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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-14521
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:13-cv-61317-WPD
RAYMOND PARDON, a.k.a. Peter Pardon,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(April 10, 2015)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Petitioner Raymond Pardon, a Florida state prisoner, appeals the district
court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. We agree with the
district court that habeas relief is not warranted, and thus affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The crime underlying this habeas petition occurred in September, 2003.
Petitioner was living with his girlfriend Michelle Madden, and the two had been
using drugs for days when they ran out of money. See Pardon v. State, 930 So. 2d
700, 701 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). While driving around, Petitioner and Madden
spotted an elderly couple at a bus stop. Id. Madden testified that Petitioner
stopped and covered his car tag, then pulled up close to the couple and told her to
get out and grab the woman’s purse. Id. Madden got out of the car, carrying a
knife that belonged to Petitioner. Id. She tried but was unable to grab the purse,
and she slashed at both the woman and her husband as they fought to maintain
possession of it. Id. At some point, Petitioner backed the car up, helped Madden
get back in, and fled the scene. Pardon, 930 So. 2d at 701.
Petitioner was arrested on September 19, 2003. When he was first detained,
Petitioner asked one of the officers who picked him up if he could talk to an
attorney. The officer responded that Petitioner would have to “worry about that
later.” Petitioner acknowledges that the officer did not interrogate him, and that
“there was no questioning going on” when he asked about an attorney.
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About three hours after he was detained, Petitioner was interviewed by
Detective Lance Moore. At the beginning of the interview, Moore required
Petitioner to read a statement of his Miranda rights out loud. While reading,
Petitioner made it clear that he understood he had a right to have an attorney
present during the interview. Petitioner told Moore that he had previously asked
about an attorney but disavowed any desire to speak to an attorney at that time,
stating:
Petitioner: [Reading rights card] And in regards to this investigation,
have you previously asked a police officer to allow you to speak to
any attorney? Yeah, I did that. No, I’m going to put no.
Moore: Well, I mean, tell me. I mean, I don’t know.
Petitioner: Well, downstairs I just briefly said to one of the fellows,
you know, you know can I talk to my attorney. And—
Moore: Okay. Well, let me ask you: Did you talk to me?
Petitioner: No
Moore: Okay. Well, let me ask you: Did—do you want to talk to an
attorney or do you want to talk to me? It’s your decision.
Petitioner: I want to talk to you.
Moore: Are you sure?
Petitioner: Yes.
Moore asked several more questions to ensure that Petitioner knew and
understood his rights, and that he did not want to contact an attorney. Petitioner
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confirmed his decision to speak to Moore without an attorney. Moore then
completed the interview, during which Petitioner made incriminating statements
about his participation in the crime. The interview was recorded.
Petitioner subsequently was charged with one count of attempted robbery,
two counts of aggravated battery on a person sixty-five years or older, and one
count of aggravated assault. Prior to trial, Petitioner moved to suppress his
interview with Moore. Petitioner argued that he had asked to speak with an
attorney and that Moore had interviewed him without honoring his request, in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and its progeny. There is no
written order in the record ruling on the motion to suppress, but the trial judge
allowed the recording of Petitioner’s interview to be played for the jury. The jury
convicted Petitioner on all four counts as charged. After applying a habitual
violent felony enhancement, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to life
imprisonment.
Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.
Pardon, 930 So. 2d at 704. Addressing Petitioner’s Miranda claim, the Florida
appellate court held that Petitioner’s rights were not violated because he was not
undergoing interrogation, and interrogation was not imminent, when he asked if he
could talk to an attorney. Id. at 703. Petitioner sought state post-conviction relief
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which was denied. See Pardon v.
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State, 88 So. 3d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Petitioner then filed the instant federal
habeas petition under § 2254 asserting numerous grounds for relief. The district
court denied relief on all grounds. This Court granted a certificate of appealability
on the Miranda issue.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Standard
We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions, and we review the
district court’s findings of fact for clear error. Terrell v. GDCP Warden, 744 F.3d
1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a highly deferential standard for reviewing the
Florida court’s decision on the merits of Petitioner’s Miranda claim. See id. The
AEDPA only authorizes federal habeas relief if the decision was “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or if it was “based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.” Id.
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)) (quotation marks omitted).
A decision is “contrary to” federal law if it conflicts with the governing rule
set forth by the United States Supreme Court, or arrives at a different result than
the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Id. (citing
Kimbrough v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 565 F.3d 796, 799 (11th Cir. 2009)). “An
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‘unreasonable application’ of clearly established federal law occurs when the state
court correctly identifies the governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies
it to the facts of the particular case.” Id. (quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694
(2002)) (quotation marks omitted). This Court has emphasized the difference
between an “unreasonable” and an “incorrect” application of federal law. Terrell,
744 F.3d at 1261. As we explained in Terrell, even a “strong case for relief” does
not necessarily mean that the state court’s contrary conclusion was “unreasonable.”
Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)) (quotation marks
omitted). See also Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1220 (11th Cir. 2011)
(habeas relief is not available if fairminded jurists could agree with the state court’s
decision).
Likewise, a state court’s factual findings are not “unreasonable” just because
the federal habeas court would have viewed the facts differently if it had
considered them in the first instance. Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210,
1230 (11th Cir. 2014). Rather, a state court’s factual findings are only
unreasonable if “no fairminded jurist could agree” with them. Holsey v. Warden,
Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 694 F.3d 1230, 1257 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Harrington,
562 U.S. at 102) (quotation marks omitted). See also Landers v. Warden, Att’y
Gen. of Ala., 776 F.3d 1288, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The Supreme Court has
found state factual findings unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2) when the direction of
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the evidence, viewed cumulatively, was too powerful to conclude anything but [the
petitioner’s factual claim]”) (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 265
(2005)) (quotation marks omitted).
