J-A07016-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
DIANE FREEMAN-RHODES, AND CRAIG IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
RHODES, HER HUSBAND PENNSYLVANIA
Appellants
v.
AMANDA SWANGER, AN ADULT
INDIVIDUAL
Appellee No. 1173 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Dated June 17, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at No(s): GD 13-017355
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MUNDY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2015
Appellants, Diane Freeman-Rhodes and Craig Rhodes, appeal from the
June 17, 2014 order, which granted the motion for judgment on the
pleadings filed by Appellee, Amanda Swanger. After careful review, we
affirm.
On February 13, 2012, Craig Rhodes was driving a vehicle in which
Diane Freeman-Rhodes was a passenger. Appellants’ Complaint, 9/20/13, at
¶ 4. While driving on East Pittsburgh-McKeesport Boulevard in Allegheny
County, Appellants collided with a vehicle driven by Swanger. Id. The trial
court provided the following procedural background of the case.
On February 15, 2013, [Appellants] filed a[n]
[] arbitration action at AR13-000658 against Amanda
Swanger as a result of an automobile accident on
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February 13, 2012, which automobile accident is also
the subject of the instant civil action. In Count I of
the arbitration complaint filed at AR13-000658, Craig
Rhodes claimed personal injuries. In Count II of the
arbitration complaint, Diane Freeman-Rhodes
claimed loss of consortium. On April 16, 2013, an
Allegheny County arbitration panel awarded Craig
Rhodes $2,500.00 for his personal injury claim and
$500.00 to Diane Freeman-Rhodes for her
consortium claim. The arbitration award was not
appealed. On May 23, 2013, [Appellants] entered
judgment on the award. [Swanger] asserts that
both Craig Rhodes and Diane Freeman-Rhodes were
paid on their arbitration award. On May 24, 2013,
[Appellants] marked the docket at AR-13000658 as
“satisfied[.]”
The instant civil action was filed by [c]omplaint
on September 20, 2013. The allegations of
[Appellants’] [c]omplaint arise out of the identical
automobile accident for which [Appellants] sued
Amanda Swanger in the arbitration matter at AR13-
000658. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the instant
[c]omplaint assert personal injuries and damages on
behalf of Diane Freeman-Rhodes. Count II of the
instant [c]omplaint asserts a loss of consortium
claim on behalf of Craig Rhodes.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/14, a 1-2.1
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1
The reproduced record contains the trial court opinion of July 30, 2014, as
corrected on August 18, 2014. We rely on the July 30, 2014 trial court
opinion because the subsequent opinion was not included in the certified
record. See Brandon v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 34 A.3d 104, 106 n.1
(Pa. Super. 2011) (recognizing an appellate court may not consider
documents that are not made part of the record). However, we note the
portions of the July 30, 2014 opinion cited to in this memorandum are
identical to the subsequent corrected opinion of August 18, 2014, attached
to Appellants’ brief.
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On January 31, 2014, Swanger filed a response to Appellants’
complaint and asserted that both Appellants’ claims are barred by res
judicata and that Appellants impermissibly split their causes of action.
Swanger’s Answer to Appellants’ Complaint and New Matter, 1/31/14, at ¶¶
28-31. On February 28, 2014, Appellants filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Appellants’ motion averred that an arbitration panel previously
found Swanger solely liable for the collision and awarded Appellants
damages. Appellants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 2/28/14, at ¶
3. Appellants observed that judgment was entered on the award on May 23,
2013, and Swanger did not appeal the arbitration award. Id. Therefore,
Appellants sought a ruling that Swanger was solely liable for the collision.
Id. at ¶ 4. Swanger also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on
May 2, 2014. In her motion, Swanger contended that Appellants have
impermissibly split their causes of action and the instant civil action is barred
by res judicata. Swanger’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 5/2/14, at
¶¶ 14-17. Swanger further asserted that Appellants’ claims have been
litigated in the previous arbitration action and sought dismissal of the civil
action against her. Id. at ¶ 18.
