MEMORANDUM DECISION
Apr 20 2015, 9:44 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Barbara J. Simmons Gregory F. Zoeller
Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Brian Reitz
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Amber Mobley, April 20, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
49A02-1409-CR-611
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
Cause No. 49F08-1405-CM-28061
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff. The Honorable Amy Jones, Judge
The Honorable Cheryl Maman-
Rivera, Pro Tem
Barnes, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Amber Mobley appeals her conviction and sentence for Class B misdemeanor
criminal mischief. We affirm.
Issues
[2] Mobley raises two issues, which we restate as:
I. whether there is sufficient evidence to support
her conviction; and
II. whether the trial court properly ordered her to
pay restitution.
Facts
[3] In May 2014, Mobley and her children were staying with Lindsi Heaton at
Heaton’s home in Marion County. Heaton and Mobley got into an argument,
and Heaton asked Mobley and her family to leave. During the argument, the
windshield of Heaton’s car was smashed. When Officer Jose Navarro of the
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department arrived on the scene, Mobley
admitted that she broke the windshield.
[4] Mobley was charged with Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief. Following
a bench trial, Mobley was convicted of Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief.
The trial court sentenced her to 180 days with 176 executed and credit for time
served for the remaining days. The trial court also sentenced Mobley to non-
reporting probation until she paid restitution in the amount of $192.15. Mobley
now appeals.
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Analysis
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[5] Mobley argues that there is insufficient evidence that she broke the windshield.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither
reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. Bailey v. State, 979
N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). We view the evidence—even if conflicting—and
all reasonable inferences drawn from it in a light most favorable to the
conviction and affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value
supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[6] Mobley contends that her seven-year-old daughter used a brick to break the
windshield and that she took the blame for her daughter’s actions. However,
Heaton testified that the children had already left the premises when the
windshield was broken and that she saw Mobley do it. This is consistent with
Officer Navarro’s testimony that he did not see any children when he arrived
and that he “did not see anything laying around the car area.” Tr. p. 26.
Moreover, Mobley told Officer Navarro that she “smashed the windshield; it is
what it is and I can’t change it now[.]” Id. at 15. Mobley’s attempt to shift the
blame to her daughter is a request to reweigh the evidence and witness
credibility. We must deny this request. There is sufficient evidence to support
the conviction.
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II. Restitution
[7] Mobley argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
restitution order. “A restitution order must be supported by sufficient evidence
of actual loss sustained by the victim or victims of a crime.” Rich v. State, 890
N.E.2d 44, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. The amount of actual loss is a
factual matter that can be determined only upon the presentation of evidence,
and a trial court’s order of restitution is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
We will affirm the trial court’s order if it is supported by sufficient evidence. Id.
[8] Mobley contends there was no evidence of Heaton’s actual loss other than her
unsupported estimate. Mobley relies on J.H. v. State, 950 N.E.2d 731, 734 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2011), in which we reversed a restitution order based solely on a piece
of paper with a dollar amount on it given to the prosecutor by the victim. We
concluded:
Neither of the purported estimates was placed into evidence and
neither is available for our review, so we cannot determine whether the
dollar amounts were listed on papers containing any information, such
as a letterhead, which would show the court that the paper came from
a legitimate business. Furthermore, neither “estimate” showed the
cost of labor and materials.
J.H., 950 N.E.2d at 734.
[9] Here, however, Heaton testified at the sentencing hearing that she had gotten a
couple of estimates to get her windshield fixed and that they were “$200.00 give
or take maybe depending on where I went and if they had to come out to me or
if I had to go to them.” Tr. p. 31. Moreover, two written estimates were
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admitted into evidence in support of the restitution request. Both included
business names, addresses, and phone numbers. Both included the parts
needed and the adhesive to be used. One was for $192.15 and the other was for
$202.63, and the trial court specifically chose the lower of the two estimates.
We must conclude that this case is distinguishable from J.H. and that there is
sufficient evidence from which the trial court could determine Heaton’s actual
loss.
Conclusion
[10] There is sufficient evidence to support Mobley’s conviction for Class B
misdemeanor criminal mischief, and there was evidence of Heaton’s actual loss
so as to support the restitution order. We affirm.
[11] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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