NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT APR 09 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ANNE MARIE BAGBY, No. 12-35282
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-01581-PK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 3, 2015
Portland, Oregon
Before: FISHER, PAEZ, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Anne Marie Bagby appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the denial
of her application for Supplemental Security Income. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
“We ‘review the district court’s order affirming the [Social Security
Administration] Commissioner’s denial of benefits de novo . . . to ensure that the
Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and a correct
application of the law.’” Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690
(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1995))
(alterations omitted).
1. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the administrative law
judge’s (“ALJ’s”) reasons for discounting Dr. Richardson’s opinions and Dr.
McCarthy’s November 2006 Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score.
See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). Dr. Richardson
stated that Bagby experienced multiple episodes of decompensation, but there is no
evidence in the record of these episodes. His evaluations of Bagby’s limitations
also contain internal inconsistencies. Similarly, although Dr. McCarthy assigned
Bagby a GAF score of 40 in November 2006, she noted one month later that Bagby
had significantly improved, casting doubt on the continued validity of the
November GAF score. The ALJ otherwise did not discount Dr. McCarthy’s
anxiety and posttraumatic stress disorder assessments. Substantial evidence thus
supports the ALJ’s decision to discount these findings.
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2. The ALJ did not err with regard to third-party witness Pitt’s statements.
Although the ALJ did not agree with Pitt’s conclusion about whether Bagby could
“survive in the common work force,” the ALJ “strongly considered [Pitt’s] report,
[and] f[ou]nd that the activities listed by [Pitt] are very similar to those expressed
by [Bagby], showing few actual limitations.” Bagby fails to show error in the
ALJ’s consideration of Pitt’s report.
3. Bagby next argues that, despite fully crediting Dr. Stuckey’s opinion, the
ALJ failed to incorporate Dr. Stuckey’s finding that Bagby faced moderate
limitations in her ability to “[r]espond appropriately to usual work situations and to
changes in a routine work setting” in his residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
assessment. We agree.
The ALJ’s RFC assessment limited Bagby to “simple, repetitive tasks,” no
contact with the public, and “occasional interaction with coworkers.” It did not
reflect Dr. Stuckey’s finding that Bagby was limited in her ability to “[r]espond
appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting.”
This is distinct from Bagby’s limited ability to interact with others, to understand,
remember, and follow “complex instructions,” and to “make judgments on
complex work-related decisions.” See 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(b) (describing “basic
work activities” to include, separately, “(3) Understanding, carrying out, and
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remembering simple instructions; . . . (5) Responding appropriately to supervision,
co-workers and usual work situations; and (6) Dealing with changes in a routine
work setting”).1
Because the RFC assessment failed to include all of Bagby’s credible
limitations, the ALJ posed an incomplete hypothetical to the vocational expert. See
DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 1991).2 On remand, the RFC
assessment must incorporate all of Bagby’s credible limitations.
4. Because we conclude that the RFC assessment was improper, we decline
to address whether the ALJ erred in concluding that Bagby’s statements were not
credible to the extent they were inconsistent with the RFC assessment. On remand,
the ALJ may reassess Bagby’s credibility.
1
We reject Bagby’s argument that the ALJ erred in failing to incorporate Dr.
Stuckey’s findings regarding Bagby’s limited ability to interact with supervisors.
As the record reflects, the ALJ included limitations in interactions with coworkers,
and Bagby has not demonstrated a basis for distinguishing between interactions
with coworkers and supervisors.
2
Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2008), is inapposite.
Stubbs-Danielson concluded that an RFC assessment limiting the claimant to
“simple, routine, repetitive sedentary work” effectively captured the claimant’s
limitations with regard to concentration, persistence, and pace because the
examining physician opined the claimant could carry out work on a sustained basis
so long as it was simple and unskilled. Id. at 1174. Here, by contrast, the RFC
assessment did not capture Bagby’s limitations in responding appropriately to
work situations and adapting to change.
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5. For the same reason, we decline to address any issues regarding the jobs
identified by the vocational expert. On remand, we do not preclude the parties
from raising arguments about other work Bagby can perform based on a proper
RFC assessment.
6. On remand, the district court is directed to remand this case to the
Commissioner for proceedings consistent with this memorandum. The parties
shall bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
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