Freight Drivers & Helpers Local Union No. 557 Pension Fund v. Penske Logistics LLC

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1464

FREIGHT DRIVERS AND HELPERS LOCAL UNION NO. 557 PENSION
FUND,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

PENSKE LOGISTICS LLC; PENSKE TRUCK LEASING CO., L.P.,

Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Ellen L. Hollander, District Judge.
(1:12-cv-02376-ELH)

Argued: January 27, 2015 Decided: April 21, 2015

Before NIEMEYER, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Thacker and Judge Harris
joined.

ARGUED: Corey Smith Bott, ABATO, RUBENSTEIN & ABATO, PA,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. David R. Levin, DRINKER
BIDDLE & REATH LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF:
Paul D. Starr, ABATO, RUBENSTEIN & ABATO, PA, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. Brian A. Coleman, Washington, D.C.,
Mark E. Furlane, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP, Chicago, Illinois,
for Appellees.
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

This appeal raises the question of how a party to an

arbitration proceeding under the Multiemployer Pension Plan

Amendments Act of 1980 (“MPPAA”), Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat.

1208 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and

29 U.S.C.), can obtain review of the arbitration order, as

provided in 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(2). Specifically, we must

determine whether § 1401(b)(2) and § 1451 require the

dissatisfied party to commence a civil action in a district

court by filing a complaint, or whether § 1401(b)(3) requires

the dissatisfied party to file an application for review of the

arbitration order by filing a motion, as provided in the Federal

Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. The distinction

between the two procedures is critical to the outcome of this

appeal.

Freight Drivers and Helpers Local Union No. 557 Pension

Fund (the “Pension Fund”), a multiemployer pension plan,

commenced this action under § 1401(b)(2) by filing a complaint.

The Pension Fund seeks to vacate or modify an arbitration order,

entered pursuant to § 1401(a)(1), which rejected the Pension

Fund’s assessment of withdrawal liability with respect to two

participating employers. When the district court granted the

participating employers’ motion to dismiss with leave to file an

amended complaint, the Pension Fund filed an amended complaint,

2
which, it argued, related back to the filing date of the

original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).

Thereafter, however, the district court granted the employers’

second motion to dismiss, ruling that the Pension Fund could

challenge the arbitration award only by filing a motion to

vacate or modify, as provided under the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 6

(providing that “[a]ny application to the court hereunder shall

be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making

and hearing of motions”). The court thereupon treated the

Pension Fund’s amended complaint as a motion and dismissed it,

concluding that it was untimely under § 1401(b)(2) because,

unlike an amended complaint, a motion cannot “relate back” under

Rule 15. In addition, because the court treated the amended

complaint as a motion, it found the motion deficient under

District of Maryland Local Rule 105, which requires a motion to

be supported by a memorandum setting forth the reasoning and

authorities for the motion.

On appeal, we conclude that commencing an action by filing

a complaint is the appropriate procedure for seeking review of

an arbitration award entered pursuant to § 1401(a) and that the

amended complaint in this case related back to the filing date

of the original complaint, thus rendering it timely.

3
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order of dismissal

and remand for further proceedings as a civil action. ∗

I

During the period from 2001 to 2004, Penske Truck Leasing

Co., L.P., engaged in several transactions by which it

ultimately transferred ownership of its subsidiary, Leaseway

Motorcar Transport Company, to a third party, in which Penske

Truck Leasing apparently retained a minority ownership interest.

As a result of the restructuring, Penske Truck Leasing took the

position that it and Leaseway were no longer under “common

control,” as that term is used in the Employee Retirement Income

Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1).

Thereafter, Leaseway ceased making contributions to the Pension

Fund, and the Fund responded by assessing withdrawal liability

against Penske Truck Leasing and the Penske Logistics Group LLC,

an affiliated company, (collectively the “Penske companies”).

When neither Penske Truck Leasing nor Penske Logistics satisfied

the Pension Fund’s requests for withdrawal liability, the

∗
With respect to pending cases, in which the party seeking
review of an MPPAA arbitration order under § 1401(b) filed a
motion, as provided by the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 6, we encourage
district courts to be flexible in allowing the party to bring
its process in compliance with our decision today, subject to
considerations of prejudice and equity.

