FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 14 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KRISANNE L. HENSLEY, No. 13-35814
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-00180-TOR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Thomas O. Rice, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 13, 2015 **
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, D.W. NELSON and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Krisanne L. Hensley appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Hensley’s application for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. Hensley’s unopposed motion to submit the case on the
briefs is granted. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo, Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012), and affirm.
The administrative law judge (ALJ) provided specific and legitimate reasons
supported by substantial evidence for giving little weight to the opinions of
psychologist W. Scott Mabee, Ph.D., who supervised mental health evaluations
conducted by counseling therapist Steven E. Erikson and social worker Amy
Robinson. First, the ALJ reasonably found that Dr. Mabee’s opinions were
inconsistent with Erikson’s and Robinson’s clinical findings. See Bray v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (permitting the rejection
of a medical opinion that is inconsistent with clinical findings). Second, the ALJ
reasonably determined that Dr. Mabee’s opinion was inconsistent with Hensley’s
reported daily activities, which included attending to personal care, cooking,
cleaning, shopping for groceries, taking the bus and swimming for exercise. See
Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that claimant’s
testimony about her daily activities may be seen as inconsistent with the presence
of a disabling condition). Third, the ALJ reasonably gave more weight to the
contradictory opinions of Drs. Bailey and Gentile, whose conclusions were
consistent with other independent evidence in the record. See Tonapetyan v.
Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that contrary opinion of a
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non-examining medical expert may constitute substantial evidence when it is
consistent with other independent evidence in the record).
The ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting
Hensley’s testimony regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her
symptoms. The ALJ noted that Hensley’s subjective complaints of disabling knee
pain and mental health impairments were not fully supported by the medical
evidence. See Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 670-671 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding
that the ALJ properly relied on medical evidence undermining claimant’s
subjective assessment of limitations). The ALJ further noted that Hensley stopped
working, in part, because of her positive drug test rather than an injury. See Bruton
v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that in making a
credibility determination, ALJ did not err by considering that claimant left his job
because he was laid off, rather than because he was injured). Finally, the ALJ was
permitted to consider Hensley’s reports of her daily living activities and her lack of
mental health treatment when considering the intensity, persistence and limiting
effects of her symptoms. See Curry, 925 F.2d at 1130; Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113
(in assessing credibility, the ALJ may properly rely on unexplained or inadequately
explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment).
AFFIRMED.
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