J-S16033-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.J.C., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
APPEAL OF: C.C., FATHER
No. 1794 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Decree September 29, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 1370 of 2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2015
C.C. (“Father”) appeals the decree entered September 29, 2014, in the
Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas, involuntarily terminating his
parental rights to his son, D.J.C. (“Child”), born in May of 2011.1 On appeal,
Father argues the trial court erred in finding Lancaster County Children and
Youth Services (“CYS”) met its burden of proving termination of his parental
rights was warranted pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and
(b). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.2
____________________________________________
1
By the same decree, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated the
parental rights of Child’s mother, A.W. (“Mother”), not only to Child, but also
to his half-sister. Mother did not file a notice of appeal.
2
Although the record and the November 16, 2014, opinion sur appeal
identify the parties by their full names, “we will identify the parties in both
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S16033-15
On July 3, 2014, CYS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of
Father to Child. A preliminary decree was issued the same day, scheduling a
hearing for August 11, 2014. The hearing was continued and then held on
September 29, 2014. The underlying factual history was taken from the
September termination proceeding, which is set forth as follows:
[Child] was born [in May of 2011]. The history of his
involvement with the Lancaster County Children and Youth
Service Agency (Agency) goes back to 2012, after the Agency
received a report concerning drug use by Father and [Child]’s
mother, [A.W.] (Mother). Although the caseworker found
Mother and Father to be drug free on a first visit, reports
continued to be received by the Agency, and Mother refused to
discuss these reports with the caseworker. On November 9,
2012, Father tested positive for opiates at a probation
appointment. Mother, who had accompanied him, tested
positive also and admitted to heroin use. The Agency put a
safety plan in place. In February of 2013, Mother, who had not
maintained consistent contact with the Agency, was in danger of
eviction and had welfare fraud charges pending. She was not
complying with the safety plan. Father, who had been
imprisoned from November 9, 2012, to March 20, 2013, and
from September 4, 2013 to October 9, 2013, was again in jail as
of September 17, 2014 for two pending theft charges and a
probation violation. He has a criminal history consisting of
burglary, theft by unlawful taking and drug possession. There
are outstanding warrants for his arrest in Tennessee and in
Florida, where the county child services had taken his other two
children, of whom he has never regained custody. He was
indicated for physical abuse against his sister in 1998.
Since Mother was uncooperative with the Agency and
Father was in prison at the beginning of 2013, the Agency
decided to remove [Child] and his sibling[, K.E.S., (“Sister”)]
from their home. Physical custody of [Child] was taken on
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
the caption and in this memorandum by their initials to preserve their
privacy.” E.W. v. T.S., 916 A.2d 1197, 1199 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2007).
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February 25, 2013; he was found to be dependent and legal
custody was obtained on March 11, 2013 by court order.
[Child], was placed with his paternal aunt and uncle, where he
remains. [Sister] was placed with him[.]
Both parents were given permanency plans with a goal of
reunification, but neither completed his or her plan. Father
never completed his mental health goal. He has not remained
free from drugs and misuse of alcohol. His case with Family
Alternatives was closed because he failed to make a required
contact with the organization. He has not remained crime free,
has been in prison three separate times, and has had four
probation violations. He will have two additional years of
probation after he is released from his latest incarceration. He
has not completed his goal of remaining free from domestic
violence. He has not completed his goal of learning and using
good parenting skills; he did not start the program prior to his
incarceration and is not in a position to do so without a positive
recommendation from both the mental health and the drug and
alcohol treatment providers. His goal of being financially stable
is incomplete because of his incarceration, and the outstanding
warrants in Florida and Tennessee make him ineligible for work
release. As for his goal of commitment to his child, while not in
prison he attended five visits with [Child]. The visits went well.
While incarcerated, he wrote to the caseworker several times to
inquire about the child’s status. He never wrote directly to
[Child] or sent him anything, and testified at [the] hearing that
no one ever told him he could do so and his mother thought that
it would be better if he did not.
