13‐3909‐cv
Neroni v. Becker
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
the City of New York, on the 22nd day of April, two thousand fifteen.
PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK,
DENNY CHIN,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
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FREDERICK J. NERONI,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
TATIANA NERONI,
Appellant,
v. 13‐3909
CARL F. BECKER, in his official capacity as
Judge of Surrogateʹs Court and Acting
Supreme Court Justice of Delaware County,
and in his individual capacity, STATE OF
NEW YORK,
Defendants‐Appellees.
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FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLANT: Frederick J. Neroni, pro se, Delhi, New York.
FOR APPELLANT: Tatiana Neroni, pro se, Delhi, New York.
FOR DEFENDANTS‐APPELLEES: Andrew B. Ayers and Denise Ann Hartman,
Assistant Solicitors General, New York State
Office of the Attorney General, Albany, New
York.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York (Sharpe, C.J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff‐appellant Frederick Neroni and his trial counsel, appellant
Tatiana Neroni, both proceeding pro se, appeal from the district courtʹs judgment filed
September 12, 2013, awarding attorneysʹ fees and costs against them, jointly and
severally, in the amount of $6,997.50. In a decision and order filed September 12, 2013,
the district court granted defendantsʹ motion for costs and attorneysʹ fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the courtʹs inherent power. We assume the
partiesʹ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the
issues on appeal.
We review a district courtʹs award of attorneysʹ fees under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 for abuse of discretion. Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 175 (2d Cir. 2012).
This standard ʺtakes on special significance when reviewing fee decisions because the
district court, which is intimately familiar with the nuances of the case, is in a far better
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position to make [such] decisions than is an appellate court, which must work from a
cold record.ʺ Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). ʺWhether a litigant is a ʹprevailing
partyʹʺ under a fee‐shifting provision ʺconstitutes a question of law warranting de novo
review.ʺ Dattner v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 458 F.3d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
Additionally, we review a district courtʹs decision to impose costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 or its inherent authority for abuse of discretion. Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp.,
675 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 2012). We conclude there was no abuse here.1
First, the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over the defendantsʹ
application for attorneysʹ fees. ʺWe have consistently held that ʹ[w]henever a district
court has federal jurisdiction over a case, it retains ancillary jurisdiction after dismissal
to adjudicate collateral matters such as attorneyʹs fees.ʹʺ Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
378 F.3d 220, 225 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Austrian & Ger. Bank Holocaust Litig., 317
F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 2003)). Moreover, ʺnotwithstanding a pending appeal, a district
court retains residual jurisdiction over collateral matters, including claims for attorneysʹ
fees.ʺ Id. Thus, the Neronisʹ argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule
on the defendantsʹ fee application because a judgment and notice of appeal had been
already filed is without merit.
1 Although there were proceedings in this case subsequent to the award of fees and costs,
we see no need to remand. The district court subsequently ruled that abstention was still appropriate
and it did not alter its prior conclusion that the Neronisʹ arguments throughout the case were baseless,
without foundation, and vexatious. A separate panel affirmed the district courtʹs application of Younger
abstention to Neroniʹs claims. See Neroni v. Becker, 595 F. Appʹx 94, 95 (2d Cir. 2015).
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Second, there is no merit to the Neronisʹ assertion that fees were not
appropriate because the case was not decided on the merits. ʺ[D]istrict courts may
award costs after an action is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.ʺ Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990); see also D.A. Osguthorpe Family Pʹship v. ASC
Utah, Inc., 705 F.3d 1223, 1236 (10th Cir. 2013) (ʺ[A] district court may still award
attorneyʹs fees after dismissing the underlying action for lack of subject‐matter
jurisdiction.ʺ). Moreover, the Supreme Court has explained that ʺ[Younger abstention]
does not arise from lack of jurisdiction in the District Court, but from strong policies
counseling against the exercise of such jurisdiction where particular kinds of state
proceedings have already been commenced.ʺ Ohio Civil Rights Commʹn v. Dayton
Christian Schs., 477 U.S. 619, 626 (1986). Thus, the court did not err by considering the
defendantsʹ fee application.
Third, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees and
costs. In civil rights actions, ʺthe court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorneyʹs fee as part of the costs.ʺ 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(b). When the prevailing party is the defendant, attorneysʹ fees may be recovered
if the underlying action was ʺfrivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or . . . the plaintiff
continued to litigate after it clearly became so.ʺ Davidson v. Keenan, 740 F.2d 129, 132 (2d
Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, on de novo review, defendants were
ʺprevailing parties,ʺ and the action was indeed frivolous, unreasonable, and groundless.
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The district court also awarded fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927
and its inherent authority. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, a court may require any attorney
ʺwho so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously . . . to
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneysʹ fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct.ʺ A courtʹs inherent authority permits it to impose costs and
fees against an attorney who has ʺacted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons.ʺ United States v. Intʹl Bhd. of Teamsters, 948 F.2d 1338, 1345 (2d Cir.
1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court found that many of the
arguments advanced by the Neronis lacked factual support and were baseless and
vexatious. Specifically, the court found that the Neronis ʺpursued [the] action in bad
faith,ʺ and that their ʺsubmissions throughout [the case] ha[d] been rife with conjecture,
irrelevant personal accusations, and a blatant disregard for well‐settled legal
principles.ʺ Neroni v. Becker, No. 12‐CV‐1226, 2013 WL 5126004, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12,
2013). These findings were well‐supported by the record, and the district court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions.
Finally, as to the amount of fees and costs, there was no abuse of
discretion. Defendantsʹ principal attorney was an experienced litigator with over 22
years of experience, charged a rate of $225 per hour, and expended 31.1 hours
defending against the action. The award of the modest sum of $6,997.50 was
reasonable. See, e.g., Bergerson v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 652 F.3d 277, 290 (2d
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Cir. 2011) (holding that, in 2011, an award of $210 per hour for an experienced civil
rights attorney in the Northern District of New York was ʺlocated within the range of
permissible decisionsʺ).
We have considered the Neronisʹ remaining arguments and conclude they
are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine OʹHagan Wolfe, Clerk
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