COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00366-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF A.M., C.M.,
AND A.R., CHILDREN
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FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF PARKER COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. CIV-12-0817
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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Appellant Mother appeals the trial court’s final order terminating her
parental rights to her three children, A.M., C.M., and A.R.2 See Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 161.001(1)(D), (E), (O), (2) (West 2014). Mother’s court-appointed
appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in support
of that motion. In the motion, counsel avers that she has conducted a
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2
We use aliases to refer to the parties to this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P.
9.8(b)(2).
professional evaluation of the record and, after a thorough review of the
applicable law, has reached the conclusion that there are no arguable grounds to
be advanced to support an appeal of this cause and that the appeal is frivolous.
Neither Mother nor the Department of Family and Protective Services filed a
response.
Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California
by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there
are no reversible grounds on appeal and referencing any grounds that might
arguably support the appeal. 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967);
see In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776‒77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)
(holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-termination cases).
In our duties as the reviewing court, we must conduct an independent
evaluation of the record to determine whether counsel is correct in determining
that the appeal is frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991); In re K.E.S., No. 02-11-00420-CV, 2012 WL 4121127, at *8
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op. on reh’g). Only
then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 82‒83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed the appellate record and appellate counsel’s
brief. We agree with counsel that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without
merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See
Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also In re
2
A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014) (holding that an appellate court that
affirms a judgment terminating parental rights need not detail the evidence when
performing a factual sufficiency review). Therefore, we grant appellate counsel’s
motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s final order terminating Mother’s
parental rights to A.M., C.M., and A.R.
/s/ Bill Meier
BILL MEIER
JUSTICE
PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.
DELIVERED: April 16, 2015
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