Upon being released from prison, he will be working at a
Halfway house for at least three months. He told the court that
he believed he would then be able to provide appropriate care
for the children, just like he did after his prior releases from
prison.
[Child] is doing very well with his aunt and uncle. His
sister … also lives in the household with him. He is attending
Head Start and fits in well with the family, which is a permanent
resource for him.
Opinion Sur Appeal, 11/16/2014, at 1-3 (footnotes and record citations
omitted).
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A decree was issued the same day as the hearing, terminating Father’s
parental rights to Child. Father timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i).
On appeal, Father presents two issues:
I. Did the Court err and abuse its discretion in terminating
the parental rights of Appellant Father in that the Appellant
Father was incarcerated during a significant period of time
during the pendency of the underlying juvenile dependency
action, but Appellant Father nevertheless utilized the
resources available to him in continuing a relationship with
his child, as Appellant Father forwarded written
correspondence to the Children and Youth Agency case
worker that inquired about the well being his child?
II. Did the Court err and abuse its discretion in terminating
the rights of the Appellant Father, as termination of his
parental rights is not in the best interests of the child and
will not promote the physical, mental, or emotional well
being of the child, as the Appellant Father will in the near
future be released from prison and within a reasonable
time be capable of performing parental duties and
providing permanency for his child?
Father’s Brief at 7.
We review this appeal according to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9
A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36
A.3d [567,] 572 [(Pa. 2011) (plurality)]. As has been often
stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because
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the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion.
Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc.,
34 A.3d 1, 51 ([Pa.] 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630,
634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying
an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We
observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during
the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at
1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an
opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the
record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an
error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of
Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, 165, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis:
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the
parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a).
Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
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paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511). The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of
parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super.
2009).
Instantly, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights
pursuant to the following provisions:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six
months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either
has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim
to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical
or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
***
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by
the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a
period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent
cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to
the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period
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of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve
the needs and welfare of the child.
***
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by
the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12
months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or
placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement
of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
***
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. “Parental rights may be involuntarily terminated where
any one subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along with consideration
of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa.
Super. 2010).
With respect to Section 2511(b), the requisite analysis is as follows:
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884
A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated,
“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are
involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.”
In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern
the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost
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attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that
bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a
bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no
bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super.
2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis
necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.
Id. at 63.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines
certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide
for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements
within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be
considered unfit and may properly have … [his] rights terminated.” In re
B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good
faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order
to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of … [his]
ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all
available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and
must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed
in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental
rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while
others provide the child with [the child’s] physical and emotional
needs. Where a parent is incarcerated, the fact of incarceration
does not, in itself, provide grounds for the termination of
parental rights. However, a parent’s responsibilities are not
tolled during incarceration. The focus is on whether the parent
utilized resources available while in prison to maintain a
relationship with…her child. An incarcerated parent is expected
to utilize all available resources to foster a continuing close
relationship with … [his] children.
In re N.M.B., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 872
A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted).
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After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Lesley
Gorbey, we conclude Father’s issues merit no relief. The orphans’ court
opinion comprehensively discusses and disposes of the questions presented.
See Opinion Sur Appeal, 11/16/2014, at 6-9 (finding: (1) Father was in jail
three times for approximately 17 months cumulatively during Child’s 3-1/2
year life; (2) Father’s efforts to remain connected with Child are lacking, in
which he wrote to the caseworker a number of times to ask about Child but
he did not communicate with Child by way of messages, cards, or gifts, and
he “seems to be concerned about his relationship with the Agency rather
than with [Child;]”3 (3) Father made no effort to remind Child of his
existence or maintain a psychological bond with Child; (4) Father has not
finished his reunification plan and certain parts cannot be started until other
sections are completed; (4) Father is a repeat criminal offender and once
released from prison, Father has not demonstrated that he will not be in
realistic position to care and provide stability for Child; and (5) termination
of Father’s parental rights is in Child’s best interests because (a) Child barely
knows Father, (b) Child knows his aunt and uncle very well since they have
been providing for him during much of his short life, and (c) they provide a
____________________________________________
3
Opinion Sur Appeal, 11/16/2014, at 6.