4
parties submitted the dispute to arbitration, as mandated by

§ 1401(a)(1).

The parties to the arbitration proceeding were “Penske

Logistics LLC [and] Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P.,” on the one

side and “Freight Drivers & Helpers Local Union No. 557 Pension

Fund” on the other, and the arbitrator never suggested that the

parties to the proceeding were not the appropriate parties. The

arbitrator dismissed the Pension Fund’s claim for the imposition

of withdrawal liability in an order dated July 13, 2012,

concluding that the Penske companies were not liable for

withdrawal payments because the Pension Fund was exempt as “a

trucking industry fund as that term is described in [29 U.S.C.

§ 1383(d)].”

The Pension Fund, as the dissatisfied party to the

arbitration proceeding, commenced this action on August 9, 2012,

to vacate or modify the arbitrator’s order, alleging that the

arbitrator erred as a matter of law in applying the trucking

industry exemption. The Pension Fund captioned its complaint

“Freight Drivers and Helpers Local Union No. 557 Pension Fund,

by its Trustee, William Alexander,” versus “Penske Logistics LLC

[and] Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P.”

The Penske companies filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint, arguing that because the Pension Fund sued “by its

Trustee, William Alexander,” instead of by its Joint Board of

5
Trustees (consisting of four trustees), the Pension Fund did not

have standing to sue under § 1401(b)(2). The district court

granted the motion and gave the Pension Fund 21 days within

which to file an amended complaint to correct the deficiency.

It is significant that in reaching its decision, the

district court analyzed the MPPAA’s procedures for judicial

review of an arbitration award as requiring the commencement of

a civil action. Explaining the procedures, the court stated

that “[j]udicial review of the arbitrator’s decision is

available to ‘any party thereto,’” as indicated by the title to

§ 1401(b)(2), by filing a “‘civil action subsequent to

arbitration award.’” (Quoting § 1401(b)(2)). The court

summarized, “As indicated, an action under 29 U.S.C.

§ 1401(b)(2) must be brought ‘in accordance with’ 29 U.S.C.

§ 1451, titled ‘Civil actions.’” Further on in its analysis,

the court applied the rules applicable to complaints, indicating

that a court may “consider documents attached to the complaint,

as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as

they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” (Quoting

Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir.

2009)). In determining who the proper party plaintiff would be

in any such action, the court explained the relationship between

§ 1401(b)(2) and § 1451. It stated, “[Section 1451] pertains to

the manner in which the § 1401(b)(2) action is initiated, i.e.,

6
the how. In other words, § 1401(b)(2) incorporates the

procedural requirements set forth in § 1451, such as the

provisions governing venue and service of process. See id.

§ 1451(d), (g).” Reiterating the policy for such a civil

action, as described in Board of Trustees, Sheet Metal Workers’

National Pension Fund v. BES Services, Inc., 469 F.3d 369, 373-

74 (4th Cir. 2006), the district court related how Congress

intended to adopt a stream-lined process that required

“arbitration, with judicial review.” (Emphasis added). The

Court stated in conclusion, “For the foregoing reasons, I will

grant defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, without prejudice, and with

leave to amend. Specifically, plaintiff may amend the Complaint

provided that the Board of Trustees file[] suit on behalf of the

Fund.” (Emphasis added). The court gave the Pension Fund

21 days within which to file its amended complaint.

As authorized by the district court, the Pension Fund filed

its amended complaint within 21 days, naming as plaintiff

“Freight Drivers and Helpers Local Union No. 557 Pension Fund,

by its Plan Sponsor, The Joint Board of Trustees.”

The Penske companies again filed a motion to dismiss the

amended complaint, this time arguing that a party challenging an

MPPAA arbitration order must do so by filing a motion in

accordance with the FAA, rather than by filing a complaint.

They argued further that if the district court were to treat the

7
amended complaint as a motion, the motion would be untimely

because it was not filed within 30 days of the arbitration award

and would be deficient for failing to comply with Local

Rule 105, which requires an accompanying memorandum of

“reasoning and authorities.”