The trial court held argument on the motions on June 16, 2014. On
June 17, 2014, the trial court, by separate orders, granted Appellants’
motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Swanger’s liability and granted
Swanger’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing both of
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Appellants’ claims. Swanger did not appeal the order granting Appellants’
motion for judgment on the pleadings.2 Appellants filed a motion for
reconsideration on July 11, 2014, asking the trial court to vacate its prior
order, which dismissed Appellants’ claims. Appellants’ Motion for
Reconsideration, 7/11/14, at 3 (unnumbered). The trial court did not rule
on Appellants’ motion for reconsideration. On July 15, 2014, Appellants
timely appealed.3
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review.
I. Whether the court below committed [an] error of
law in its [o]rder of June 1[7], 2014 which granted
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2
On August 22, 2014, Appellants filed a motion to quash/vacate the order
on appeal with this Court because Swanger failed to appeal the order finding
her liable for the collision. Appellants’ Motion to Quash/Vacate, 8/22/14, at
¶ 8. Therefore, Appellants argue, Swanger cannot argue that the order
subject to the instant appeal should be affirmed without challenging the
validity of the order which found her liable for the collision. Id. However, “a
party adversely affected by earlier rulings in a case is not required to file a
protective cross-appeal if that same party ultimately wins a judgment in its
favor; the winner is not an ‘aggrieved party.’” Basile v. H & R Block, Inc.,
973 A.2d 417, 421 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted, italics in original).
Accordingly, we deny Appellants’ motion.
3
We observe that the filing of a motion to reconsider does not toll the period
of time in which Appellants were required to file their appeal. See M.O. v.
J.T.R., 85 A.3d 1058, 1060 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2014) (noting, “if the trial court
does not grant the motion for reconsideration before the expiration of the
thirty days in which the litigant can file a notice of appeal, the litigant will
lose the right to appeal[]”).
Appellants and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
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[Swanger’s] [m]otion for [j]udgment [o]n [t]he
pleadings on grounds that both []Appellants had
violated the rule against splitting causes of action
embodied in Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d) because it adopted
an unreasonable construction of the phrase “cause of
action” in the context of Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d) and failed
to recognize that the derivative loss of consortium
claims arose from the marital relationship of
[]Appellants and not out of the accident in which
they and [Swanger] were involved[?]
II. Whether the court below committed [an] error of
law in its [o]rder of June 1[7], 2014 which granted
[Swanger’s] [m]otion for [j]udgment on the
[p]leadings on the grounds that both []Appellants
had violated the rule against splitting causes of
action embodied in Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d) because it
failed to reconcile the language of Pa.R.C.P. 2228(a),
which required that the derivative loss of consortium
claim of Diane Freeman-Rhodes had to be joined in
the prior action or be forfeited under Pa.R.C.P.
2232(a) and the provisions of Local Rule 1301 of
Allegheny County that Craig Rhodes claims had to be
heard before a [b]oard of [a]rbitrators, with the
provisions of Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d)[?]
Appellants’ Brief at 2.
When considering the grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
we adhere to the following standard of review.
Entry of judgment on the pleadings is permitted
under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1034,
which provides that “after the pleadings are closed,
but within such time as not to unreasonably delay
trial, any party may move for judgment on the
pleadings.” Pa.R.C.P. 1034(a). A motion for
judgment on the pleadings is similar to a demurrer.
It may be entered when there is no disputed issues
of fact[,] and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
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Appellate review of an order granting a motion for
judgment on the pleadings is plenary. The appellate
court will apply the same standard employed by the
trial court. A trial court must confine its
consideration to the pleadings and relevant
documents. The court must accept as true all well
pleaded statements of fact, admissions, and any
documents properly attached to the pleadings
presented by the party against whom the motion is
filed, considering only those facts which were
specifically admitted.
We will affirm the grant of such a motion only when
the moving party’s right to succeed is certain and the
case is so free from doubt that the trial would clearly
be a fruitless exercise.
Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Forest Res., LLC., 83 A.3d 177, 185 (Pa. Super.
2013) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 96 A.3d 1029 (Pa. 2014).
In their first issue, Appellants claim the trial court failed to “grasp []
what the phrase ‘cause of action’ means in the context of Pa.R.C.P. 1020 ….”
