COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00119-CR
CARLOS AGUILAR APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM THE 432ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1326283D
----------
MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
----------
A jury convicted Carlos Aguilar of continuous sexual abuse of a child, and
the trial court sentenced him to thirty years’ confinement. In two issues,
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.
Because the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Although Appellant and Y’s mother had four children together, Appellant
was not Y’s father. Y testified that on multiple occasions, when she was in pre-
kindergarten until she was going into second grade, Appellant touched her
genitals with his hand and made her touch his penis with her hand. He touched
her genitals over her clothes and had her touch his penis both over and under his
clothes. He also touched her breasts. He told her not to tell anyone. Appellant
admitted to police in a recorded interview that he had touched Y’s genitals and
that he had made Y touch his penis.
In two issues, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. There
is a single standard for sufficiency of the evidence: that standard is set out in
Jackson v. Virginia. 2 In our due-process review of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 3
A person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child if,
“during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits two or
more acts of sexual abuse” and, “at the time of the commission of each of the
acts of sexual abuse, the actor is 17 years of age or older and the victim is a
2
443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
3
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d
166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
2
child younger than 14 years of age.” 4 An “act of sexual abuse” includes
indecency with a child under section 21.11(a)(1) of the penal code if the actor
committed the offense in a manner other than by touching, including touching
through clothing, the breast of a child. 5 A person commits indecency with a child
under section 21.11(a)(1) if, with a child younger than seventeen years of age,
the person engages in sexual contact with the child or causes the child to
engage in sexual contact. 6 Sexual contact means any touching by a person,
including touching through clothing, of the anus, or any part of the genitals of a
child, or any touching of any part of the body of a child, including through
clothing, with the anus or any part of the genitals of a person, with the intent to
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. 7
Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient because there were
problems with the credibility of the witnesses, Y’s outcry was delayed, and her
mother received a U Visa, an immigrant permit for victims of violent crime, 8 as a
witness. But Appellant himself admitted to the sexual abuse. Credibility is the
4
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b) (West Supp. 2014).
5
Id. § 21.02(c)(2) (West Supp. 2014), § 21.11(a)(1) (West 2011).
6
Id. § 21.11(a)(1).
7
Id. § 21.11(c).
8
See Joseph v. State, Nos. 14-12-00949-CR, 14-12-00950-CR, 2014 WL
2446611, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 29, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 994 (2015).
3
sole province of the jury, so long as there is evidence to support the jury’s
verdict. 9
Appellant also argues that the testimony did not support a finding that the
abuse occurred over a period of at least thirty days’ duration. Y testified that the
abuse began when she was in pre-kindergarten and continued until she was
going into second grade. The jury could properly infer that this time period is
more than thirty days’ duration.
We therefore hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt, overrule Appellant’s two issues, and affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot
LEE ANN DAUPHINOT
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: April 16, 2015
9
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (West 1979); Jackson, 443
U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Dobbs, 434 S.W.3d at 170; Isassi v. State, 330
S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
4