The district court again granted the Penske companies’

motion to dismiss by order dated February 7, 2014, and thus it

ended the litigation. In doing so, the district court concluded

first that the Penske companies were correct that a party

challenging an MPPAA arbitration award must do so by filing a

motion, as required by the FAA, because, as they claimed, such a

procedure was required by § 1401(b)(3). The court stated:

[Section 1401(b)(3)] plainly provides that arbitration
proceedings under ERISA should be conducted in
accordance with the procedures set forth in the FAA,
and the FAA plainly provides that a party seeking to
vacate an arbitration award must proceed by motion.

* * *

As a result, plaintiff’s “Amended Complaint” is an
improper filing.

The court declined, however, to elevate form over substance and

therefore treated the Pension Fund’s amended complaint as a

motion to vacate. But in doing so, it noted that a motion,

unlike a complaint, could not relate back under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15(c), therefore rendering the motion untimely.

Moreover, in treating the amended complaint as a motion, the

court also concluded that the motion should have been
8
“accompanied by a memorandum setting forth the reasoning and

authorities in support of it,” as required by Local Rule 105.

After the district court denied its motion for

reconsideration, the Pension Fund filed this appeal, challenging

the district court’s gateway procedural ruling that a party

seeking review of an MPPAA arbitration order must do so by

filing a motion, as provided in the FAA.

II

The Pension Fund contends that the district court erred in

rejecting its filing of a complaint as the proper method by

which to obtain review of an MPPAA arbitration order. It argues

that 29 U.S.C. §§ 1401(b)(2) and 1451 “evince that the mechanism

through which to bring an action [to vacate or modify an

arbitration award] is by filing a complaint.”

The Penske companies contend, to the contrary, that “the

sole method to challenge an arbitration award . . . is by filing

a motion, so the ‘Amended Complaint’ is not a proper method for

the [Pension Fund] to challenge the arbitration award.” They

rely on § 1401(b)(3), which provides that “[a]ny arbitration

proceedings under this section shall, to the extent consistent

with this subchapter, be conducted in the same manner, subject

to the same limitations, carried out with the same powers . . .

9
and enforced in United States courts as an arbitration

proceeding carried out under [the FAA].”

The difference in the parties’ positions thus presents the

narrow procedural question of whether a party who seeks to

vacate or modify an arbitration award under the MPPAA (1) must

commence an action by filing a complaint or (2) must file an

application by motion under the FAA. We conclude that the MPPAA

requires the former.

The MPPAA provides that after mandatory arbitration

proceedings have been conducted pursuant to § 1401(a), a party

to the arbitration proceeding “may bring an action . . . in an

appropriate United States district court . . . to enforce,

vacate, or modify the arbitrator’s award.” § 1401(b)(2)

(emphasis added). It also provides that the action must be

brought “in accordance with section 1451 of this title,” id.,

which, in turn, requires that “the complaint in any action under

. . . section 1401 of this title shall be served upon the

[Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation] by certified mail,” id.

§ 1451(g) (emphasis added). The plain meaning of these

provisions can only lead to the conclusion that a party seeking

review of an MPPAA arbitration award must do so by commencing a

civil action in a district court by filing a complaint to vacate

or modify the award. While the titles of § 1401(b) and § 1451,

explicitly referring to such review as a “civil action,” are not

10
part of the substantive text, the text in no uncertain terms

refers to a civil action, using the terms “an action” in a

“district court” with respect to which the “complaint” must be

served on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Indeed,

this is the language of most federal statutes providing for

civil actions in a district court.

This reading is confirmed by the statute’s identical

provision for a civil action to collect withdrawal liability

payments where no arbitration is involved. Section 1401(b)(1)

provides that “[i]f no arbitration proceeding has been

initiated . . . , the amounts demanded [for withdrawal

liability] shall be due and owing” and the Plan’s sponsor “may

bring an action . . . for collection.” (Emphasis added). The

parties agree that this provision authorizes collection by means

of a civil action commenced by the filing of a complaint in

court. They can hardly deny that the exact same language used

in § 1401(b)(2) likewise authorizes review of an arbitration

award by means of a civil action commenced by the filing of a

complaint in court. See United States v. Cleveland Indians

Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 213 (2001) (noting the general

presumption that “identical words used in different parts of the

same act are intended to have the same meaning” (quoting Atl.

Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433

(1932)).

11
 Finally, it is no accident that the MPPAA uses the terms of

art “an action,” “civil action,” “in a district court,” and

“complaint,” which are precisely those used by the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure governing civil actions in district courts.

Rule 2 provides that “[t]here is one form of action -- the civil

action,” and Rule 3 provides that “[a] civil action is commenced

by filing a complaint with the [district] court.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 2, 3 (emphasis added).

Moreover, the House Committee Report explaining the MPPAA

leaves little doubt that judicial review authorized by

§ 1401(b)(2) refers to review by a civil action commenced by the

filing of a complaint. In describing enforcement of arbitration

awards under the MPPAA by a “civil action,” the Report states:

In general, the district courts of the United States
have exclusive jurisdiction for civil actions under
the bill without regard to the amount in controversy.
In the case of an action brought by a plan fiduciary
to collect withdrawal liability, State courts of
competent authority are also to have jurisdiction.

* * *

In addition, a copy of the complaint in any action
brought under the bill is to be served on the PBGC by
certified mail. The PBGC may intervene in any action
brought under the bill.

In the case of an action under the bill, the court is
permitted to award to the prevailing party all or a
portion of costs and expenses in connection with the
action, including reasonable attorneys fees.

The period of limitations for the commencement of an
action under the bill is to expire six years after the
date on which the cause of action arose.
12
H.R. Rep. No. 96-869, pt. 2, at 42 (1980), reprinted in 1980

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2993, 3032.

The Penske companies rely exclusively on § 1401(b)(3) in

support of their position. That provision incorporates

generally the FAA procedures for “[a]ny arbitration proceedings”

under the MPPAA, which, they argue, includes the FAA’s

procedures for review of arbitration awards. See 9 U.S.C. § 6.

First, we note that if there were any tension between

subsection (b)(3) (providing for use of FAA procedures for

arbitration proceedings) and subsection (b)(2) (providing for

civil actions to review arbitration awards), subsection (b)(3)

requires that subsection (b)(2) govern, as subsection (b)(3)

expressly limits applicability of the FAA “to the extent

consistent with this subchapter.” § 1401(b)(3). But when the

overall structure of the statute is considered and the statute

is properly construed, there appears to be no such tension.

Subsection (a)(1) requires that disputes over withdrawal

liability be submitted to arbitration; subsection (b)(3)

requires that the “arbitration proceedings” be conducted in

accordance with the procedures set forth in the FAA; and

subsection (b)(2) and § 1451(g) require that review of

arbitration awards be pursued by bringing a civil action in

district court by filing a complaint and serving a copy on the

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Thus, the mechanisms for

13
conducting arbitration proceedings are provided by the FAA and

the mechanisms for review of those proceedings are provided by

the MPPAA and the rules governing civil actions in district

courts, beginning with the commencement of a civil action by the

filing of a complaint.

The conclusion that the MPPAA distinguishes procedures for

arbitration proceedings from procedures for judicial review is

further indicated by the scope of regulations promulgated by the

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation regarding “Arbitration of

Disputes in Multiemployer Plans,” 29 C.F.R. pt. 4221. The

stated purpose of those regulations is to “establish procedures

for arbitration, pursuant to [§ 1401], of withdrawal liability

disputes.” Id. § 4221.1. And in providing the procedures for

arbitration proceedings under the MPPAA, the regulations limit

their scope “to arbitration proceedings initiated pursuant to

[§ 1401]” and then “only to the extent that they are consistent

with this part and adopted by the arbitrator in a particular

proceeding.” Id. The regulations provide procedures for every

stage of such an arbitration proceeding from its “initiation” to

the “award,” id. §§ 4221.3-4221.8, but they provide no

procedure for review of an award except the arbitrator’s

“reconsideration of [an] award,” id. § 4221.9. The absence of

regulations pertaining to judicial review speaks volumes about

the scope of § 1401(b)(3)’s reference to the FAA.