B. Petitioner’s Miranda Claim
Petitioner contends that, when he asked one of the officers who arrested him
if he could talk to his attorney, he invoked his Miranda right to have counsel
present during any subsequent questioning. The recorded interview reflects that
Petitioner advised Moore of his previous request for an attorney. Rather than
concluding the interview, Moore sought a Miranda waiver and resumed his
questioning. Petitioner argues that Moore thereby violated Miranda and the
Supreme Court’s subsequent admonition that an accused who invokes his right to
have counsel present during questioning “is not subject to further interrogation by
the authorities until counsel has been made available to him.” Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). According to Petitioner, the Florida appellate court’s
adverse ruling was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law, and was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. We
disagree.
1. The state court properly identified the governing legal principles.
The Florida appellate court’s decision clearly was not “contrary to” federal
law. Beginning with Miranda itself, the Florida court cited and accurately
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described the holdings of the most relevant Supreme Court cases. Pardon, 930 So.
2d at 701-703. The Florida court noted that Miranda “require[s] the police to
unequivocally honor an arrestee’s request not to speak to the police without
counsel.” Id. at 702. Quoting extensively from Edwards, the court further
recognized that an accused, “having expressed his desire to deal with the police
only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Id. (quoting
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85). This is a correct statement of the legal principles
that govern Petitioner’s claim.
2. The state court’s decision was not an “unreasonable application” of
the above authorities.
Although the Florida court acknowledged that the police must scrupulously
comply with the Miranda-Edwards rule, it held that the rule was not implicated
here because Petitioner was not subject to interrogation or imminent interrogation
when he inquired about an attorney. Id. In support of its holding, the court cited
Supreme Court authority indicating that (1) Miranda safeguards only apply when a
defendant is subject to “custodial interrogation” and (2) “custodial interrogation”
must involve something more than merely being in custody. Id. (citing Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (“the special procedural safeguards
outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody,
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but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation”). Specifically,
the Supreme Court has explained that “interrogation” in the Miranda context refers
either to “express questioning” or other “words or actions on the part of the police
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)” that are likely to elicit
an incriminating response. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Based on the evidence
presented, the Florida court concluded that although Petitioner was in custody, he
was not subject to questioning or other “words or actions” likely to elicit
incriminating information when he inquired about an attorney. Pardon, 930 So. 2d
at 702.
Furthermore, the Florida court rejected the idea that Petitioner could have
“anticipatorily invoked” his Miranda right to counsel before interrogation was
imminent. Id. According to the court, “requiring the invocation [of the right to
counsel] to occur either during custodial interrogation or when it is imminent
strikes [the healthiest] balance between the protection of the individual from police
coercion on the one hand and the State’s need to conduct criminal investigations on
the other.” Id. (quoting Ault v. State, 866 So. 2d 674, 686 (Fla. 2003)) (quotation
marks omitted). Petitioner conceded that he was fully apprised of his Miranda
rights and that he did not invoke, and in fact repeatedly disavowed, his right to
counsel just prior to his interview with Moore, when his interrogation did become
imminent. Id. at 701. The Florida court thus held that Petitioner’s interview did
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not violate the Miranda-Edwards rule, and that the interview was properly
admitted into evidence. Id. at 702-04.
The Florida court’s decision was not unreasonable. Supreme Court authority
supports its conclusion that the Miranda-Edwards safeguards only apply when a
defendant is undergoing or imminently subject to interrogation and not when the
defendant is merely in custody. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 (“‘Interrogation,’ as
conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion
above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.”) and McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501
U.S. 171, 177-78 (1991) (noting that the Miranda-Edwards guarantee “relates only
to custodial interrogation”). The evidence in this case suggests that although
Petitioner was in custody when he inquired about an attorney, he was not
undergoing or imminently subject to “interrogation.” See Pardon, 930 So. 2d at
701. Moreover, the Supreme Court has never held that a defendant can invoke his
Miranda rights anticipatorily. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n. 3. See also Bobby v.
Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 29 (2011) (quoting McNeil for the proposition that “this
Court has never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in
a context other than ‘custodial interrogation’”) (quotation marks omitted). Thus,
the Florida court’s holding that Petitioner’s interrogation did not violate the
Miranda-Edwards rule was a reasonable application of the governing Supreme
Court precedents.
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3. The state court’s decision was not based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence in the record.
Finally, Petitioner’s argument that the Florida court’s decision was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts consists of little more than a conclusory
assertion. Petitioner does not support the assertion with any more detailed
argument or even identify the factual determinations that he claims to be
unreasonable. Based on his arguments below, we assume Petitioner’s position to
be that the Florida court unreasonably determined that interrogation was not
“imminent” when Petitioner asked about an attorney. Petitioner argued in the
district court that there were no facts in the record to support this conclusion.
Again, we disagree.
Indeed, there is plenty of evidence in the record to support the Florida
court’s finding. Petitioner acknowledged during the interview that “there was no
questioning going on” when he inquired about an attorney. There is no evidence
that Petitioner, at the time of the inquiry, was otherwise subjected to any “words or
actions on the part of the police” that were likely to elicit incriminating
information. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. About three hours after the inquiry, and just
prior to his interview, Petitioner equivocated when asked whether he had
previously invoked his right to an attorney, stating “Yeah, I did that. No, I’m
going to put no.” He then clarified that he had no desire to talk to an attorney, and
wanted to waive his Miranda right to have an attorney present during questioning.
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Based on this evidence, the Florida appellate court’s factual finding was not
unreasonable.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the denial of Petitioner’s § 2254
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
AFFIRMED.
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