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“loving and stable family”4). We agree with the court’s rationale while
emphasizing the court’s concern that despite Father’s numerous promises
that he will put his life together once he is released from jail, “a child’s life
simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the
ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d
726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 5,6
Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the orphans’ court opinion.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/17/2015
____________________________________________
4
Id. at 9.
5
It bears mentioning that while Father does not specifically attack any
provision of Section 2511(a), the court’s analysis satisfies Subsection
2511(a)(8).
6
Furthermore, we note Child’s Guardian ad Litem filed an appellate brief,
joining in the appellee brief filed by CYS, requesting that this Court affirm
the termination order on appeal.
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHANS' GOU RT DIVISION
IN THE INTEREST OF: Docket No.: 1370 of 2014
cmll-c91111· a minor SUPER CT. NO.: 1794 MDA 2014
By: Leslie Gorbey, Judge
OPINION SUR APPEAL
Procedural History
A Petition to terminate the parental rights of C E••Jt ~(Father) to
his son, D I JI Jtllla C I I I (~) was filed on July 30, 2014, and a
preliminary Decree was lssued the same day scheduling a hearing for August 11, 2014.
That hearing was continued and was held on September 29, 2014. A decree was
issued the same day terminating Father's parental rights to~· Father filed an
..
appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court on October 22, 2014, pursuant to which
appeal this Opinion is being written.1
Factual History
~ r.-was born on Mayl 2011. (N.T. 4)2 The history of his
involvement with the Lancaster County Children and Youth Social Service Agency
(Agency) goes back to 2012, after the Agency received a report concernlnq drug use by
Father and~ mother, P4111111t~(Mother). Although the caseworker
found Mother and Father to be drug free on a first visit, reports continued to be received
1The
parental rights of ~mother, A .. 't.91 were also terminated In this action, not only to
~ but to his half-sister,~ did not af)pea[
2AII
citations to transcript pages In this opinion refer to the hearing of September 29, 2014 only.
1
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by the Agency. and Mother refused to discuss these reports with the caseworker. (N.T.
11-12). On November 9, 20121 Father tested positive for opiates at a probation
appointment. Mother, who had accompanied him, tested positive also and admitted to
heroin use. The Agency put a safety plan in place. (N.T., 12-13) In February of 2013,
Mother, who had not maintained consistent contact with the Agency, was in danger·of
eviction and had welfare fraud charges pending. She was not complying with the safety
plan. Father, who had been imprisoned from November 9, 2012, to March 20, 2013,
and from September 4, 2013 to October 9, 2013, was again in jail as of September 17,
2014 for two pending theft charges and a probation violation. He has a criminal history
consisting of burglary, theft by unlawful taking and drug possession. There are
outstanding warrants for his arrest in Tennessee and in Florida, where the countychild
services had taken his other two chltdren, of whom he has never regained custody. He
was indicated for physical abuse against his sister in 1998. (N.T. 14)
Since Mother was uncooperativewith the Agency and Father was in prison at the
beginning of 2013, the Agency decided to remove DI B and his sibling K9, from
their home. Physical custody of D 11 ( was taken on February 251 2013; he was
found to be dependent and legal custody was obtained on March 111 2013 by court
order. D ( J , was placed with his paternal aunt and uncle. where he remains. K-
was placed with him (N.T. 15)
Both parents were given permanency plans with a goal of reunification, but
neither completed his or her plan. (N.T. 14-15) Father never completed his mental
health goal. He has not remained free from drugs and misuse of alcohol. His case with
Famlly Alternatives was closed because he failed to make a required contact with the
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organization. He has not remained crime free, has been in prison three separate times,
and has had four probation violations. He will have two additional years of probation
after he is released from his latest incarceration. He has not completed his goal of
remaining free from domestic violence. He has not completed his goal of learning and
using good parenting skills; he did not start the program prior to his incarceration and is
not in a position to do so without a positive recommendation from both the mental
health and the drug and alcohol treatment providers. His goal of being financially stable
is incomplete because of his incarceration, and the outstanding warrants in Florida and
Tennessee make him ineligible for work release. As for his goal of commitment to his
child, while not in prison he attended five visits with Diij I f. The visits went well.
