Case: 13-12470 Date Filed: 04/20/2015 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-12470
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:13-cv-00037-WS-GRJ
WINDSOR E. COOKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(April 20, 2015)
Before HULL, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Windsor E. Cooks, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte
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dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. In his complaint, Cooks alleged that the Florida Department
of Corrections (“FDOC”) violated his constitutional rights by keeping him in its
custody without possessing certain probable cause affidavits that led to his arrest.1
Accordingly, Cooks sought (1) a declaration that the FDOC’s actions violated his
rights; (2) an injunction directing the FDOC to contact the clerk of the sentencing
court and state that Cooks would be immediately released from the FDOC’s
custody; and (3) compensatory and punitive damages. Upon review of the record
and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
We review a district court’s decision to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A de novo, taking the allegations in the complaint as true.
Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). In addition, we liberally
construe Cooks’s pro se pleadings, holding them to a less stringent standard than
those drafted by an attorney. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263
(11th Cir. 1998).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, in § 1915A, provides that the district
court “shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as
practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks
1
In particular, Cooks cites Fla. Stat. § 944.17(5), which provides that the FDOC must
refuse to accept any individual for imprisonment unless the committing authority furnishes such
affidavits.
2
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redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Upon review, the district court must dismiss the
complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. “A
complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken
as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,
215, 127 S.Ct. 910, 920, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007).
A prisoner is barred from challenging the legality of his conviction or
confinement in a suit for damages under § 1983 if (1) the action, if successful,
would demonstrate the invalidity of the underlying conviction or sentence; and (2)
his conviction or sentence has not been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372,
129 L.E.2d 383 (1994). As the Supreme Court stressed in Wilkinson v. Dotson,
544 U.S. 74, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005), we must “ensure that state
prisoners use only habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies when they seek to
invalidate the duration of their confinement—either directly through an injunction
compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that
necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State’s custody.” Id. at 81, 125 S.Ct. at
1247.
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The district court did not err in dismissing Cooks’s complaint for failure to
state a claim because his claims are not cognizable under § 1983. In his complaint,
Cooks challenged the very fact of his physical imprisonment, and for relief, he
sought a determination that he was entitled to immediate release from
imprisonment as well as damages based on his unconstitutional imprisonment.
Because Cooks did not assert or demonstrate that his conviction or sentence had
been invalidated, he could not bring his claims under § 1983, and his sole federal
remedy was to seek a writ of habeas corpus. See Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81-82, 125
S.Ct. at 1248; Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. at 2372; Preiser, 411 U.S. 475,
489, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1836, 1841, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). Accordingly, the
allegations in Cooks’s complaint, liberally construed and taken as true, show that
he is not entitled to relief. 2 See Jones, 549 U.S. at 215, 127 S.Ct. at 920.
AFFIRMED.
2
Furthermore, it appears that Fla. Stat. § 944.17(5) does not “confer a liberty interest upon
a prisoner” or “create a cause of action for prisoners to challenge their detention under a facially
valid judgment and sentence.” Edward v. Crews, 124 So.3d 422, 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
4