UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4723
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MAURICE ANTONIO DAVIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Jackson L. Kiser,
Senior District Judge. (3:99-cr-50015-JLK-1; 3:99-cr-00063-JLK-
1; 3:00-cr-00045-JLK-1)
Submitted: March 30, 2015 Decided: April 10, 2015
Before KEENAN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Fay F. Spence, First
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Appellant. Anthony P. Giorno, Acting United States Attorney,
Jean B. Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, Steven F.
Bans, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Maurice Antonio Davis appeals the district court’s judgment
revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing him to
serve a term of 45 months’ imprisonment. Davis argues that the
district court erred in denying his request for a continuance
and in admitting hearsay evidence at the revocation hearing
without engaging in the balancing test required by Fed. R. Crim.
P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) and our decisions in United States v. Ferguson,
752 F.3d 613 (4th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Doswell, 670
F.3d 526 (4th Cir. 2012). Finding no reversible error, we
affirm the district court’s judgment.
I.
Davis argues the district court abused its discretion by
proceeding with the supervised release hearing while the appeal
of his state court conviction, which was the basis for the
revocation, was pending. We review a district court’s denial of
a motion for a continuance for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Midgett, 488 F.3d 288, 297 (4th Cir. 2007). Because a
defendant is provided the full panoply of due process rights at
trial, including that the offense be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, a conviction, provides sufficient grounds to conclude, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant violated the
terms of supervised release. See United States v. Spraglin, 418
F.3d 479, 480-81 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); United States v.
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Fleming, 9 F.3d 1253, 1254-55 (7th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
Accordingly, Davis’s state court conviction, although pending
appeal, provided the district court sufficient basis to revoke
supervised release. Therefore, the district court did not abuse
its discretion when it denied Davis’s request to continue the
hearing until the conclusion of his state appeal.
II.
Davis next argues that the district court erred when it
admitted a transcript from his state trial proceedings and
denied his request to confront the state trial witnesses without
determining whether the interests of justice required the
witnesses to appear. As part of the “minimum requirements of
due process,” a defendant at a revocation hearing shall have
“the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses
(unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for
not allowing confrontation).” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 489 (1972); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C)
(providing defendant “is entitled to . . . an opportunity to
appear, present evidence, and question any adverse witness
unless the court determines that the interest of justice does
not require the witness to appear”).
We conclude, however, that any error by the district court
in this regard is harmless. Ferguson, 752 F.3d at 617. The
erroneous admission of hearsay evidence is harmless where “the
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error had no substantial and injurious effect or influence on
the outcome” of the supervised release hearing. Id. at 618
(internal quotation marks omitted). An error is harmless, for
instance, where the district court relied on a basis for
revoking supervised release independent of the erroneously
admitted hearsay evidence. Doswell, 670 F.3d at 531.
Here, Davis admitted at the revocation hearing that he had
been convicted of three felony offenses in state court. This
admission provided sufficient grounds for revoking supervised
release. Admittedly, during the supervised release hearing, the
district court placed considerable focus on the evidence
presented at Davis’s state trial and found that Davis committed
the felonies underlying his conviction. In its written judgment
of revocation, however, the district court cited only Davis’s
admission that he had been convicted of three felonies in state
court as its basis for revoking supervised release.
As a general rule, where a district court’s written
judgment and its oral pronouncement conflict with respect to the
reason for revocation, the oral pronouncement of the sentence
controls. Doswell, 670 F.3d at 531-32 n.3 (citing United States
v. Osborne, 345 F.3d 281, 283 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003)). But if the
oral pronouncement of sentence is ambiguous, we look to the
written judgment to resolve the ambiguity. Osborne, 345 F.3d at
283 n.1.
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We conclude that the purpose of the district court’s
discussion of the trial transcript and its oral pronouncement
regarding its basis for revoking supervised release were
ambiguous. Because the written judgment relies only on Davis’s
admission of his state conviction, however, and evidence of a
conviction is sufficient to warrant revoking supervised release,
any error regarding the admission of the trial transcript was
harmless.
III.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment
revoking Davis’ supervised release. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this Court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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