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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-12132
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:13-cr-00103-RH-CAS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL TOWNSEND ANTHONY,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(April 21, 2015)
Before MARTIN, JULIE CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Townsend Anthony appeals his conviction and 188-month sentence,
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imposed after he pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a previously
convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e). Anthony raises
three arguments on appeal. He argues that the district court erred by denying his
motions to suppress evidence and to appoint new counsel. Anthony also argues
that at sentencing, the district court erred by finding that he possessed firearms “in
connection with” a controlled substance offense under United States Sentencing
Guidelines § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A). After careful review, we affirm.
I.
On August 13, 2013, Anthony was stopped by a Tallahassee Police
Department officer because the officer believed that Anthony’s vehicle had an
illegal window tint. After a trained drug-detection dog signaled the presence of a
controlled substance, officers searched Anthony’s vehicle and found crack cocaine,
oxycodone, penicillin, drug paraphernalia, and three loaded firearms. As a result
of this search, and approximately fourteen minutes after Anthony had been
stopped, officers took Anthony into custody and later charged him with possessing
a firearm as a previously-convicted felon.
Before pleading guilty, Anthony moved to suppress the controlled
substances, firearms, and drug paraphernalia, arguing that this evidence was the
fruit of an unlawful search and seizure. The district court denied the motion to
suppress because it found that officers had not prolonged the stop longer than was
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necessary to deal with the traffic violation.
After he pleaded guilty, Anthony also moved for the appointment of new
counsel. He argued that his trial counsel, an attorney from the Federal Public
Defender’s Office, had not adequately represented his interests at the suppression
hearing. Specifically, he believed that his attorney had failed to argue that the
Tallahassee Police Department misrepresented the circumstances of the traffic
stop. The district court denied Anthony’s motion to appoint new counsel.
At sentencing, and over Anthony’s objection, the district court found that
Anthony possessed firearms “in connection with” a controlled substance offense
under USSG § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A), and sentenced him to a within-Guidelines sentence
of 188-months imprisonment. Anthony now appeals both his conviction and
sentence.
II.
We first address Anthony’s argument that the district court erred by denying
his motion to suppress evidence. “Because rulings on motions to suppress involve
mixed questions of fact and law, we review the district court’s factual findings for
clear error, and its application of the law to the facts de novo.” United States v.
Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). The Fourth
Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at
1303. Because traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment, the
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duration of the stop “must be limited to the time necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop.” United States v. Ramirez, 476 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir.
2007) (quotation omitted). The use of a trained drug-detection dog during a traffic
stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the stop is not
“unreasonably prolonged.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407–08, 125 S. Ct.
834, 837 (2005).
We agree with the district court that there was no Fourth Amendment
violation. To begin, because Anthony does not contest the legality of the initial
traffic stop, he must show that he was detained for longer than necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop. See Ramirez, 476 F.3d at 1236–37. According
to computer-aided dispatch (CAD) records produced by the government, the entire
stop—from the time that Anthony was pulled over to the time that he was taken
into custody—lasted for only fourteen minutes. In addition, the police officer that
stopped Anthony was still in the process of checking Anthony’s registration and
had not yet completed the traffic citation when the drug-detection dog signaled the
presence of controlled substances. Therefore, there is no indication that the traffic
stop was unreasonably prolonged.
III.
We turn next to Anthony’s argument that the district court erred by denying
his motion for new counsel. We review the district court’s denial of a motion for
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new counsel for an abuse of discretion, considering “1) the timeliness of the
motion; 2) the adequacy of the court’s inquiry into merits of the motion; and 3)
whether the conflict was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication
between the defendant and his counsel thereby preventing an adequate defense.”
United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1343 (11th Cir. 1997). If we find that
the district court abused its discretion, we then consider whether the defendant was
prejudiced; if not, the error is harmless. Id.
Even assuming that the district court abused its discretion in denying
Anthony’s motion, we find that any error was harmless. At a hearing before the
district court, Anthony explained that he had moved for new counsel solely
because he wanted to supplement the record in an attempt to show that the
Tallahassee Police Department had misrepresented the circumstances of its search
of his vehicle. Although his attorney disagreed with this strategy, Anthony
believed that these additional documents would have caused the district court to
grant his motion to suppress evidence. However, following its hearing on
Anthony’s motion for new counsel, the district court considered these documents
and Anthony’s argument, and nonetheless did not change its ruling on his motion.
For this reason, Anthony cannot show prejudice.
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IV.
Finally, we address Anthony’s argument that the district court erred at
sentencing by finding that he possessed firearms “in connection with” a controlled
substance offense under USSG § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A). We review de novo the district
court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines, but we accept
the court’s fact findings unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Cruz,
713 F.3d 600, 605 (11th Cir. 2013). The district court does not clearly err “where
there are two acceptable views of the evidence.” United States v. Reeves, 742 F.3d
487, 507 (11th Cir. 2014).
Under USSG § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A), a defendant convicted under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g) and 924(e) begins with a base offense level of 34 “if the defendant used
or possessed the firearm or ammunition in connection with either a crime of
violence . . . or a controlled substance offense.” This Court has interpreted the
phrase “in connection with” expansively. For example, in United States v. Young,
115 F.3d 834 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam), we held that § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) can be
applied when a defendant possesses a firearm during the commission of a crime of
violence, even where there is no finding that the firearm served some purpose in
the commission of that crime. Id. at 837–38. Similarly, in United States v.
Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d 82 (11th Cir. 2013), we held that identical language in a
different Guidelines provision is satisfied if “the firearm is in proximity to drugs or
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if the firearm facilitates the drug offense.” Id. at 96 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
In this case, police officers found three loaded firearms in Anthony’s
vehicle, along with drugs and drug paraphernalia. Under this Court’s precedent,
that is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A). The district court
did not clearly err by finding that Anthony possessed a firearm in connection with
a controlled substance offense.
AFFIRMED.
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