While incarcerated, he wrote to the caseworker several times to inquire about the
child's status. He never wrote directly to~ or sent him anything, and testified at
hearing that no one ever told him he could do so and his mother thought that it would
be better if he did not. (N.T. 32)3
Upon being released from prison, he will be working at a Halfway house for at
least three months. He told the court that he believed he would then be able to provide
appropriate care for the children, just like he did after his prior releases from prison.
(N.T. 19-23, 33-35)
DC S is doing very well with his aunt and uncle.
the household with him. He is attending Head Start and fits in well with the family,
which is a permanent resource for him. (N.T. 23)
31n
his 1925{b) statement, Father contended he sent correspondence to the caseworker asking about the
child or intended for the child. The latter contention was directly contradicted by his testimony.
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Whether a parent's parental rights to his three year old son were appropriately
terminated when Father was incarcerated for approximately seventeen months
cumulatively during his son's life, maintained no direct connection with the child during
his various incarcerations, had four probation violations during that time, was planning
to be in a halfway house for some unspecific period after his release from prison, but
had no specific job, money or settled plans to complete his reunification permanency
plan after he left there.
Parental rights to D- ~ Analysis
were terminated pursuant to the
Pennsylvania Adoption Statute. The pertinent statutory section, 23 Pa. C.S.A. §2511,
provides as follows:
. (a) GENERAL RULE.-THE RIGHTS OF A PARENT IN REGARD TO A CHILD
MAY BE TERMINATED AFTER A PETITION FILED ON ANY OF THE
FOLLOWING GROUNDS:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months
immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a
settled purpose of rellnquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duUes.
(2) The repeated and continued Incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the
parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control
or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied by the parent.
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or
under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six
months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child
continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions
within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
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available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time
and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or
under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have
elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led
to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination
of parental rights wold best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
(b) Other considerations.- The court in tenninatlng the rights of a parent shall
give primary consideration- to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare of the child ....
The party seeking the termination of parental rights bears the burden of establishing
clear and convincing evidence to do so. In Re C;M.S., 832 A.2d 457 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Clear and convincing evidence is testimony that is so "clear, direct, weighty and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear convictions, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." In Re Adoption of J.M.M., 782 A.2d
1024, 1030 (Pa. Super. 2001), citing In Re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super.
2000). In a termination proceeding, the focus is on the conduct of the parent and
whether that conduct justifies a termination of parental rights. In Re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d
847, 854-855 (Pa. Super. 2004). Grounds for termination can consist of lack of
capacity and not just affirmative misconduct. A parent who is incapable of performing
parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties. In re
Child M., 681 A.2d 793 (Pa. Super 1996)
Father contends in his 1925(b) statement that the Court erred in terminating his
parental rights under these statutory sections. The Court does not agree.
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D911was born on May.2011. Father was in jail three times for
approximately seventeen months cumulatively during~ 3-1/2 year life. During
the year prior to the hearing, Father clearly had no easy avenue of contact with
ctlllllbecause of his incarceration. But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has said
that "lncarceratlon does not obviate a parent's duty to exercise reasonable firmness in
maintaining a secure bond with a child. An incarcerated parent is expected to utilize
whatever resources are available to him while in prison in order to foster a continuing
close relationship with his children. In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa Super 1992)" An
examination of Father's efforts to remain connected with ~shows a substantial
lack of effort. He wrote to the caseworker a number of times to ask if t1m" was
okay. He did not communicate with the child by way of messages or cards or gifts. He
seems to have been concerned about his relationship with the Agency rather than with
t9I The Superior Court has been adamant that "to be legally significant, the
[post-abandonment] contact must be steady and consistent over a period of time,
contribute to the psychological health of the child, and must demonstrate a serious
intent on the part of the parent to recultivate a parent child relationship and must also
demonstrate a willingness and capacity to undertake the parental role. The parent
.