Appellants’ Brief at 8. Therefore, Appellants argue, “the [trial] court …
erroneous[ly] determin[ed] that the cause of action of Diane Freeman-
Rhodes for personal injuries in this case against [] Swanger was barred by
operation of … Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d) … and that [Rhodes’] cause of action for
loss of consortium in this case was likewise barred ….” Id. Specifically,
Appellants argue, “the claims of a husband and wife are separate and
distinct” and “[] the derivative consortium claims did not arise from the
accident at issue but rather from their marital relationship.” Id. at 10-11.
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For the following reasons, we conclude Appellants are not entitled to relief
on this issue.4
Rule 1020(d) provides as follows.
Rule 1020. Pleading More Than One Cause of
Action. Alternative Pleading. Failure to Join.
Bar
…
(d) If a transaction or occurrence gives rise to more
than one cause of action heretofore asserted in
assumpsit and trespass, against the same person,
including causes of action in the alternative against
any such person. Failure to join a cause of action as
required by this subdivision shall be deemed a
waiver of that cause of action as against all parties
to the action.
Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d). In interpreting Rule 1020(d), we note that it should “be
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action or proceeding to which it is applicable.” Hineline v.
Stroudsburg Elec. Supply Co., Inc., 586 A.2d 455, 456 (Pa. Super.
1991). Further, “[t]he purpose of Rule 1020(d) is to avoid a multiplicity of
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4
We observe that Appellants’ argument rests heavily on Gulak v. Yu, 295
F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Pa. 1969), and Appellants urge this Court to adopt its
reasoning. However, “federal court decisions do not control the
determinations of the Superior Court. Our law clearly states that, absent a
United States Supreme Court pronouncement, the decisions of federal courts
are not binding on Pennsylvania state courts[.]” NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc.
v. PennMont Sec., 52 A.3d 296, 303 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
Moreover, the Gulak Court specifically commented that the disposition of
the case was “a by-product of the dual system of state and federal courts[.]”
Gulak, supra at 1328. Therefore, Gulak is inapposite to the case before
this Court.
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suits, thereby ensuring the prompt disposition of all rights and liabilities in a
single action.” Id. Rule 1020(d) is also intended to “prevent the imposition
of a heavy burden on defendants and the judicial system to defend multiple
suits arising from the same occurrence.” Id. at 459.
In its opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a), the trial court observed “[t]he
allegations of [Appellants’] [c]omplaint arise out of the identical automobile
accident for which [Appellants] sued Amanda Swanger in the arbitration
matter at AR13-000658.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/14, at 2 (emphasis
added). Permitting Appellants to pursue additional damages, based on the
occurrence for which they were both awarded compensation in the
arbitration matter, would impose a heavy burden on Swanger and the
judicial system to defend multiple suits arising from the same occurrence.
See Hineline, supra at 456. Thus, we conclude the trial court’s ruling was
consistent with the interpretation of Rule 1020(d) and ensured the prompt
disposition of all rights and liabilities in a single action. See id.
In their second issue, Appellants present a related, yet distinct,
argument. Appellants contend that Rule 1020(d) does not bar the instant
case because Appellants were required to bring the claims based on Craig
Rhodes’ injuries and Diane Rhodes’ loss of consortium to a board of
arbitrators pursuant to Local Rule 1301 of Allegheny County and Pa.R.C.P.
2228(a). Id. at 13. Allegheny Local Rule provides, in relevant part, as
follows.
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Rule 1301. Scope
(1) The following civil actions shall first be submitted
to and heard by a Board of Arbitrators:
(a) Civil actions, proceedings and appeals or issues
therein where the demand is for $35,000 or less
(exclusive of interest and costs);
…
Allegheny Cty.Civ.Fam.R. 1301(1)(a). Rule 2228(a) provides as follows.
Rule 2228. Joinder of Related Plaintiffs
(a) If an injury, not resulting in death, is inflicted
upon the person of a husband or a wife, and causes
of action therefor accrue to both, they shall be
enforced in one action brought by the husband and
the wife.
…
Pa.R.C.P. 2228(a).