14
 It is therefore not surprising that in MPPAA arbitration

cases, we have noted that the MPPAA “clear[ly]

authoriz[es] . . . judicial review . . . [of] the arbitrator’s

legal rulings,” Republic Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council

No. 83 of Va. Pension Fund, 718 F.2d 628, 641 (4th Cir. 1983)

(emphasis added), and that the judicial review authorized by

§ 1401(b)(2) is much more expansive than the narrow review

authorized by the FAA, see id. (noting that the FAA “prohibits

judicial review of legal or factual disputes voluntarily

submitted to an arbitrator”). While the MPPAA does restrict to

some degree judicial review of an arbitrator’s factual findings,

see § 1401(c) (creating a presumption of correctness of the

arbitrator’s findings of fact), it provides de novo judicial

review of the arbitrator’s legal conclusions, see Trustees of

the Cent. Pension Fund of the Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs

and Participating Emp’rs v. Wolf Crane Serv., Inc., 374 F.3d

1035, 1038 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that “the appropriate

standard of review is clear error for findings of fact [made by

the arbitrator] and de novo for conclusions of law” and

collecting cases of the different courts of appeals so holding,

including our decision in Republic Industries). Indeed, we

explained the overall structure of the MPPAA in BES Services,

where we described precisely the dichotomy of procedures -- FAA

15
procedures for arbitration proceedings and judicial review by

court proceedings in a district court:

Congress did not intend to create a new, broad
category of litigation that would force benefit plans
to spend their assets on court costs and attorneys
fees. Rather, it chose to require arbitration, with
judicial review, to create a more efficient dispute-
resolution process.

* * *

Thus, when there is a dispute concerning the
determination of withdrawal liability, the dispute,
whether over law, facts, or both, is committed in the
first instance to arbitration. And that arbitration
proceeding is conducted as any arbitration would be
conducted under the Federal Arbitration Act.

But unlike the Federal Arbitration Act, the MPPAA
treats an award issuing from such a § 1401 arbitration
like an agency determination -- the arbitrator decides
the issues in the first instance but then the decision
is subject to judicial review.

* * *

Thus, if a party commences an action in federal court
without having first exhausted the mandatory
arbitration process, it will be subject to a failure-
to-exhaust defense.

469 F.3d at 374-75 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

In sum, a party seeking to vacate or modify an arbitrator’s

award under § 1401(b)(2) must commence an action in a district

court by filing a complaint and pursuing that action thereafter

in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

16
 III

The distinction between a civil action commenced by the

filing of a complaint to vacate an arbitration award and an

application to vacate an award by means of a motion is critical

in this case.

The arbitrator’s award was entered on July 13, 2012, and

the Pension Fund commenced this action to challenge the award

within 30 days, as required by § 1401(b)(2), by filing a

complaint in the district court on August 9, 2012. When the

district court granted the Penske companies’ motion to dismiss

for lack of standing, it granted the Pension Fund leave to file

an amended complaint within 21 days, and the Pension Fund

complied with that order, filing an amended complaint on

August 7, 2013. Because that date was far beyond the 30 days

specified by § 1401(b)(2), however, the amended complaint would

be timely only if it related back to the filing date of the

original complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(c).

The district court did not address whether the Pension

Fund’s amended complaint, properly viewed as such, related back;

rather, it concluded that the amended complaint should be

treated as a motion and that a motion “cannot ‘relate back’

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.” Thus, in treating

the Pension Fund’s amended complaint as a motion, the district

17
court created the conditions for the court’s order of dismissal.

First, it dismissed the motion as untimely; and second, it found

the motion deficient because it was not accompanied by a

memorandum setting forth the “reasoning and authorities” for the

motion, as required by Local Rule 105.

Inasmuch as we find that the Pension Fund’s filing of a

complaint was indeed the appropriate procedure by which to

challenge the arbitration award under § 1401(b)(2), we are left

to determine only whether the Pension Fund’s amended complaint

related back to the filing date of the original complaint.