wishing to reestablish his parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof on this
question." In re z.e., 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2010); In re A.O., 2014 PA
Super 119, 93 A.3d 888 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) Father did not try very hard. Proving his
interest to the caseworker was in no way the same as maintaining the bond with his
chlld. c9II was only two years old at the time of Father's last incarceration and had
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no contact with him for a year. Father made no effort to remind the child of his
existence or maintain a psychological bond with the child.
Father assured the Court that upon his release that after 90 days In a halfway
house, he would be in a position to provide exemplary parenting for his son. There is
no indication of that in the record. Father will be on probation for two years; he has
violated prior probations four times, achieving returns to prison. He has not finished his
reunification plan and certain parts cannot even be started until other sections are
completed. Even if Father should be able to reach a position to have his child returned,
that position will not come soon or easily. The Superior Court has said that a child's life
"simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the abjlity to
handle the responsibilities of parenting." Id. at 1125. ttlll has already been in care
for 18 months. Even where the parent makes earnest efforts, the "court cannot and will
not subordinate indefinitely a child's need for permanence and stability to aparent's
claims of progress and hope for the future. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502 (Pa
Super 2006) Father has not for the past year showed the requisite indication that he
was willing and/or able to act to the best of his ability as a parent, even given his
incarceration. All he had to offer the court was rosy predictions and an unsupported
belief that he could adequately care for his child in the future. The Court does not
accept his unrealistic beliefs and finds that Father's parental rights fail the necessary
standards for maintenance of his parental rights under the above-cited sections of the
adoption statute.
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Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties or a settled
purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of inquiry:
(1) the parent's explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment
contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination of
parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b). In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726,
730 (Pa. Super. 2008) The answers to inquires (1) and (2) are obvious. Father was (1)
in jail and (2) had no contact with Cllllll As to the effect of a termination, the
emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include
"[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and etabillty." In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791
(Pa. Super. 2012). In In re EM., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)1, the Superior Court
held that the determination of the child's "needs and welfare" requires consideration of
the emotional bonds between the parent and chlld, The "utmost attention" should be
paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. In
re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). Father contends in
his 1925(b} statement that termination of his parental rights is not in ctlllll's best
interest and wlll not promote the physical, mental or emotional well-being of the child.
Father's assertion is inaccurate.
Ctlll barely knows his Father. He knows his aunt and uncle well, because
they have been his parents during much of his short life. It may be possible that Father
could parent him adequately after some period of time, but there is a more reaHstic and
serious risk of his repeating his history, violating his probation, and disappearing into
prison - again. Except for Father's unsupported optimism at hearing, the Court has no
evidence before it to indicate that Father is capable of controlling his actions so as to
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avoid further criminal acts or probation violations or finish his plan. Therefore, the Court
sees only benefit and no additlonal harm to the child in severing Father's parental
relationship and leaving ctllllllwith people he considers to be his loving parents.
The Court believes and holds that there is no negative effect on the child of
permanently severing any remaining parental bond between ctllll and his father
and that it is in olllllll's best interest to terminate Father's parental rights and allow
~ to be part of a loving and stable family.
Conclusion
For the reasons and law stated above, the Court finds that it appropriately
terminated the parental rights of c-cmmto his son lllllJIIII
BY THE COURT:
DATED: November 61 2014
~wkf
LESLIE GORBEY, JUDGE
Attest:
Copies to:
~c~~1~
Albert J. Meier, Esquire
David E. Alspach, Esquire
John P. Stengel, Esquire
'tlllllVvlll Mother
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