There is no dispute that Rule 2228 requires that the spouse of an
injured party bring his or her claim for loss of consortium in the same action
as the claim brought by the injured spouse. See Appellants’ Brief at 13;
Swanger’s Brief at 8; accord Pa.R.C.P. 2228(a). Further, by local rule,
parties to claims of less than $35,000.00 must submit their claims to
arbitration. Allegheny Cty.Civ.Fam.R. 1301(1)(a). Appellants acknowledge
they were required to join Freeman-Rhodes’ claim of loss of consortium with
Rhodes’ claim of injury pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 2228(a), and because the
combined claims were less than $35,000, Allegheny Local Rule 1301
required this action be decided by a board of arbitrators. Appellants’ Brief at
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15. Appellants contend, however, that because Freeman-Rhodes’ claim for
her own, personal injuries was in excess of $35,000, they could not enforce
this claim in arbitration, and they should not be prohibited from bringing this
claim to the trial court. Id. For the following reasons, we conclude
Appellants are not entitled to relief.
“Res judicata, which is also known as claim preclusion, holds that a final
judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction will bar any
future action on the same cause of action between the parties and their
privies.” Rearick v. Elderton State Bank, 97 A.3d 374, 380 (Pa. Super.
2014) (citation omitted). In applying the doctrine of res judicata, “the
essential inquiry is whether the ultimate and controlling issues have been
decided in a prior proceeding in which the parties had an opportunity to
appear and assert their rights.” Clark v. Pfizer Inc., 990 A.2d 17, 31 (Pa.
Super. 2010) (citation omitted, emphasis added), appeal denied, 13 A.3d
473 (Pa. 2010). “Res judicata bars not only the claims that were disposed
of via the original judgment, but also those claims that were based upon the
same set of facts and could have been asserted in the original
proceedings.” Id. (citation omitted, italics and emphasis added). We
highlight, “[t]he courts of this Commonwealth have long adhered to the
generally accepted view disfavoring the splitting of claims.” Id. (citation
omitted).
The trial court addressed Appellants’ argument as follows.
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[Appellants] first observe Pa.R.C.P. 2228(a) requires
compulsory joinder of any derivative consortium
claim with the claim of an injured spouse. This is an
accurate statement. However, Pa.R.C.P. 2228(a) in
no way prohibited Diane Freeman-Rhodes from
bringing her own personal injury claims within the
prior arbitration action. [Appellants] appear to
contend that because Diane Freeman-Rhodes claim[]
is in excess of the compulsory arbitration limits in
Allegheny County, she was not able to do so. Of
course, had she asserted her claim then, that would
have simply caused the removal of the entire prior
matter from the arbitration realm and into the
[c]ourt of [c]ommon [p]leas. In short, there was no
prohibition preventing Diane Freeman-Rhodes from
asserting a personal injury claim at the same time
she asserted her loss of consortium claim arising out
of the same automobile accident.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/14, at 3.
We agree with the trial court’s analysis. While Appellants correctly
summarize what Rule 2228(a) requires in terms of joining a claim for loss of
consortium with a spouse’s claim of injury, they misconstrue it to mean that
Freeman-Rhodes was somehow prohibited from bringing her injury claim at
the same time as Rhodes’ injury claim. See Appellants’ Brief at 15.
Moreover, permitting Freeman-Rhodes’ claim to proceed would promote a
multiplicity of suits regarding the same occurrence, violating the spirit of
Rule 1020(d). See Hineline, supra.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court correctly considered and
applied Rules 1020(d) and 2228(a) in finding that our rules of procedure
required Appellants to bring all their claims arising from this occurrence at
one time. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/14, at 3-4; Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d);
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Pa.R.C.P. 2228(a). Freeman-Rhodes had the opportunity to appear and
assert her claim for personal injury at the same time she brought her loss of
consortium claim resulting from Rhodes’ personal injury claim. A final
judgment was rendered on Rhodes’ claim and Freeman-Rhodes’ loss of
consortium claim, which found Swanger liable for the accident and resultant
injuries. Because Freeman-Rhodes elected not to bring her personal injury
claim, that was based on the same set of facts as the claims settled by
arbitration, when she had opportunity to present it, res judicata bars her
claim in the instant action as well as Rhodes’ derivative claim for loss of
consortium. See Rearick, supra; Clark, supra.
Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude the trial court correctly
entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of Swanger, as she is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Sw. Energy Prod. Co., supra.
Accordingly, we affirm the June 17, 2014 order.
Motion to quash/vacate denied. Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/17/2015
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