Because the factual circumstances relevant to resolving this

question are not disputed and the relation-back question is

purely legal, we decide it here. See Hill v. Peoplesoft USA,

Inc., 412 F.3d 540, 544 n.* (4th Cir. 2005) (“Although the

district court did not address these arguments, a remand to

address these arguments is unnecessary because the arguments

raise purely legal questions based on facts not in dispute”).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides in pertinent

part:

An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of
the original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts
a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set out -- or attempted to
be set out -- in the original pleading.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). Even with the addition of new

parties, the Rule allows the relation back of amendments so long

18
as the parties have notice of the particular conduct,

transaction, or occurrence at issue. See 6A Charles Alan Wright

et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1498 (3d ed. 2010 &

Supp. 2014).

In this case, the original complaint was brought in the

name of the Pension Fund, by one of its trustees, challenging

the July 13 arbitrator’s award, to which the Pension Fund and

the Penske companies had been the only parties. As with the

original complaint, the amended complaint was again brought in

the name of the Pension Fund, but this time by its Board of

Trustees, comprised of four members. And it again challenged

the same July 13 arbitration award. In short, the Pension Fund

as the named party remained the same; the conduct challenged

remained the same; and the cause of action remained the same.

The only change effectuated by the amended complaint was to note

that the Pension Fund was suing through all four trustees

instead of only one.

Because the substantive allegations in the amended

complaint were identical to those contained in the initial

complaint, the requirements of relation back under Rule 15(c)

clearly apply. See Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 225

(4th Cir. 2014) (“The proposed amended complaint in this case

clearly meets the . . . requirement of . . . Rule 15(c)(1)(B)

. . . because it [does not] alter the underlying causes of

19
action”). Moreover, the Penske companies have identified no

prejudice nor have they identified any information or fact that

they did not know as of the filing date of the original

complaint. Indeed, the Penske companies’ counsel conceded at

oral argument that there was “absolutely no doubt” that the

initial complaint placed the Penske companies on notice of the

claims leveled against them by the Pension Fund.

The Penske companies argue that the second filing was not

really an “amended” complaint at all, but rather the initial

complaint of the only party to have statutory standing to bring

the suit, the Joint Board of Trustees. They reason therefore

that the second filing commenced an entirely new action that

could not “relate back” to anything. This argument is hyper-

technical, carrying no equitable or pragmatic weight. Moreover,

it is inconsistent with the circumstances acted on by the

district court and with the conduct of the parties. The court

stated that “[the] plaintiff” -- identified in the caption of

the court’s order as the Pension Fund -- “may amend the

Complaint provided that the Board of Trustees file[] suit on

behalf of the Fund.” And, in amending its complaint, the

Pension Fund did exactly what the district court instructed it

to do, changing nothing except the reference to the Pension

Fund’s trustees.

20
 Further, as the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 15(c)

observe, the Rule does not expressly treat the relation back of

an amended complaint that changes plaintiffs. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment; see also In

re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 297 (3d Cir. 2010)

(explaining that Rule 15(c) does not expressly contemplate

“amendments changing plaintiffs” because “th[at] problem is

generally easier [than that of amendments changing defendants]”

(second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15

advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment)). Thus, the

amendment at issue does not technically implicate the “chief

consideration of policy” of Rule 15(c). See id. (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment); cf.

Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 618 (4th Cir.

2001) (“[A] court determining whether to grant a motion to amend

to join additional plaintiffs must consider . . . the general

principles of amendment provided by Rule 15(a) . . .” (emphasis

added)). As explained by Professors Wright and Miller:

As long as defendant is fully apprised of a claim
arising from specified conduct and has prepared to
defend the action, defendant’s ability to protect
itself will not be prejudicially affected if a new
plaintiff is added, and defendant should not be
permitted to invoke a limitations defense. This seems
particularly sound inasmuch as the courts will require
the scope of the amended pleading to stay within the
ambit of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth in the original pleading.

21
6A Wright et al., supra, § 1501 (emphasis added) (footnote

omitted). The important fact remains that the amended complaint

concerns the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth

in the original pleading.

We conclude, therefore, that the Pension Fund’s amended

complaint relates back to the filing date of the original

complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).

* * *

For the reasons given, we reverse and remand for further

proceedings as a civil action.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

22