to rent a
motel room for her because she was underage. The district court acknowledged
the effectiveness of K.B.’s cross-examination, commenting that K.B.’s attitude
changed from being “demur” on direct examination to “indicating a degree of
casualness or indifference” on cross-examination, which the district court thought
gave the jury a different and perhaps more “accurate view” of K.B.’s approach and
willingness to participate in prostitution. Based on this record, sufficient evidence
2
Contrary to Chin’s assertions on appeal, K.B. never testified -- either directly or indirectly --
that she had not considered prostituting herself until after she met Chin.
5
Case: 14-11419 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 6 of 6
existed to enable Chin’s lawyer to argue properly that K.B. lacked credibility. And
nothing evidences that the jury would have formed “a significantly different
impression” about K.B.’s credibility had Chin been permitted to cross-examine
K.B. about her past acts of prostitution. See Taylor, 17 F.3d at 340.
Moreover, evidence of K.B.’s earlier involvement in prostitution was not
critical to Chin’s “mere presence” defense. K.B.’s testimony demonstrated that
K.B. was already knowledgeable about the prostitution business. For example,
K.B. testified that prostitution was prevalent in her neighborhood and that it was
her idea to start telling men that they had to pay for sex. K.B. began managing
S.M.’s prostitution activities, which included coaching S.M. on “how to be a girlie
girl,” what to wear, and how to “keep [her]self up.” K.B.’s testimony also
demonstrated that, at times, she and S.M. found clients, set up prostitution “dates,”
and engaged in acts of prostitution without Chin’s involvement or instruction. In
the light of K.B.’s trial testimony, the district court’s exclusion of evidence about
K.B.’s prostitution history in no serious way hindered Chin’s ability to argue that
he was “merely present” for K.B. and S.M.’s prostitution activities.
Chin has failed to demonstrate a violation of his constitutional rights; the
district court abused no discretion in excluding evidence of K.B.’s history of
prostitution under Rule 412.
AFFIRMED.
6